Daniel Overbey appeals from the final order awarding his former wife attorney’s fees resulting from a modification proceeding filed by Overbey. We find that the trial court abused its discretion because the parties have a substantially equal ability to pay. See Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So.2d 134, 136 (Fla. 1976) (where the parties to a dissolution proceeding are equally able to pay attorney’s fees, it is an abuse of the court’s discretion to *352require one spouse to pay the other’s attorney’s fees); Sizemore v. Sizemore, 487 So.2d 1080, 1081 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (stating that “[w]here the parties depart the marriage in relatively equal economic circumstances, it is error to award attorney’s fees to one party.”) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we reverse.

REVERSED.

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent.

Appellee was forced into court by appellant seeking modification of his divorce judgment. Appellant was unsuccessful and ap-pellee incurred attorney’s fees to protect her rights under the judgment. Although their economic situations are close to equal, appellant does have a greater ability to pay than does appellee. The judge did not abuse his discretion in ordering appellant to pay for appellee’s attorney under the facts of this case. I would affirm.