Florida Department of Revenue ex rel. Barranco v. Barranco
Florida Department of Revenue ex rel. Barranco v. Barranco
Opinion of the Court
The Florida Department of Revenue,
The wife was not entitled to prejudgment interest on the $8,207 judgment for arrearage. Prejudgment interest accrues from the date of the last support payment to the date of the arrearage judgment only where there has been a default. See Ledford v. Leirer, 486 So.2d 42 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Melvin v. Melvin, 391 So.2d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). The father had been making timely support payments since the last judgment for arrearage in 1991, which was $14,-065.
The trial court improperly denied attorney’s fees by evaluating the reasonableness of the fees in determining the right to an award. §§ 409.2567 and 409.2554(11), Fla.Stat. (Supp. 1994). Ability to pay the fees is the only relevant consideration for an award of attorney’s fees under Title IV-D. See Department of Revenue v. Atherley, 659 So.2d 469 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (administrative costs are to be assessed against a nonprevail-ing obligor upon a determination of the non-prevailing obligor’s ability to pay).
By considering the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees in denying an award, the trial court did not reach the issue of the father’s ability to pay them. The court should grant
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded.
. The state agency responsible for administration of the child support enforcement program under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 651 et seq. (1991). § 409.2557, Fla.Stat. (Supp. 1994).
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.