ORDER

The Court has scheduled a status conference in this case for Friday, April 5, 2013, at 10:00 a.m., in response to an order entered by a United States District Judge in the Southern District of Georgia (sometimes referred to in this order as “the *1295Georgia court”) granting Defendant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and directing that he be returned to this district to be resentenced.1 The Government, as reflected in the response to Defendant’s petition, conceded that Defendant was entitled to relief in the form of a resentencing based on the “savings clause” of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) and § 2241 and also waived any procedural default which may have barred Defendant from obtaining relief.2 After careful and thoughtful reflection on this unique scenario involving a district judge of one district ordering a district judge of a different district to alter and amend a sentencing order, the Court respectfully declines to follow the directive of its coequal colleague in the Southern District of Georgia and will not resentence Defendant for the following reasons.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 20, 2008, a jury found Defendant guilty of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition affecting interstate commerce.3 Because he had suffered convictions in the past that qualified him as an armed career criminal under then existing Eleventh Circuit law, he faced an enhanced sentence pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), commonly referred to as the Armed Career Criminal Act (the ACCA).4 Defendant’s enhancement resulted in an enhanced offense level of 33, a criminal history category of VI, and an advisory guideline range of 235 to 293 months of imprisonment.5 Of more significance is the fact that his maximum statutory term of imprisonment was increased from ten years to life, and he was subjected to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of fifteen years.6 On May 2, 2008, this Court sentenced him to a mid-advisory guideline range of 265 months followed by sixty months of supervised release.7 At the time of his sentencing, Defendant’s two prior convictions for carrying a concealed firearm qualified as crimes of violence for purposes of enhancement under Eleventh Circuit law. See United States v. Gilbert, 138 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 1998). Nevertheless, Defendant never objected to his armed career criminal enhancement at his sentencing hearing.8

On May 5, 2008, Defendant, through counsel, appealed his judgment of conviction and sentence to the Eleventh Circuit *1296Court of Appeals.9 The Eleventh Circuit issued an unpublished opinion on March 13, 2009, followed by its mandate on April 13, 2009, affirming Defendant’s conviction and sentence.10 Again, Defendant never raised as an issue the legal propriety of his armed career criminal enhancement, specifically with regard to utilizing his two prior convictions for carrying a concealed firearm to support the enhancement, despite the fact that in United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008), decided on June 26, 2008, the Eleventh Circuit abrogated the holding in Gilbert after Archer’s case was remanded to the Eleventh Circuit by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of the holding in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008), decided on April 16, 2008.11

On March 1, 2010, Defendant, proceeding pro se, next filed a motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging only one claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.12 The Court summarily dismissed that motion.13 Defendant did not seek review of that order by the Eleventh Circuit. And, again, Defendant failed to raise any objection to his armed career criminal classification in his § 2255 collateral attack on his sentence, specifically as to his two prior convictions for carrying a concealed firearm being improperly classified as violent felonies for sentencing enhancement purposes, despite the decisions in Begay and Archer.

On August 16, 2012, while confined at FCI Jesup located in Jesup, Georgia, which is within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, Brunswick Division, Defendant, again proceeding pro se, for the first time challenged his designation as an armed career criminal in a petition filed pursuant to § 2241, claiming as his only ground for relief that he was “actually innocent of his underlying 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) statutory enhancement.”14 Relying on Begay and Archer, Defendant alleged that he “is actually innocent of his *1297underlying statutorily enhanced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) because his two (2) prior convictions for ‘carrying a concealed firearm’ (Florida law) are no longer considered violent felonies under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).”15 Importantly, Defendant never advanced the proposition that he was “actually innocent” of committing the crimes of carrying a concealed firearm.16 In an accompanying memorandum of law, he also noted that his Florida conviction for possession with intent to sell or deliver cannabis also did not qualify as a predicate offense for enhancement purposes because it was punishable by a term of imprisonment not exceeding five years and thus did not qualify as a “serious drug offense” which requires that the maximum term of imprisonment be of at least a duration of ten years. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).17

As noted earlier, the Government in its response to Defendant’s petition conceded that he was entitled to relief and waived procedural default.18 As was also noted earlier, based on these concessions, the United States Magistrate Judge assigned the case issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that Defendant’s petition be granted, which the assigned United States District Judge approved in an order directing that Defendant “be transported to the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, for resentencing purposes.”19 In light of the Government’s concessions, it is obvious that this order will not be appealed, thus depriving the Eleventh Circuit of the opportunity to determine whether the order has merit in light of that Court’s en banc decision in Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,—U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 1001, 181 L.Ed.2d 743 (2012). In that case, the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, decided “that the savings clause does not authorize a federal prisoner to bring in *1298a § 2241 petition a claim, which would otherwise be barred by § 2255(h), that the sentencing guidelines were misapplied in a way that resulted in a longer sentence not exceeding the statutory maximum.” Id. at 1323. The Eleventh Circuit left open, however, the question of whether “the savings clause would permit a prisoner to bring a § 2241 petition claiming that he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding the statutory maximum.” Id. That issue is squarely presented by Defendant’s case.

