MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This is an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First and Fourteenth Amend­ments to the United'States Constitution in which the Plaintiffs claim that their rights under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment have been violated by the De­fendants. Specifically, the claim is that the Defendant school authorities have adopted a policy that permits prayer at graduation ex­ercises in the public high schools of Duval County, Florida, and that such policy violates the First Amendment prohibition against the *448 establishment of religion by the state. 1

The Plaintiffs constitute a group of gradu­ating seniors and a parent of a graduating senior who brought this action in early June, 1993, to enjoin the Duval County Public School District from permitting religious in­vocations and benedictions at the 1993 pubhc high school graduation ceremonies. The Plaintiffs also sought declaratory rehef and damages. Another group of students was granted leave to intervene as Defendants, opposing the Plaintiffs’ claims and asserting their own First Amendment right of free speech at graduation ceremonies.

On June 4, 1993, after a hearing in open court, I orally denied the Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunctive rehef, finding that the Plaintiffs had failed to sustain their bur­den of demonstrating a substantial likelihood of success on the merits (Doc. 18). 2 A re­newed motion for injunctive rehef was also denied by written order entered the follow­ing week (Doe. 32), and the 1993 graduation ceremonies at the seventeen high schools within the Duval County school district were conducted under the School Board’s pohcy which is the subject of the constitutional challenge made in this litigation. The case then proceeded through the discovery stage and is presently before the Court on the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Upon due consideration-, I have determined that there is no genuine issue of material fact, that the case can be decided on the existing record as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 56, and that the Defendants are entitled to prevail on the constitutional issues presented. 3 It follows, for the reasons ex­plained below, that the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment will be denied, the De­fendants’ motion and that of the Intervenors will be granted, and final judgment will be entered accordingly.

BACKGROUND

Shortly after the Duval County high school graduation ceremonies in early summer, 1992, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Lee v. Weisman, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992), holding that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment is violated whenever school officials, as state actors, plan for and arrange the making of religious albeit “non­sectarian” prayer in the form of invocations and benedictions at high school graduation exercises. In response to that decision, Vicki R. Reynolds, the Duval County School Board’s legal liaison, at the direction of Lar­ry Zenke, Superintendent of Schools for the Duval County public schools, wrote a memo­randum to all school principals in the county saying that “due to the recent Supreme Court Ruling in Lee v. Weisman, there should be no prayer, benediction, or invoca­tion at any graduation ceremonies.” Deposi­tion of Larry Zenke, at 7-8 and at Exhibit 1. Thereafter, Superintendent Zenke received a number of letters suggesting that student-­initiated and student-led prayer might be constitutional. Deposition of Larry Zenke, at 8-9. Accordingly, he directed Ms. Reyn­olds to further research the issue. Id. She later advised Superintendent Zenke that it would be appropriate for principals to allow student-initiated and student-led prayer dur­ing the graduation ceremony so long as the administration and faculty were not involved in the decision making process. Id. at 10-11. Accordingly, and again pursuant to Superin­ *449 tendent Zenke’s direction, Ms. Reynolds is­sued to all high school principals another memorandum dated May 5, 1993, entitled “Graduation Prayers” stating:

You will recall that after the 1992 Su­preme court case of Lee v. Wiseman [sic], you received a memorandum from me in­structing that because of the decision, we would no longer be able to have prayers at graduation ceremonies. Most of you have recently been bombarded with information, as have I, regarding whether or not stu­dent initiated and led prayers are accept­able based upon a recent Fifth Circuit opinion. The purpose of this memorán-­dum is to give you some guidelines on this issue if the graduating students at your school desire to have some type of brief opening and/or closing message by a stu­dent.

This area of the law is far from clear, at this time, and we have been threatened by lawsuits from both sides on the issue de­pending on what action we take. The key to the Lee v. Wiseman [sic] decision was that the prayer given at that graduation ceremony was directed and initiated by the school system, which made it unconstitu­tional, rather than by permissive student choice, and initiative. With that premise in mind, the following guidelines may be of some assistance:

1. The use of a brief opening and/or closing message, not to exceed two min­utes, at high school graduation exercises shall rest within the discretion of the graduating senior class;

2. The opening .and/or closing message shall be given by a student volunteer, in the graduating senior class, chosen by the graduating senior class as a whole;

3. If the graduating senior class choos­es to use an opening and/or closing mes­sage, the content of that message shall be prepared by the student volunteer and shall not be monitored or otherwise reviewed by Duval County School Board [sic], its officers or employees;

The purpose of these guidelines is to allow the students to direct their own graduation message without monitoring or review by school officials.

