James v. State
James v. State
Opinion of the Court
Javion James, a juvenile two weeks shy of his eighteenth birthday, was arrested and subsequently convicted, after trial, of robbery with a firearm, possession of a short barreled rifle, battery on a person 65 years of age or older, and burglary of a structure with an assault. His sole claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress his statement to the police. We affirm.
It is well settled that law enforcement officers must give a suspect appropriate warnings under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) before conducting a custodial interrogation. The officers may then proceed with the questioning only if the suspect has waived the right to remain silent and the right to counsel. A statement made after a waiver of rights can be admitted into evidence, but the burden is on the prosecution to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972). To demonstrate that a waiver of Miranda rights was knowing and voluntary, the evidence must show: (1) that the waiver was a free choice by the suspect, not produced by police intimidation, coercion or deception; and (2) that the waiver was made with a full awareness of the nature and consequences of the rights given up. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). Both issues are determined in the trial court by the totality of the circumstances test. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979). A trial court’s ruling on the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights will not be reversed on appeal unless the ruling is clearly erroneous. Brookins v. State, 704 So.2d 576, 577-78 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
In the record before us, we find no evidence of coercion or improper conduct on the part of the law enforcement officers. We conclude that the evidence supports the trial court’s ruling that James was aware of the nature and consequences of his waiver. Although James was relatively uneducated, the trial court considered his educational level, along with all other circumstances surrounding his statement, in concluding that his statement was voluntarily made.
Finally, we reject James’s claim that his statement was inadmissable because the officers failed to contact his mother. As the supreme court explained in Doerr v. State, 383 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1980), the failure to notify a child’s parent is relevant to the voluntariness of a statement made during police interrogation, but it does not require exclusion of the statement. There is nothing in the record to. suggest that the fact that James’s mother was absent affected the voluntariness of his statement. See also Brookins, 704 So.2d at 578. Rather, the record supports the trial court’s finding that James’s statement was made after a voluntary waiver of his rights. Therefore, we conclude the statement was properly admitted in evi
AFFIRMED.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.