ORDER DETERMINING DEFENDANT’S TWO MILLION DOLLAR REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS UPON PLAINTIFFS’ DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT

Defendant Banco Central del Ecuador’s (“Central Bank”) motion for approximately $2 million dollars in Attorney’s Fees and Costs is the final issue in this case. This issue has literally “taken on a life of its own.”

The Plaintiffs Ortega originally filed a suit for liable on February 20, 1998.1 Now, four years later and eleven months after filing for attorneys’ fees and costs, the only issue remaining in this case is for the Court to determine what part of these expenses are “wasted” effort defending this case in that the results of this effort cannot be used in the ongoing case between the same parties in the Bahamas; and the reasonableness of the expenses Defendant incurred.

Mindful of the teachings of the Eleventh Circuit opinion in Yoffe v. Keller Indus., 580 F.2d 126, 129 (5th Cir. 1978),2 which affirmed a 1977 S.D. of Fla. (King, J.) decision, and now understanding the massive cost involved, the Court must give consideration to a fair method for applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2).

Plaintiffs moved for voluntary dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) on February 28, 2001. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), a federal court may dismiss an action at the request of a plaintiff “upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.” (Id.) The Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Voluntary Dismissal and retained jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses incurred by Defendants in defending this case. (See Court’s Orders dated March 28 and July 11, 2001.)

*650Defendant Central Bank seeks more than $2 million3 in attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses paid its attorneys in this litigation. Defendant Central Bank has submitted voluminous, and substantially redacted, time and billing records.4 In addition, Steven E.M. Hartz, Thomas E. Scott, George Volsky and John F. O’Sullivan filed declarations in support of Plaintiffs’ motion.5 Plaintiffs contest Defendant Central Bank’s claim for attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses submitting the declarations of Daniel S. Pearson and Samuel A. Terilli, Jr. in support of their opposition. Plaintiffs contend that Defendant has not met its burden of substantiating entitlement to a fee and cost award, and that the redacted submission effectively prevents Plaintiffs from asserting meaningful objections.

All of the witnesses who had filed written declarations, (named in the preceding paragraph) gave oral expert opinion testimony before the Court on November 15, 2001. Plaintiffs’ experts opined that Defendant Central Bank’s recovery should be no more than approximately $50,0000 to prepare a motion to dismiss, or no more than $110,000 for costs incurred by Defendant Conover & Company Communications (“Conover”); and no cost recovery for the time, effort and expense incurred for work performed by Defendant’s counsel that can be used in the still pending Bahamas litigation between Plaintiffs and Central Bank.

Discussion

Rule 41(a)(2) provides that “an action shall not be dismissed at plaintiffs instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.” (emphasis added). Eleventh Circuit decisions grant the Court considerable discretion to determine appropriate terms and conditions for a voluntary dismissal.6 The Fifth Circuit has stated, “a district court considering a motion for dismissal without prejudice should bear in mind principally the interests of the defendant, for it is the defendant’s position that the court should protect.” McCants, at 856; LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 1976). In accordance with McCants, this Court has already ruled that the Defendant is entitled to a determination of its reasonable fees, costs and expenses (See Orders dated March 28, 2001 and July 11, 2001).

Defendant Central Bank, as the applicant for attorneys’ fees and costs, bears the bur*651den of documenting the time spend on litigation. See American Civil Liberties Union of Georgia v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 427 (11th Cir. 1999); Norman v. Housing Authority of the City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988). Defendant Central Bank must provide the Court with specific and detailed evidence from which a determination of the reasonableness of the hourly rates7 for the work performed can be made. Barnes, 168 F.3d at 427.

The issue is not over the hourly rates charged (presumably because Plaintiffs’ counsel charge substantially the same hourly rates) but rather, the necessity for, and the usability of, the legal work performed. Was it “wasted (on a dismissed case)? Was it necessary? Is it usable?”

Plaintiffs assert that the substantially redacted time and billing records provided by Defendant Central Bank do not provide specific and detailed information on the specific tasks performed so as to determine if the work was “wasted,” usable or necessary. According to Plaintiffs, they are unable to challenge with particularity Defendant Central Bank’s time and billing records, which they must do when challenging the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees and costs.8

Plaintiffs and their expert witness do not object to the hourly rates sought by Central Bank and charged by the lawyers; only whether the total hours are wasted or usable. This does not relieve the Defendant from its obligation under Barnes to establish its entitlement to the requested fees and costs.

