Jiles v. State
Cases that cite this one
7 later published cases cite this decision.
- Avery Corbitt v. State (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)
- Ryan v. State (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)
- Alvin Davis v. State of Florida (Fla. 2021)
- Carl Lewis Burns v. State of Florida (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018)
- Allen v. State (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)
- Robinson v. State (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)
- Jackson v. State (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
Kevin A. Jiles appeals his convictions and sentences for burglary of a dwelling with a firearm, false impi-isonment with a firearm and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. We find no revei-sible error relating to Jiles’ trial, and affirm the convictions without elaboration. However, we agree with Jiles that the sentencing record reflects a consideration by the court of improper sentencing factors. Specifically, after Jiles maintained his innocence at trial and dui-ing sentencing, the judge ci-edited a co-defendant for “accepting] responsibility for what he did and ... [being] willing to take the hit for what he did without going through the process.” By contrast, the judge noted that Jiles did not “accept x-esponsibility” but “denied [his] involvement.” These are improper sentencing considerations. See, e.g., Hannum v. State, 13 So.3d 132, 135-36 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (holding trial court’s improper considei-ation during sentencing of fact that defendant maintained his innocence at trial and at sentencing and refused to take responsibility for his actions was equivalent to a denial of due process and thus constituted fundamental error); Bracero v. State, 10 So.3d 664, 665-66 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (holding that consideration of claim of innocence as a factor in determining sentences violated defendant’s due process rights); Soto v. State, 874 So.2d 1215, 1216 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (holding that defendant’s protestation of innocence and unwillingness to admit guilt were impex-missi-ble considerations for sentencing, and that a trial court’s statements indicating consideration of those factors required reversal for resentencing before another judge).
*1217 Accordingly, we reverse the sentences and remand with directions that Jiles be resentenced before a different judge.
CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCES REVERSED; REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.