Deposition of Larry Zenke, at Exhibit 3.

At a subsequent School Board meeting held on June 1, 1993, a motion was made to substitute a “moment of silence” for any student initiated messages that might other­wise be given pursuant to the guidelines or policy announced in Ms. Reynolds’ memoran­dum of May 5. That motion failed by a vote of four to three; and, thus, while the Reyn­olds’ memorandum of May 5 was not itself the subject of any specific vote by the Board, that memorandum was left in force with the acquiescence or tacit approval of the Board as its’ official policy governing the 1993 com­mencement exercises. Moreover, it remains in effect and, unless altered by Defendants or enjoined by this Court, will govern the ap­proaching ceremonies in 1994 as well.

With respect to the 1993 ceremonies con­ducted after this Court declined to enjoin implementation of the May 5 memorandum, the high school principals, in accordance with the guidelines established in the memoran­dum, delegated decision making authority to graduating senior students at each school, respectively, to determine whether student messages should, be given at the opening and/or closing of the graduation exercises. 4 At ten of the seventeen high schools, it is undisputed that the students opted for mes­sages that constituted various forms of reli­gious prayer. At the remaining .seven schools, however, it appears that either no messages were given at all, or that any that *450 were given were entirely secular, having no religious aspects.

THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

Plaintiffs move for summary judgment and argue that prayer during public school grad­uation ceremonies is per se unconstitutional regardless of the manner in which the deci­sion to have prayer is made and how or by whom the prayer is presented. Plaintiffs argue that the primary purpose of the guide­lines in the Reynolds’ memorandum of May 5 was to advance religion. Plaintiffs also ar­gue that delegating to the students the deci­sion whether prayers are to be included in graduation exercises does not insulate Defen­dants from being “excessively entangled” with the religious aspect of the graduation ceremony.

Defendants also move for summary judg­ment and argue that the policy guidelines set out in the May 5 memorandum had a secular purpose; that any prayers delivered were student-initiated, student-written and stu­dent-delivered without monitoring or review by school officials; and therefore, the policy as implemented lacked the pervasive govern­ment involvement condemned in Lee and in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). Defendants contend that the purpose of the guidelines was to provide direction to school principals concerning graduation messages without ad­vancing or inhibiting religion in any official sense condemned by the Establishment Clause, and that allowing the students to decide whether and what type of speech to have at graduation does not excessively en­tangle the state with religion. Defendants and the Intervenors further assert the stu­dents’ constitutionally protected right to freedom of expression at public high school graduations.

DISCUSSION

The First Amendment’s mandate that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’ applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). Pursu­ant to the Establishment Clause, the govern­ment may not aid one religion, aid all reli­gions or favor one religion over another. Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 15, 67 S.Ct. 504, 511, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947). For the last twenty years, the United States Supreme Court has accomplished the often excruciating task of keeping government and religion apart by resorting to the three-pronged test set out in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). “First, the statute [or policy] must have a secular legis­lative purpose; second, its principal or pri­mary effect must be one that neither ad­vances nor inhibits religion; finally, the stat­ute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ ” Id. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. at 2111-12 (citations omitted). Fail­ure to meet any one of these tests requires that the challenged statute or policy be stricken as violative of the Establishment Clause.

Last term, however, in deciding Lee v. Weisman, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2649 (1992), the Supreme Court did not engage in a Leman analysis. Rather, the Supreme Court pursued a fact-sensitive “coercion” analysis. Id. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2660. The Court stated that it need not reconsider Lemon because of controlling precedents concerning prayer and religious exercise in primary and secondary schools pointing the way to resolution of the case before it with­out applying the Lemon test. Id. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2655. 5 The Supreme Court’s failure to apply Lemon has led some courts to speculate on the stability of Lemon after Lee. See, e.g., Sherman v. Community Con­sol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437, 445 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2439, 124 L.Ed.2d 658 (1993). In Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, however, the Court spe­cifically declared that Lemon “has not been overruled.” — U.S. -, - n. 7, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 2148 n. 7,124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993). *451 See also Chabad-Lubavitch of Georgia v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383, 1388 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc). Accordingly, it is appropriate to en­gage in both a Lemon analysis and to apply the “coercion” test of Lee.