The failure to meet the Barnes criteria makes it almost impossible for the Plaintiffs to set forth specific objections to Defendant Central Bank’s motion for fees and cost.9 Plaintiffs object, in accordance with the implications of McCants, to Defendant recovering for those fees and costs that are or will be useful in the pending Bahamas case. McCants, at 860. This is also keeping with the decision in Barnes, which applies the same rule to litigation that has already occurred. The Barnes Court stated, “[a]n attorney is not entitled to be paid in a case for the work he or another attorney did in some other case.” Barnes, at 430. The Court agrees that Central Bank should not be able to recover those costs and fees that are, have been, or will be useful in the Bahamas litigation.

Central Bank argues that it should not be required to prove that the work is not useful; instead they argue that the Plaintiff should be required to show that the work is useful in the Bahamas litigation. Appreciating the difficulty of Central Bank to show that some of the fees requested are not useful in the Bahamas case, Central Bank is required to set forth with sufficient particularity how the requested fees do relate to this ease. Barnes, at 427. Since counsel for Central Bank have redacted a substantial portion of the time sheets and billing records they maintained during the course of this protracted litigation and filed with the Court to support Defendant’s request for fees and costs, Central Bank has only partially met the Barnes burden.10

*652Central Bank’s failure to set forth its fees could allow the Court to rely on the Plaintiffs’ method for determining reasonable costs. Id., at 429. “Not wishing to penalize the defendants for plaintiffs’ failure to keep more precise records, we will accept the defendants’ method for parceling out hours to tasks, and we will rely in this opinion on the resulting numbers.” Id.

While Barms allows the Court to use the method suggested by opposing parties for determining fees and costs, it does not require it. The Eleventh Circuit has stated that “[f|or decades the law in this circuit has been that ‘[t]he court, either trial or appellate, is itself an expert on the question and may consider its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an independent judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.’ ” Barnes, at 429 (quoting Norman v. Housing Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988)) (quoting Campbell v. Green, 112 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir. 1940)).

Plaintiffs’ experts suggest that Defendant should be awarded no more than $50,000 for basic defense and $110,000 in fees and costs, for achieving the dismissal of Conover & Company Communications, Inc.11 The Court must reject this reasoning although superficially it sounds like a sensible alternative solution to the Defendants’ position which urges the Court to exercise its broad discretion in these matters and award the entire $2 million to Defendants. It is too simplistic an approach to what has developed into a very complex problem. Therefore although Central Bank failed in part to meet its burden, the Court cannot adopt Plaintiffs’ suggestion.

Rather than punish Central Bank for redacting what it argues are privileged records, this Court recognizes that it must award a fair amount that is neither too high or too low.12 Awarding Central Bank nothing, given its tremendous cost, would be too low in this case. The Court is mindful that awarding Central Bank even approximating what it seeks could be too high. Although the Court has great latitude in awarding fees, “[tjhere will be cases in which the amount of money set as the price of a voluntary dismissal without prejudice is so clearly unreasonable as to amount to appealable ‘legal prejudice’ or to warrant review through a prerogative *653writ.” Yoffe, at 131. Although the Eleventh Circuit has not ruled on how high an amount would have to be to constitute legal prejudice (thus making it a case of dismissal with prejudice), the amount requested in this case (even after adjusting for inflation) is 13 times greater than the award fixed by this judge in 1977 in Yoffe.13 Plaintiffs have suggested in their motion to withdraw its voluntary dismissal that it could try the case cheaper14 then sustain payment of their award, even if they lost the case and Defendant was awarded a sum under the American Rule. This rule departs from the English Rule. America adopted and continued on with the rule that in the absence of some statutory provision that permits the fees or in the absence of a contract, fees are not awarded to the winning party. When dealing with a situation where there is no winning party, and there has been no particular result on the merits in the case that a winner or loser can be declared by the merits, and the case is somehow dismissed without that result, then it is necessary to look to what is the standard for an award of fees under Rule 41.15

“Our cases establish that attorneys’ fees generally are not a recoverable cost of litigation ‘absent explicit congressional authorization.’ Recognition of the availability of attorneys’ fees therefore requires a determination that ‘Congress intended to set aside this longstanding American rule of law.’ ” Key Tronic Corp. v. US, 511 U.S. 809, 815, 114 S.Ct. 1960, 128 L.Ed.2d 797 (1994) (internal citations omitted).

