Florida District Courts of Appeal, 1995

Sklar v. Brawley

Sklar v. Brawley
Florida District Courts of Appeal · Decided March 22, 1995 · Schwartz, C.J., and Barkdull and Baskin
651 So. 2d 1314; 1995 WL 119108 (Southern Reporter, Second Series)
Sklar v. Brawley

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Opinion

651 So.2d 1314 (1995)

Olga SKLAR, Appellant,
v.
Ann BRAWLEY, Appellee.

No. 94-640.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

March 22, 1995.

Popper & Popper and Victor K. Rones, for appellant.

Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, Stanley B. Price and Eileen Ball Mahta, for appellee.

Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BARKDULL and BASKIN, JJ.

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.

Because the plaintiff improperly took a default without notice after communicating with opposing counsel, who clearly indicated his intention to defend on the merits, see Ole, Inc. v. Yariv, 566 So.2d 812 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Gulf Maintenance & Supply, Inc. v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 543 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), the default should have been set aside whether or not the answer raised a meritorious defense. Cardet v. Resolution Trust Corp., 563 So.2d 167, 169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); J.A.R., Inc. v. Universal Am. *1315 Realty Corp., 485 So.2d 467 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Chester, Blackburn & Roder, Inc. v. Marchese, 383 So.2d 734, 735 n. 3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).[1]

Reversed.

NOTES

[1] For this reason we express no view as to whether a "meritorious defense" was in fact presented.

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