A. LEMON APPLICATION

1. Secular Purpose

The Plaintiffs contend that the true purpose of the Reynold’s memorandum of May 5 was to preserve and perpetuate pray­er during graduation exercises. They con-' tend that the guidelines set out in the memo­randum were prepared and distributed only after pressure was brought to bear upon Superintendent Zenke and Ms. Reynolds to promulgate a policy accommodating prayer. They point especially to a letter to Ms. Reyn­olds from the pastor of the First Baptist Church stating that he is “ ‘fish’[ing] for ways to incorporate prayer in our graduation cere­monies.” March 3,1993 letter from Calvin J. Carr to Vicky Reynolds, Deposition of Vicky Reynolds, Doc. 103, at Exhibit 1. The Plain­tiffs also point to statements made by three of the Defendants as members of the School Board at the meeting held on June 1, 1993, when the possible alternative of a moment of silence was rejected by a vote of the Board. 6

The Defendants and the Intervenors con­tend, on the other hand, that the policy or guidelines announced in the May 5 memoran­dum had a primary secular purpose—name­ly, to safeguard the free speech rights of the participating students by permitting them, through a chosen representative of their own, to solemnize the occasion as a culminating educational experience (unlike periodic ath­letic events or student assemblies) by having a brief message at the beginning and/or the end of the program acknowledging and draw­ing attention to the unique, milestone nature of the event.

It is here that a potential issue of fact enters into the case if, in making an analysis under Lemon, the purpose of the policy is to be determined on the basis of the subjective motivations or intentions of the policy mak­ers rather than the language of the policy itself, the historical setting in which it was conceived, and the manner in which it has been interpreted and applied. In this in­stance, however, I do not believe that any material fact issue exists.

First, especially where the law or pol­icy under review is the result of an institu­tional process, such as a vote of a multi-­member legislature, council or board rather than action taken by an individual decision maker, the purpose of the disputed law or policy should normally be discerned from the plain meaning of the words used; the official legislative history, if any; the manner in which the law or policy has been interpreted and applied (if such demonstrable experience is available); and, lastly, the general social condition or historical background which led up to the adoption of the law or policy. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566-68, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 2461, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991); Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 8, 23, 11 L.Ed. 469 (1845); Church of Scientology v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1527 (11th Cir. 1993). The individual, and quite possibly varied, purposes or inten­tions of the several operative decision mak­ers, especially when those views are known only with respect to less than a majority of those voting or deciding, would have little or no probative value.

So, here, to the. extent that the School Board was the institutional policy maker (rather than Superintendent Zenke and/or Ms. Reynolds) the purposes or intentions of the members of the Board are unknown. No debate was had and no vote was taken on the Reynolds memorandum of May 5. The dis­cussion pointed to by the Plaintiffs had to do with an alternative proposal—the “moment of silence”—and the views that were ex­pressed were those of three of the members, less than a majority. Furthermore, of those three, only one clearly expressed a prefer­ence for the retention of prayer as a board sanctioned activity. 7 In the circumstances of *452 this ease, therefore, at least as far as the motivation or intent of the Board itself is concerned, I do not believe that there is any material dispute. The motivation or intent of the Board relative to the Reynolds memo­randum of May 5 is essentially unknown; or, to the extent that the general views of three of the members were disclosed in public de­bate about a “moment of silence” (rather than the policy in dispute), that evidence is so attenuated as to have no probative value. 8

Secondly, even if the Court should consider the individual motives or intentions of Super­intendent Zenke and Ms. Reynolds, taking the sum of the evidence pointed to by the Plaintiffs together with the inferences to be drawn from that evidence, all in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs’ position in the case, the most that can be said is that Super­intendent Zenke and Ms. Reynolds had a mixed motive or purpose: (a) to permit secu­lar “graduation messages” by the students as a solemnization of the ceremony in lieu of the historical invocations and benedictions led by clergy; (b) to accommodate prayer or reli­gious content in such student driven “gradua­tion messages” if the students, independently of any involvement by school authorities, de­cided upon that course in the exercise of their own First Amendment right of free speech; or (c) to have neither secular mes­sages of solemnization nor religious prayer if the students preferred that mode. There is, therefore, no material dispute of fact con­cerning those motives; and, as can now be demonstrated as a matter of law, those mo­tives are predominantly secular in nature for the purpose of the first prong of the Lemon test (requiring a secular governmental objec­tive in enacting the law or policy in dispute).

