ON MOTION FOR REHEARING AND MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION

We deny the motion for rehearing but grant the motion for certification. Pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v), we certify the following to be a question of great public importance:

Where the presiding judge in a criminal case has accepted the prosecutor assigned to the case as a Facebook “Mend,” would a reasonably prudent person fear that he could not get a fair and impartial trial, so that the defendant’s motion for disqualification should be granted?

GROSS, J. concurs specially with opinion.

concurring specially.

I concur in the certification of the question because I recognize that the ability to participate in social media is of great importance to many and there are disagreements between reasonable persons about the way that a judge may take part in social media sites such as Facebook. I also concur in the denial of the motion for rehearing because I believe the case was correctly decided.

Judges do not have the unfettered social freedom of teenagers. Central to the public’s confidence in the courts is the belief that fair decisions are rendered by an impartial tribunal. Maintenance of the appearance of impartiality requires the avoidance of entanglements and relationships that compromise that appearance. Unlike face to face social interaction, an electronic blip on a social media site can become eternal in the electronic ether of the internet. Posts on a Facebook page might be of a type that a judge should not consider in a given case. The existence of a judge’s Facebook page might exert pressure on lawyers or litigants to take direct or indirect action to curry favor with the judge. As we recognized in the panel opinion, a person who accepts the responsibility of being a judge must also accept limitations on personal freedom.

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur in the majority’s denial of the state’s motion for rehearing. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s granting of the state’s motion for certification of a question of great public importance.

The majority does not provide its reasoning for its conclusion that the certified question is one of great public importance. The only reasoning for its conclusion appears to be stated in the concurring opinion. I disagree with the concurring opinion’s reasoning.

The concurring opinion reasons that the ability of judges to participate in social media with attorneys who appear before them “is of great importance to many.” However, the concurring opinion does not cite any authority for that statement. On the contrary, as the concurring opinion recognizes, common sense suggests that the public, without question, would appear to desire otherwise: “Maintenance of the appearance of impartiality requires the avoidance of entanglements and relationships that compromise that appearance ... [A] person who accepts the responsibility of being a judge must also accept limitations on personal freedom.”

*180Our original panel opinion, Domville v. State, 103 So.3d 184 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), addressed the narrow issue which has led to the certified question. We concluded that, where the presiding judge in a criminal case had accepted the prosecutor assigned to the case as a Facebook “friend,” a reasonably prudent defendant would fear that he or she could not receive a fair and impartial trial, so that the defendant’s motion for disqualification should be granted. The occurrence of those facts in this case appears to be an isolated event, and understandably so. I see no basis to certify a question of great public importance.1