(concurring).

I concur with the decision to deny the City of Miami Beach’s (the “City”) petition for writ of certiorari. Developer Micky Biss (“Biss”) began construction on a building in 2001. A dispute with the City’s *882Planning Department and Historic Preservation Board led Biss to file suit in circuit court. Biss immediately informed the City’s Building Director that the suit would prevent construction from continuing, and asked whether the suit would toll the building permit. The City’s Building Director confirmed in writing that the litigation would toll Biss’ building permit. The City later changed its mind and argued that Biss’ suit did not toll the building permit under the building code, and that the permit had expired. Because the City agreed at the commencement of litigation that Biss’ suit tolled the building permit, they are not now entitled to this extraordinary writ. I thus concur in the denial of the petition.

In the exercise of our discretion, certio-rari is denied.

(dissenting).

This case involves an “interpretation” of a provision of the South Florida Building Code which deals generally with the requirement that if work does not proceed under a duly-issued building permit within a specified time, the permit will lapse. Section 304.3(f) states, however:

Work shall be considered to have commenced and be in active progress when, in the opinion of the Building Official, a full complement of workmen and equipment is present at the site to diligently incorporate materials and equipment into the structure throughout the day on each full working day, weather permitting. This provision shall not be applicable in case of civil commotion or strike or when the building work is halted due to legal action. (Emphasis added).

The obvious purpose of the emphasized language is to keep the permit in effect when work is prevented by some adverse legal action. 101A C.J.S. Zoning and Land Planning § 287 (2005). In the decision now before us, however, the Miami-Dade County Board of Rules and Appeals made, and a three-judge panel of the appellate division of the circuit court without opinion approved, the astonishing finding that the permittee’s own circuit court action seeking declaratory relief concerning the permit acted as a stay. This conclusion, which means that the permit may be held in limbo forever — so long as the holder comes up with successive filing fees to maintain successive actions against the City — is, I believe, so plainly absurd1 as to invoke the stomach-turning exception to the rule which disfavors second-tier review. Escobar v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 898 So.2d 952 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005); United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Total Rehab & Med. Ctr., 870 So.2d 866 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)(en banc). I would grant review and quash the rulings below.