While this case has been pending, the United States Court of Appeals for the Elev­enth Circuit has rendered an important en banc decision concerning the Establishment Clause, the Lemon test, and the interrela­tionship of the Establishment Clause and the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Chabad-Lubavitch of Georgia v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc). There the court considered the constitutionality of a refusal by the state of Georgia to permit display in the capital rotunda of a Chanukah menorah. The state contended that if it allowed the display it would violate the Es­tablishment Clause, while the plaintiff assert­ed that no Establishment Clause violation would occur and that it had a First Amend­ment right of free speech to exhibit the display. The court began unraveling this constitutional puzzle by applying the Lemon test to decide whether the Establishment Clause would be violated if the state allowed exhibition of the menorah in the capital ro­tunda. The court held:

Georgia would not violate the first prong of the [Lemon ] test because its neutral treat­ *453 ment of Chabad’s display would advance the secular purpose of providing an arena for its citizenry’s exercise of the constitu­tional right to free speech. See Widmar [v. Vincent ], 454 U.S. at 271, 102 S.Ct. at 275 [70 L.Ed.2d 440] [ (1981) ] (noting with approval that the district and appellate courts held that “an open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against reli­gious speech, would have a secular purpose”); cf . Lynch [v. Donnelly ], 465 U.S. at 680, 104 S.Ct. at 1362 [79 L.Ed.2d 604] [ (1984) ] (“The Court has invalidated legis­lation or governmental action on the ground that a secular purpose was lacking, but only when it has concluded there was no question that the statute or activity was motivated wholly by religious consider­ations”).

5 F.3d at 1389 (emphasis supplied). So, in this case, even though allowance of student-­initiated and student-delivered messages may result in the giving of prayer in some gradua­tion. exercises, that does not equate with a finding that the policy announced in the Reynolds’ memorandum of May 5 was in­tended to promote religion. On the contrary, it’s purpose was secular—to retain, < if the graduating students so desired, the giving of messages to solemnize the occasion and to observe and protect the right of free speech of the students giving such messages. “[A] policy of treating religious speech the. same as all other speech certainly serves a secular purpose.” Americans United For Separa­tion of Church and State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1543 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc).

2. Primary Effect

Plaintiffs next argue that the guide­lines in the Reynolds’ memorandum of May 5 have the primary effect of an advancement of religion by the state. They contend that allowing any prayer at a school sponsored event controlled by school officials leads to the inescapable conclusion that the school officials endorse and are advancing the estab­lishment of religion in contravention of Lem­on’s second proscription.

Defendants and Intervenors contend, on the other hand, that the guidelines merely provide a mechanism whereby the students have the opportunity to decide whether or not to have a “graduation message” during commencement exercises, which constitute a limited public forum. The guidelines do not mandate, require, or direct that religious ex­pression or prayer occur at any graduation ceremony. Indeed, the students may opt not to have a message at all or they may opt for a purely secular message. Accordingly, De­fendants argue, the School Board itself has not advanced religion in any way, officially or otherwise.

Determining the primary effect of the guidelines in Reynold’s May 5 memorandum is not particularly difficult. While, to be sure, the constitutionality of prayer at gradu­ation ceremonies is the issue that prompted the issuance of the guidelines, the guidelines themselves are entirely neutral on the sub­ject of prayer. The word is never men­tioned, nor is there any inference, subtle or otherwise, that the students should opt for prayer in preference to a secular message or no message at all. Moreover, the neutrality of the guidelines in the understanding of those most affected by them was clearly demonstrated in the results they produced in 1993. While ten of the schools elected to have some form of prayer, as many as seven did not. 9 And finally, even in those schools having prayer, it was necessarily understood by all of the graduating.students (even those opposed to it) that the prayer was the volun­tary election of the students themselves— since they voted on the issue—and was not the result of any governmental policy or deci­sion by the school authorities, i.e., was not the result of any “establishment” activity on *454 the part of the state within the meaning of the First Amendment.

