Johnson Construction Management, Inc. v. Lopez
Johnson Construction Management, Inc. v. Lopez
Opinion of the Court
Johnson Construction Management, Inc. appeals a jury verdict in Miguel Lopez’ favor in this personal injury action. Johnson argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant its motion for summary judgment, in thereafter failing to grant its motion for directed verdict, and ultimately in permitting the jury to reach a verdict by means of an impermissible pyramiding of inferences. With no proof from which a jury could base a finding of wrongdoing by this defendant, we agree with the conclusion that the judgment against Johnson must be reversed.
According to Lopez, a United Airlines employee, he was on a coffee break when he noticed a puff of smoke coming from a room located on Concourse F at Miami International Airport (MIA). When he entered the unlocked room (room F1530) to investigate, he was burned by an exploding electrical panel. Lopez subsequently brought suit against Metropolitan Dade County, the owner-operator of the airport, claiming negligent renovation, repair, and construction work in room F1530; negligent inspection of the renovations, repairs and construction performed in room F1530; negligent maintenance of room F1530; and, failure to warn of risk of harm inside the room. He later joined as defendants the owners and operators of two vending machines located outside the room, claiming that they had negligently used jumper cables to connect an electrical outlet needed to power the machines to the high voltage electrical panel which exploded. He also joined as defendants Johnson and its electrical subcontractor, Kinetic Electric, Inc., after the County answered a set of interrogatories stating that these two entities were responsible for locking the door to the room.
Four and one half years after this action was filed, summary judgments were entered in favor of the vending machine owners and operators when it was determined that the machines were powered by a fully functional outlet rather than the outlet “hot wired” to the allegedly exploding electrical panel. Judgment was also entered in favor of Johnson’s electrical subcontractor, Kinetic Electric, upon an undisputed showing that it had no access to, and had performed no work in, room F1530. Johnson likewise sought summary judgment, arguing that neither it nor any of its subcontractors had any connection to the room. The court rejected that argument and the case proceeded to trial against the County and Johnson.
At the start of the trial, Johnson again asserted that it had no connection to room F1530. Lopez argued that certain documents that had been in Johnson’s possession, but had been destroyed, would have established that room F1530 was within the scope of Johnson’s contract. Lopez maintained that as a result of the missing evidence, he should be permitted to argue that the jury could infer Johnson’s “control” of the room. Rejecting Johnson’s claim that it was being “ambush[ed],”
The case proceeded with Lopez asserting that his injuries were caused by a loose connection in a high voltage panel which caused the panel’s circuit breakers to melt and slowly burn, exhausting the oxygen in the room and resulting in a flash explosion when he opened the door.
At the close of the evidence, Johnson moved for a directed verdict. Lopez maintained that circumstantial evidence which showed that electrical work was being done in and around the room proved that Johnson was in control of the room and was obligated to keep the room locked, a duty that Johnson breached when Lopez entered the unlocked room and was injured.
In McCain v. Florida Power Corp., 593 So.2d 500, 503 (Fla. 1992), the Florida Supreme Court held that a legal duty exists if the defendant’s conduct creates a fore
On the facts presented, the trial court could properly conclude that if the jury believed Johnson had done work in the room, Johnson had a duty to lock the door upon exiting. The problem is that there was absolutely no evidence upon which a jury could conclude that this duty was breached. Lopez was injured on a Saturday afternoon approximately twenty four hours after Johnson left the job site.
As to some greater duty to “control” the room, under the facts presented, that was an impossibility, due to the undisputed evidence that numerous keys to the room had been distributed to numerous airport and non airport personnel.
There also was no evidence upon which a jury could conclude Johnson’s actions were the cause of Lopez’ injury. As to this point, we find our analysis in State, Dept. of Envtl. Regulation v. CTL Distrib., Inc., 715 So.2d 262, 263 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), persuasive. In CTL, the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) initiated an enforcement action against seven trucking companies, alleging that the companies had caused the hazardous substance “DOP” to be released into the soil and groundwater of the Culbertson Plastics Company. Evidence indicated that each of the seven trucking companies had made DOP deliveries during the relevant time period. Affidavits of Culbertson employees confirmed that DOP had been spilled from truck hoses during half of the DOP deliveries to the plant. However, with the exception of a bill of lading showing that a spill had occurred from a CTL truck, there was no evidence as to which, if any, of the other six trucking companies had spilled DOP at the plant.
