Glenn E. Padgett, M.D., appeals a final judgment entered following a jury verdict in favor of appellees, Edward Sims and Barbara Ann Sims, in their medical malpractice action against appellant based upon his alleged misdiagnosis of Mr. Sims’ colon cancer. We find no error and affirm the trial court with respect to all issues raised on appeal. We write only because one of the appealed issues raises a matter of first impression in this district concerning the requirements for an expert witness under section 766.102, Florida Statutes (1995).

Dr. Padgett, a family practice physician in Marianna, Florida, argues that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Howard Able, M.D., as appellees’ expert witness under section 766.102(2), Florida Statutes (1995). Appellant contends that under section 766.102(2)(a)1 Dr. Able, an internal med*358icine physician who practices m Hollywood, Florida and specializes in medical oncology and hematology, was not qualified to render an opinion as to the standard of care for a family practitioner in Marianna. Dr. Pad-gett submits that a similar health care provider who would be qualified to testify against him must be trained and experienced in family practice and practice in a community similar to Marianna.

If section 766.102(2)(a) were the only statutory provision governing this issue, we might agree with appellant’s argument. Regardless of our reading of section 766.102(2)(a), however, Dr. Able clearly qualifies as an expert witness under the more general provisions of section 766.102(2)(c)2. See Green v. Goldberg, 630 So.2d 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Catron v. Roger Bohn, D.C., P.A., 580 So.2d 814 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). In section 766.102(2)(c),2 the legislature has provided that a proposed expert witness who does not qualify as “a similar health care provider” may nevertheless testify as an expert if the witness “possesses sufficient training, experience, and knowledge ... in a related field of medicine, so as to be able to provide such expert testimony as to the prevailing professional standard of care in a given field of medicine.” Here, as in Green, a general practitioner was alleged to have negligently misdiagnosed cancer (colon cancer here, and breast cancer in Green). See Green, 630 So.2d at 608-09. In the instant case, Dr. Padgett was not practicing outside of his family practice discipline and, therefore, was not subject to the oncologist’s standard of care. The central issue here, as in Green, concerns the defendant physician’s misdiagnosis of cancer. Thus, the testimony of a specialist in oncology who is experienced in diagnosing colon cancer is admissible under section 766.102(2)(c)2 as the testimony of a health care provider in a related field of medicine concerning the prevailing professional standard of care applicable to a family practice physician who is treating a patient with the symptoms presented by Mr. Sims in the instant case. Id. at 608-09; see also Catron, 580 So.2d at 821 (Altenbernd, J., concurring).

In affirming this issue based upon our reading of section 766.102(2)(e)2, we find it unnecessary to address whether the final sentence of section 766.102(2)(b)3 should be interpreted to apply to section 766.102(2)(a), an issue thoroughly discussed in Judge Campbell’s majority opinion and Judge Al-tenbernd’s concurring opinion in Catron. See Catron, 580 So.2d at 818 and 580 So.2d at 820-22 (Altenbernd, J., concurring).

AFFIRMED.