Lemon only condemns government action that has the primary effect of advancing religion. 403 U.S. at 612, 91 S.Ct. at 2111. In summary, the guidelines in Reynolds’ May 5 memorandum lack that primary effect in two distinct senses. First, unlike the display of the menorah in Chabad-Lubavitch of Georgia, which would always involve reli­gious connotations, this is a stronger case for the Defendants because implementation of the guidelines may or may not result in prayer at all. There is no suggestion or incentive one way or the other, and the lone occasion on which the guidelines have been applied to date produced divided results. Secondly, even when prayer was given, it was not as a result of any creative or authoritari­an “establishment” activity on the part of school authorities, and this was necessarily understood by those in attendance. “[T]o have forbidden ‘effects’ under Lemon, it must be fair to say that the government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence.” Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 2869, 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987). That would not be fair to say in this case.

There is another reason here that the challenged policy would not have the primary effect of advancing religion. It lies in the fact that the public high school graduation ceremonies conducted by the Defendants are limited public fora within the meaning of the First Amendment’s free speech jurispru­dence. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Lo­cal Educator’s Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46, 103 S.Ct. 948, 954-55, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983), and Crowder v. Housing Auth. of City of Atlanta, 990 F.2d 586, 590-91 (11th Cir. 1993). Tradi­tionally, the ceremonies are held at the coli­seum, away from the school campuses, and virtually the entire program is given over to public speech making by the valedictorian and other leaders of the graduating class, and by community leaders who are invited to give the principal commencement address. 10 In this instance, for example, the featured speaker at one of the graduation exercises in 1993 was none other than Chief Judge Ger­ald Bard Tjoflat of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Deposi­tion of Don Buckley, Doc. 93, at 93, lines 11-­13. The speaker at another was the Honor­able Tillie Fowler, United States House of Representatives, Fourth District of Florida. Deposition of Dalton Epting, Doc. 95, at Ex­hibit 2. I have no difficulty concluding, therefore, that the Duval County public school graduation ceremonies are designated, limited public fora. See Brady v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1120 (3d Cir. 1992). With that decided, Chabad-Lubavitch of Georgia once again governs the outcome:

The analysis that courts must bring to bear on the interplay between the Free Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause in the public forum context is some­what curious in that the existence of the public forum initially implicates the Free Speech issue and ultimately determines the Establishment Clause issue. Once the state creates a public forum, it may only exclude a private party’s religious speech within the forum—a content-based restric­tion on speech—if the exclusion survives strict scrutiny review, that is, if the restric­tion is narrowly tailored to serve a compel­ling state interest.

In those public fora eases, the state—as it has here—will interpose as a compelling state interest the need to avoid a violation of the Establishment Clause and will argue that permitting the religious speech may send a constitutionally impermissible mes­sage of state endorsement. This might be true if the private party communicated the religious speech on government property that was not a true public forum. Precise­ly because the religious speech is commu­nicated in a true public forum, however, *455 the state, by definition, neither endorses nor disapproves of the speech.

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Any perceived endorsement of religion in a true public forum is simply mispercep­tion; the Establishment Clause is not, in fact, violated. Doe [v. Small], 964 F.2d [611, 629 (7th Cir. 1992) ] (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“[Rjeligious speech may not be excluded from public forums just be­cause passersby misunderstand the public role.”).

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Giving full effect to the public forum doctrine does not elevate the Free Speech Clause above the Establishment Clause. The central Establishment Clause inqui­ry—whether Georgia endorses Judaism by permitting Chabad to display its menorah in the Rotunda—is resolved by reference to the Rotunda’s status as.a public forum. Because the Rotunda is a public forum, in which the speech of private parties does not enjoy the State’s imprimatur, there is no Establishment Clause violation in the first instance to weigh against Chabad’s rights under the Free Speech Clause. Courts that have found otherwise ... sim­ply misunderstood the principles they sought to apply.

5 F.2d at 1393-94 and n. 17 (citations omit­ted).

3. Excessive Entanglement

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that because the public high school graduation exercises are sponsored by the School Board and held at government owned facilities controlled by Defendants, allowing graduation prayer at graduation ceremonies results inevitably in excessive entanglement of the public schools with religion in violation of Lemon’s third prong.

