Julius Junior Crusaw appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion for post-conviction relief. We reject all claims but one. Because we are bound by the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Cooper, 634 So.2d 1074 (Fla. 1994), we conclude that double jeopardy principles barred Crusaw’s conviction for careless driving with a suspended license resulting in death or serious bodily injury.

Crusaw was convicted of several crimes, all relating to an automobile accident that killed one and injured another. Relevant here, Crusaw was convicted of vehicular homicide (Count III) and careless driving with suspended license causing death or great bodily injury (Count IV). The information listed the same victim for both counts.

In Cooper, the Court held that a defendant convicted of DUI manslaughter could not also be convicted of careless driving without a license causing death or serious *423 bodily injury “because he has already been punished for the death by the DUI manslaughter conviction.” Id. at 1075; see also Kelly v. State, 987 So.2d 1237, 1239-40 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

Cooper controls here. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of Crusaw’s motion, and we remand for the trial court to vacate the conviction for careless driving with a suspended license resulting in death or serious bodily injury and to resentence accordingly.

REVERSED and REMANDED with directions.