concurring in part, and dissenting in part.

I concur in affirmance as to grounds 1 through 4 and 6 through 9. However, I would affirm as to ground 5 as well. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse as to that ground.

In its entirety, ground 5 of appellant’s motion consists of the allegation that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because “[cjounsel coerced [him] into entering a plea of guilty to crime [sic] where there existed no factual basis to support the plea.” Appellant alleges neither that he is innocent of the offense to wMch he entered his plea of guilty, nor that he pleaded guilty to the wrong offense. Likewise, he does not allege any facts which would support such a conclusion. In the absence of such a demonstration of prejudice, he is not entitled to any relief. State v. Fox, 659 So.2d 1324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (plea will not be set aside based on failure to obtain proper factual predicate absent claim of innocence or plea to wrong charge), review denied, 668 So.2d 602 (Fla. 1996).

Moreover, I believe that appellant’s claim that he was coerced to enter a plea by trial counsel is clearly refuted by the copy of the written, signed, Plea of Guilty and Negotiated Sentence attached to the order denying relief. According to that document, appellant agreed to plead guilty to second-degree murder, and to waive the sentencing guidelines, in return for the state’s agreement not to seek an indictment charging first-degree murder, to drop other charges related to the incident and to cap the potential sentence at 40 years. To the extent relevant, the document also contains the following representations by appellant:

I hereby enter my plea of guilty for the reason that I am guilty. Before entering such plea of guilty, I was advised of the *606nature of the charge against me, ... the possible defenses to the charge and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the charge against me.

I consider this negotiated sentence to be to my advantage, and I have freely and voluntarily entered my plea of guilty. I have not been offered any hope of reward, better treatment, or certain type of sentence to get me to plea [sic] guilty — other than the sentence set forth above — nor have I been threatened, coerced, or intimidated in any way to get me to plead guilty.

Before entering this plea of guilty, my attorney and I have fully discussed all aspects of this case, and he has, to my complete satisfaction, answered all my questions and has fully explained the charge, and I am satisfied with the services he has rendered in this case in my behalf....

My attorney and I have read this statement of my guilty plea together in private, and he has explained all parts hereof to my complete satisfaction and understanding, and before my pleading guilty, the Judge of this Court, in Open Court, read the statement to me and explained it to me, and asked if I understood it and if I wanted to plead guilty and give up these rights. I advised him that I understood it, understood my rights, and wanted to plead guilty to this charge.

I have had sufficient time to consider the charge against me, the possible defenses, the advice of my attorney, the waiver of constitutional rights by entering my plea of guilty, and to reflect upon the consequences of my plea. The Judge of this Court has advised me that I may have additional time to consider all of these matters if I wanted more time for such consideration. I have advised him that I do not need or desire more time and that I wanted to proceed with my guilty plea at this time.

I would affirm the denial of appellant’s motion for postconviction relief as to all grounds raised.

John Randall Hudson appeals the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We affirm, without discussion, the denial of relief as to grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9. However, because the record fails to show conclusively that Hudson is entitled to no relief under ground 5, we reverse.

Hudson executed a written plea form whereby he agreed to enter a plea of guilty to second-degree murder in return for a 40-year sentence. Prior to the plea hearing, he handwrote a letter to the lower court requesting that he be allowed to withdraw his plea. As grounds, he alleged primarily that he did not commit the charged offense and that he was coerced by defense counsel into *605entering Ms plea. The record does not reflect whether the trial court considered the pro se motion. Subsequently, Hudson entered Ms plea and was convicted of second-degree murder and was sentenced to 40 years in prison, with a 3-year minimum mandatory. The record does not contain a transcript of the plea colloquy or the sentencing hearing.

Hudson timély filed the instant motion alleging, under ground 5, that defense counsel coerced him into entering a plea of guilty where there existed no factual basis to support the plea. He also alleged, under a separate ground, that he was improperly sentenced for possession of a firearm where in fact he was not in possession of the firearm employed in the murder. The trial court demed the motion on the basis that the execution of the written plea agreement waived any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172(a) requires that before the court accepts a plea, it must satisfy itself that the plea is voluntary and that a factual basis exists for the plea. We construe Hudson’s allegations as sufficient to raise a question concerning whether defense counsel effectively represented him by advising him to enter a plea under circumstances where, if the allegations are true, there may have existed no factual basis for the plea. See Colding v. State, 638 So.2d 1008 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Although the lower court attached the written plea agreement, this document contains no language addressing the factual basis of the plea and is, therefore, insufficient to support summary demal on the facts of this ease. We find nothing in the record to indicate that the lower court satisfied itself that a factual basis existed for Hudson’s plea. See Baker v. State, 620 So.2d 1122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Gust v. State, 558 So.2d 450 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions either to supplement the attachments to the order of demal with a copy of that portion of the plea colloquy wherein the lower court addressed the factual basis of the plea, and any other record excerpts supporting demal, or to hold an evidentiary hearing on tMs claim for relief.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part, and REMANDED with directions.