The United States Supreme Court has only held state action unconstitutional where it has found excessive entanglement of gov­ernmental and religious institutions. “The entanglement prong of the Lemon test is properly limited to institutional entangle­ment.” Lynch, 465 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 1368 (O’Connor, J., concurring). By requir­ing that graduation messages be voted on by the students, and written and presented by a student volunteer, the guidelines effectively exclude institutional entanglement. Plain­tiffs would have the Court find an excessive entanglement in this case because the gradu­ation ceremonies are “closely school-con­trolled.” For such supervision and control to be constitutionally significant, however, it must involve the challenged activity. That is, Plaintiffs must demonstrate some entangle­ment between the school and the prayer. There is none. Even in Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District, 11 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2950, 124 L.Ed.2d 697 (1993), a case with analogous facts, the court did not find an excessive entanglement where the policy required review of the message by a faculty member. In this ease, the students were given carte blanche to determine the content of the message and no review was required thereby relieving the institution of an “exces­sive entanglement.” See also Chabad-Lu­bavitch of Georgia, 5 F.3d at 1389.

Accordingly, because the guidelines in Reynolds’ May 5 memorandum have a pre­dominantly secular purpose, do not have the primary effect of advancing or endorsing reli­gion, and do not excessively entangle the schools and the School Board with religion, I find no violation of the Establishment Clause under Lemon.

B. LEE APPLICATION

In Lee v. Weisman, the Supreme Court held that Robert E. Lee, a public school *456 principal acting in accord with the policy of his school district, violated the Establishment Clause by inviting a member of the local clergy, Rabbi Leslie Gutterman, to deliver a nonsectarian, nonproselytizing invocation at his school’s graduation ceremony. Instead of directly considering any of the Lemon prongs in invalidating the school district’s policy in Lee, the Court analyzed the coercive effect of the principal’s actions. That is, the Court determined that the principal coerced graduation attendees to join in a formal reli­gious exercise. 505 U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2655. In reaching its conclusion, the Court emphasized that the inquiry was a “delicate and fact-sensitive one.” Id. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2661.

The facts that the Court found particularly troubling in Lee were summarized as follows:

State officials direct the performance of a formal religious exercise at promotional and graduation ceremonies for secondary schools. Even for those students who ob­ject to the religious exercise, their attend­ance and participation in the state-spon­sored religious activity are in a fair and real sense obligatory....

Id. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2665. Thus, Lee identifies unconstitutional coercion when (1) the government directs (2) a formal religious exercise (3) in such a way as to oblige the participation of objectors. Applying this analysis to the facts in this case does not change the outcome as dictated by Lemon.

Here, the school principals exercise signifi­cantly less control than was found in Lee. In Lee the principal specifically decided that an invocation and a benediction should be given, and he decided that a particular religious leader would give it. The guidelines here, by contrast, do not solicit or mandate invoca­tions or benedictions; they simply permit them if the students desire. Neither the principals nor the faculty have any avenue of reviewing the messages once composed, and the guidelines explicitly preclude anyone but a student volunteer from delivering the grad­uation message. Finally, and most signifi­cantly in terms of coercive effect, the partici­pants clearly understand that the student messages are just that—student messages that are divorced entirely from any govern­mental or institutional sponsorship. This Court agrees with the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in Jones that “the graduation prayers per­mitted by the [guidelines] place less psycho­logical pressure on students than the prayers at issue in Lee because all students ... are aware that any prayers represent the will of their peers, who are less able to coerce par­ticipation than an authority figure from the state or clergy.” 977 F.2d at 971.

Plaintiffs argue that allowing any type of prayer at graduation places an uncon­stitutionally impermissible amount of psycho­logical pressure upon students to participate in religious exercises. To so hold, however, would constitute an unwarranted extension of Lee. The Court had the opportunity in Lee to ban all prayer at graduation ceremonies. Rather than focus upon and, indeed, empha­size the need for fact sensitivity, the Court could have stated that any prayer at public high school graduation ceremonies violates the Constitution under any circumstances. It did not do so. Or, the Court could have required that separate baccalaureate services be held in lieu of including invocations and/or benedictions in official graduation ceremo­nies. Again, the Court declined to so hold.

In light of the dictates of both Lemon and Lee, the Court finds that the. Defendants’ policy as announced in the Reynolds’ memo­randum of May 5, 1993 does not violate the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.

Accordingly, upon due consideration, De­fendants’ motion (Doc. 87) and Intervenors’ motion (Doe. 85) for summary judgment are GRANTED and Plaintiffs’ motion (Doc. 90) for summary judgment is DENIED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and Intervenors and against Plaintiffs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DONE and ORDERED.