ANALYSIS

There can be no question that the Georgia court and not this Court had jurisdiction to entertain Defendant’s § 2241 petition inasmuch as he was incarcerated within that jurisdiction. See Fernandez v. United States, 941 F.2d 1488, 1495 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that “[s]ection 2241 petitions may be brought only in the district court for the district in which the inmate is incarcerated.”). As a panel of the Eleventh Circuit observed a little more than one month ago, “our precedent instructs that courts outside the district of a petitioner’s incarceration do not have jurisdiction over a petitioner’s 2241 motion.” United States v. Agosta, 505 Fed.Appx. 893, 894 (11th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (citing Fernandez); see also Lee v. Wetzel, 244 F.3d 370, 373 (5th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the district court in the Northern District of Florida, where Petitioner was incarcerated, did not have the discretion to transfer petitioner’s § 2241 petition to the district court in the Eastern District of Louisiana, where petitioner was sentenced).

In the Court’s view, however, the Georgia court did not possess the authority to order this Court to resentence Defendant because such an order would cause this Court to violate clear and unambiguous Eleventh Circuit precedent in the form of the “mandate rule” which requires that “[a] trial court, upon receiving the mandate of an appellate court may not alter, amend, or examine, or give any further relief or review, but must enter an order in strict compliance with the mandate.” Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1119-20 (11th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted); accord Norelus v. Denny’s, Inc., 628 F.3d 1270, 1280 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Piambino ).20 To follow the Georgia court’s order would in effect require this Court in resentencing Defendant to “alter” and “amend” the Eleventh Circuit’s mandate in this case affirming Defendant’s original sentence, which Eleventh Circuit precedent, as just explained, absolutely prohibits.21 Reaffirming this Court’s view of the Georgia court’s lack of authority to command this Court to resentence Defendant is the fact that the Georgia court’s order does not bind this Court. See United States v. Cerceda, 172 F.3d 806, 812, n. 6 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (noting that the “[ojpinion of a district court carries no *1299precedential weight, even within the same district.”) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Articles of Drug Consisting of 203 Paper Bags, 818 F.2d 569, 572 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that “[a] single district court decision, however (especially one that cannot be appealed), has little precedential effect. It is not binding on the circuit or even other judges in the same district.”) (citation omitted).

Additionally, this Court strongly, but respectfully, disagrees with the underlying rationale of the order issued by the Georgia court, rendered in a non-adversarial context and based on concessions by the Government which that court was not required to accept. Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1306, n. 14. Instead, the Court is persuaded by the well-reasoned and thorough opinion rendered by United States District Judge Wm. Terrell Hodges in McKinney v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium, 870 F.Supp.2d 1351 (M.D.Fla. 2012), in which he denied habeas relief to McKinney under § 2241 in a procedural and factual setting virtually identical to Defendant’s case, despite the Government’s concession that McKinney was entitled to relief.22 This Court embraces Judge Hodges’ ultimate conclusion that the holding and rationale of the en banc Gilbert court, which required denial of McKinney’s § 2241 petition, likewise should have required that Defendant’s petition be denied rather than granted, despite the Government’s concession that Defendant was entitled to relief. This Court, like Judge Hodges, “do[es] not see any difference in principle between the case of an offender who receives an enhanced sentence that is both automatic and mandatory under [the] ACCA (citations omitted) and the case of an offender who receives an enhanced sentence for the same reason under the Guidelines, especially when the Guidelines were mandatory at the time.” 870 F.Supp.2d at 1358. And, similar to Judge Hodges’ observation, “[i]f there is a difference of legal significance between the cases of Ezell Gilbert on the one hand, and [that of Defendant] on the other, [the Court does] not envy the lawyer who will have to explain the difference to Gilbert” while Defendant is afforded the benefit of a substantial reduction in his sentence. Id. at 1359. Consequently, the Court respectfully rejects the Georgia court’s rationale for granting Defendant § 2241 habeas relief, which the Court is entitled to do under Cerceda.

Finally, the Court finds instructive the footnote comments contained in a recent published opinion of the Eleventh Circuit in Turner v. Warden Coleman FCI (Medium), 709 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2013), which appear to lend support to Judge Hodges’ decision. In that case, the Court again sidestepped answering the question left open by the en banc court in Gilbert as to whether a defendant who could demonstrate that he was erroneously classified as an armed career criminal, such that the defendant is serving a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum, could invoke the “savings clause” in § 2255(e), thereby permitting the defendant to bring a § 2241 petition claiming he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding the statutory maximum. Turner, 709 F.3d at 1335 (stating, in sidestepping the issue, that “we need not dip a toe in the boiling cauldron at this juncture”). In that footnote, the Eleventh Circuit commented in part that “[w]e harbor some doubt as to whether such a showing, even if properly made, would permit opening the § 2241 portal.” Id. at n. 3.

*1300Accordingly, based on the reasons expressed, this Court respectfully declines to follow the directive of the Georgia court to resentence Defendant. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court recognizes that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243 the Georgia court has the discretion to “dispose of the matter as law and justice require.” See Dasher v. Attorney General, 574 F.3d 1310, 1318 (11th Cir. 2009).23 In this Court’s view, however, the Georgia court’s ordered disposition of requiring this Court to resentence Defendant is contrary to the law of the “mandate rule” formulated by the Eleventh Circuit such that any resentencing would be in direct conflict with the interest of justice. It is this Court’s further view that it is for the Eleventh Circuit to decide whether its previous mandate affirming Defendant’s sentence as an armed career criminal should be altered or modified in a resentencing proceeding.24

CONCLUSION

It is, therefore, ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Court will not resentence Defendant as directed by the Georgia court. The status conference scheduled for Friday, April 5, 2013, at 10:00 a.m., is cancelled, and the United States Attorney is directed not to return Defendant to this jurisdiction for resentencing.