In consideration that the potential award in this case may be so high as to be prohibit-edly prejudicial, this Court may allow the Plaintiffs to withdraw the voluntary motion to dismiss and allow this case to proceed to trial, under certain restrictions.16

In the interests of ensuring a fair and just award, the Court is required to state its findings and conclusions regarding a decision to award attorneys’ fees and costs to allow meaningful review. Iraola, at 862; Barnes, at 427 quoting Norman v. Housing Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1304 (11th Cir. 1988).

Plaintiffs’ Original Suit for Defamation

Here, the Court finds that Defendant Central Bank is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs incurred for any wasted effort in defending Plaintiffs’ original liable claim. The Court applies the American rule that attorneys’ fees and costs should be awarded for wasted efforts. See Germain v. Semco Service Machine Co., 79 F.R.D. 85, 87 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (awarding costs to a defendant for wasted effort incurred in arguing a question of personal jurisdiction of a New York court in granting plaintiffs voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2)); see also McCants at 860. The Court finds that Defendant Central Bank’s wasted efforts include any work product or documentation produced that cannot be used in the pending Bahamas litigation (or any other litigation between the parties).

Defendant Central Bank’s Counterclaim

Both parties agree that the usability analysis is the proper approach to determine the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees and costs in *654this case where there is still pending a lawsuit in the Bahamas between the parties on the same issues. (See Trans, of Evidentiary Hearing at 91).

Defendant Central Bank will not be awarded attorneys’ fees and costs preparing and litigating, to date of dismissal, Defendant’s Counterclaim. The work performed in furtherance of the Counterclaim is not “wasted” because it can be used in the Bahamian litigation. In addition, this Court dismissed Defendant Central Bank’s Counterclaim on the ground of forum non conveniens (which appeal thereof was dismissed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals) (See Court’s Order dated December 3, 1998; dismissed on appeal by Order, dated August 26, 1999, 11th Cir.) and later refused to reinstate the Counterclaim. (See Court’s Order dated March 19, 2001) Therefore, to award attorneys’ fees and costs to Defendant Central Bank for work performed in asserting its counterclaim would be contrary to the American rule and confer an unjustified award for an unsuccessful effort in this Court.

Because of the redaction of the billing records the Court does not have enough information before it to determine how much, if any, of the other requested costs associated with this case or the fees claimed for discovery here, may be useful in the Bahamas. In order for this Court to make additional meaningful findings concerning what fees and costs will be useful in the Bahamas litigation requires more information.

When confronted with this conundrum, the Court found itself laboring under the same handicap previously experienced by Plaintiffs’ counsel in their attempt to formulate objections, namely, the redacted bills and time sheets. Without the redacted detail, an intelligent decision concerning “wasted, usable and necessary,” as discussed above, cannot be made. For a fair determination of wasted, usable and reasonable, more information is needed from Central Bank and its counsel. For the reasons set forth above, it would be unfair for the Defendant not to be afforded an opportunity to furnish this information insofar as counsel for Central Bank may elect, consistent with the confidentiality requirements of the law. Swpra at 652. It is therefore,

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that

1) The Defendant Central Bank and its counsel shall furnish the redacted information from Defendant’s exhibits 4, 6, 8 and 10, admitted into evidence on November 26, 2001, to enable the Court and counsel to determine whether or not the work performed was wasted, usable and necessary within the context of this opinion. Defense counsel, in their sole discretion, shall determine which of the previously redacted charges for fees and costs cannot be detailed with the specificity required by this Order without breaching confidential communications from their clients or theories of strategy and ongoing litigation.17

The information required herein must be based upon the record as it now stands, with specific reference to exhibits numbered 4, 6, 8 and 10, admitted into evidence on November 26, 2001, and should be consistent with the governing principles set forth in the foregoing opinion. The redacted information, ordered in the preceding paragraphs, may be furnished as promptly as the Defendant and its counsel can prepare the document, but in no event shall it be filed later than ninety (90) days from the date of this Order.

2) Upon receipt of Defendant Central Bank’s written submission, Plaintiffs and Defendants are ordered to confer, at a mutually convenient time, to discuss and jointly analyze Defendant’s written submission and to resolve, insofar as that is possible, those items of fees and costs which may be in dispute. This conference shall occur within thirty (30) days of Plaintiffs’ receipt of Defendant’s written submission.

3) Following the joint meeting set forth in paragraph 2 hereof, Plaintiffs shall file a *655written submission (or chart) setting forth the unresolved objections, if any, Plaintiffs may have to Defendant’s submission. Defendants will have fifteen (15) days thereafter to respond to any filed objections.18