Robert Brown appeals his conviction and sentence for trafficking in cocaine, asserting as error the State’s cross-examination of Brown at trial and later closing argument, questioning why he waited until trial — four years after the date of the crime — to divulge the name of the alleged actual , owner of the contraband. Because Brown invoked his.right to remain silqnt, pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 1 when he was arrested at the scene of the crime and never waived that right during the ensuing four years, we find, as the State has admirably conceded, that the prosecution’s questioning and argument were in error arid shifted the burden of proof to Brown to prove his innocence: See State v. Smith, 573 So.2d 306, 317 (Fla. 1990) (“Our cases have made clear that courts must prohibit all evidence or argument that is fairly susceptible of being interpreted by the jury as a comment on the right of silence.”); see also, U.S. Corist. amend. V (“No Person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself’); Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. (“No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness • against oneself.”). We note that in this regard, we have considered the State’s harmless error argument and are unable to conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986).

Reverséd and remanded for a new trial.