Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed July 2, 2025.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________ No. 3D24-1862 Lower Tribunal No. F01-21587B ________________

Javarus Morgan, Appellant, vs. The State of Florida, Appellee.

An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Laura Shearon Cruz, Judge.

Javarus Morgan, in proper person.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Linda Katz, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before EMAS, FERNANDEZ and BOKOR, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Henry v. State, 948 So. 2d 609, 621 (Fla. 2006) (“Strickland requires defendants to show ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ . . . [A] ‘reasonable probability’ is a ‘probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984))); see also Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975, 996 (Fla. 2009) (“The Court need not reach both Strickland prongs in every case. ‘[W]hen a defendant fails to make a showing as to one prong, it is not necessary to delve into whether he has made a showing as to the other prong.’” (quoting Preston v. State, 970 So. 2d 789, 803 (Fla. 2007))); State v. Larzelere, 979 So. 2d 195, 211 (Fla. 2008) (“Larzelere has not shown counsel to be ineffective for not calling a concrete expert because she had not demonstrated what an individual qualified as a concrete expert would have testified to in this case or how such testimony would cast doubt on her guilt.”); Connor v. State, 979 So. 2d 852, 863 (Fla. 2007) (“Relief on ineffective assistance of counsel claims must be based on more than speculation and conjecture.”).