Ruble v. Rinker Material Corp.

Florida District Courts of Appeal
Ruble v. Rinker Material Corp., 59 So. 3d 137 (2011)
2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 1019; 2011 WL 409015
Emas, Lagoa, Wells

Ruble v. Rinker Material Corp.

Opinion of the Court

WELLS, Judge.

Affirmed. See § 768.20, Fla. Stat. (2010) (providing that “[w]hen a personal injury to the decedent results in death, no action for the personal injury shall survive, and any such action pending at the time of death shall abate”); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.260(a)(1) (stating that the court may order substitution of the proper parties “[i]f a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished”); Capone v. Philip Morris U.S.A. Inc., 56 So.3d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (“The original complaint for personal injury could not be amended, on [the plaintiff’s] death, to include a new wrongful death claim because Florida law establishes that a personal injury claim is extin*138guished upon the death of the plaintiff, and any surviving claim must be brought as a new and separate wrongful death action-it cannot be brought as an amendment to a personal injury action.” See Martin v. United Security Servs., Inc. 314 So.2d 765, 770 (Fla. 1975) (upholding section 768.20, and explaining that, “a separate lawsuit for death-resulting personal injuries cannot be brought as a survival action”); ACandS, Inc. v. Redd, 703 So.2d 492, 494 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (plaintiffs personal injury action is extinguished and abated even when the plaintiffs death occurs during the trial of his/her case); Niemi [v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 862 So.2d 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)], (“holding that, when death is the result of a personal injury, the law of Florida essentially substitutes a statutory wrongful death action for the personal injury action that would otherwise survive under section 46.021).”) (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).

Reference

Full Case Name
Joan RUBLE, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Lance Ruble v. RINKER MATERIAL CORPORATION
Cited By
3 cases
Status
Published