All seven companies moved for summary judgment, CTL on a statute of limitations theory, the other six on the argument that there was no evidence that any of them had spilled DOP. The trial judge granted all of the summary judgment motions. On appeal, we rejected the claim that the case was like Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948), where two hunters negligently discharged their weapons in the direction of the plaintiff who was injured. CTL, 715 So.2d at 264 n. 3. We affirmed the summary judgments in favor of the “other six” trucking companies concluding
Applying CTL’s analysis, the wrongdoing in this case was leaving the door unlocked, not having access to, or some control of, the room. There was no evidence whatsoever as to when the door was left unlocked or by whom. There certainly is no evidence that anyone associated with Johnson left the door unlocked. As we said in CTL, there can be no causation without showing a wrongful or negligent act in the first place.... Without proof of wrongdoing, liability cannot attach.
Accordingly, the directed verdict Johnson sought should have been granted.
. Early in the litigation, interrogatories were propounded asking the County what contractors/subcontractors did electrical work in the room. The County identified Johnson and Kinetic. With contract documents refuting this claim, Johnson served interrogatories asking what witness would testify that Johnson or Kinetic did the work. The County answered "none.”
. We have serious misgivings about this tactic. Cases in which evidence has been de
We also have serious misgivings ás to the propriety of the sanction imposed. The propriety of a sanction imposed for failing to preserve evidence depends on (1) the willfulness or bad faith of the responsible party, (2) the extent of prejudice suffered by the requesting party, and (3) the remedy imposed to cure the prejudice. See Nationwide Lift Trucks, 832 So.2d at 826. In this case, the jury was permitted to infer a fact from missing documents on no more than a showing that Johnson’s documents had been destroyed by the warehouse where they were stored after Johnson went into bankruptcy and failed to pay its bill.
. This theory is contrary to that asserted by Lopez for almost five years against the vending machine owners and operators and to the findings of Miami Dade County's Fire Investigation Report which concluded that “the fire occurrbd due to a short circuit caused when the jumper wires from the open electrical junction box were used to contact the electrical components within the electrical power distribution panel.” In other words, the fire occurred when someone attempted to hot wire the electrical box.
. While some duty to properly place a sign on the room was initially mentioned, the testimony was that there was a sign on the door indicating that it was an electrical room.
. The unrebutted evidence was that except for Johnson's plumbing subcontractor, which was re-routing a sewer pipe the day before Lopez was injured, no Johnson employee had been on this job site for six full days before Lopez was injured.
. The uncontradicted testimony was that Johnson applied for a key to room E2273, a mechanical room located on a different concourse. Although Johnson was told that the key would open a number of rooms, it had no knowledge that the key would also open room F1530.
. Lopez also argues that the jury’s verdict was supported by evidence of "numerous safety violations and negligent acts that caused grievous injury to Mr. Lopez.” The problem with this position is the trial judge's ruling that the issue submitted to the jury was Johnson's "control” of room F1530. Thus, it is to a breach of that duty that Lopez needed to submit evidence. Lopez submitted none. As a matter of law and logic, some control over the room, standing alone, does not support a finding of breach of duty, where dozens of others had keys that would open the door to the same room. Accordingly, permits, drawings, videotapes and pictures, even if supporting the conclusion that Johnson had done work in the room and thus had some control over it, does not change our analysis.
. Any other result would equate to a verdict against Johnson based on nothing more than rank speculation, the exact danger at which the rule against pyramiding inferences was aimed. Voelker v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 73 So.2d 403, 406-7 (Fla. 1954) (observing that the rule providing that an inference may not be drawn from another inference, as opposed to being drawn from an established fact, is designed to protect litigants from verdicts or judgments based on speculation); see also Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Trusell, 131 So.2d 730, 733 (Fla. 1961) (confirming that circumstantial evidence "will not support a jury inference if the evidence is purely speculative and, therefore, inadequate to produce an inference that outweighs all contrary or opposing inferences”); Tranter v. Wible, 191 So.2d 595, 598 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966) (observing "[a] jury's decision must have a rational predicate in the evidence and cannot rest on mere whim, guess work or suspicion”). The exception to this rule is when the first inference is inescapable, that is, when "no contrary reasonable inference may be indulged,” another may be drawn from it. Voelker, 73 So.2d at 407; Nielsen v. City of Sarasota, 117 So.2d 731, 733 (Fla. 1960) ("if a party to a civil action depends upon the inferences to be drawn from circumstantial evidence as proof of one fact, it cannot construct a further inference upon the initial inference in order to establish a further fact unless it can be found that the original, basic inference was established to the exclusion of all other reasonable inferences”); Green House, Inc. v. Thiermann, 288 So.2d 566, 568 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) (a second inference cannot be superimposed upon a prior inference where the prior inference "was not established to the exclusion of all other reasonable inferences”).
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.