UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA ORLANDO DIVISION STEPHANY TORRES MONTANEZ, Plaintiff, Vv. Case No. 6:24-cv-701-JA-LHP FRANCES SLUSARS, Defendant.

ORDER Plaintiff, Stephany Torres Montanez, moves to remand this action to th state court from which it was removed by Defendant, Frances Slusars. (Mot Doc. 10). Having considered Montanez’s motion, Slusars’s response (Doc. 12 and the record, the Court finds that Montanez’s motion must be granted. I. Background Montanez initiated this action by filing a one-count Complaint fo negligence in state court on February 29, 2024. (Doc. 1-1). She alleges tha Slusars negligently operated a motor vehicle that collided with Montanez’. vehicle and injured her. The state-court Complaint seeks damages exceedins $50,000—the jurisdictional minimum for Florida circuit courts. (dd. at 1). On April 12, 2024, Slusars removed the action to this Court, invoking thi: Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction under

and 1441 based or

the parties’ diverse citizenship and a purported amount in controver: exceeding the $75,000 threshold for diversity jurisdiction. (Notice of Remove Doc. 1). In her Notice of Removal, Slusars stated that prior to filing sui Montanez’s counsel provided her with a demand letter dated December 1, 202 requesting $74,999.00 to settle the case. (Doc. 1 at 6; see also Demand Lette Doc. 1-7). The demand letter—addressed to Slusars’s insurer—stated that Slusars’s insurer did not respond by the deadline designated in the letter, tk settlement offer would be withdrawn and Montanez’s counsel would “file lawsuit to seek an excess judgment against” Slusars. (Doc. 1-7). Along with tk Notice of Removal, Slusars also submitted Montanez’s medical records. (Doc: 1-8 through 1-10). Montanez now moves to remand, asserting that Slusars has nc established that the amount-in-controversy exceeds $7 5,000 as required for thi Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Slusars opposes the motion, again relyin on the demand letter and medical records. II. Discussion Under

(a), this Court has “original jurisdiction of all civ: actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,00C exclusive of interest and costs, and is between .. . citizens of different States. And “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of th United States have original jurisdiction] may be removed by th

defendant ...to the district court of the United States for the district an division embracing the place where such action is pending.”

(a) “If a plaintiff makes ‘an unspecified demand for damages in state court, : removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that th: amount in controversy more likely than not exceeds the... jurisdictiona requirement.” Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc.,

(11th Cir. 2020 (alteration in original) (quoting Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp.,

(11th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc.

(11th Cir. 2000)). Slusars has not met this burden here. Slusars relies in part on the pre-suit demand letter to her insurer Although demand letters are not determinative of amounts in controversy, they “count for something.” Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co.,

(11th Cir 1994). Courts typically “analyze[] whether demand letters merely ‘reflect puffing and posturing,’ or whether they provide ‘specific information to support the plaintiffs claim for damages’ and thus offer a ‘reasonable assessment of the value of [the] claim.” Lamb v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 3:10-cv-615: J-32JRK,

, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 2010) (second alteration in original) (quoting Jackson v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.,

(S.D. Ala. 2009)). Here, the demand letter requested $74,999.00—one dollar below the amount-in-controversy threshold—and provided no explanation supporting that

amount. Thus, this demand letter appears to be “puffing and posturing” an as Montanez aptly puts it, it looks like “simply a form demand designed to ki start negotiations—which it did.” (Doc. 10 at 6). Obviously, Montanez did n expect negotiations to result in a settlement higher than her demanded amour and her starting point was below the jurisdictional minimum. And as Montan notes, Slusars’s insurer responded to the demand letter with an offer to sett for only $10,000.00. (See Doc. 10-4). Further, although Montanez threatens to “file a lawsuit to seek an excess judgment,” (Doc. 1-7), such puffing ar posturing does not establish that when Montanez later did file suit (or whe Slusars removed the case to federal court), the amount in controversy actual exceeded $75,000.00. The medical records upon which Slusars relies do not support tk requisite amount in controversy either. They show only bills “to date” □ $29,321.90 and an estimate of bills of between $5,700 and $8,400 over the ne: eighteen months. (See Doc. 12 at 6-7). The fact that Montanez has apparent] suffered a permanent impairment with a 6% impairment rating also does litt! to shed light on damages. (See id. at 6). At this point, the record merel supports medical bills of approximately $35,000. In sum, Slusars has not met her burden as the removing defendant establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controvers exceeds $75,000.00. Thus, she has not established this Court’s subject-matte

jurisdiction, and this action must be remanded to the state court from which i was removed. IiI. Conclusion Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows: 1. Plaintiffs Motion to Remand (Doc. 10) is GRANTED. 2. This action is remanded to the Circuit Court of the □□□□□□□□□□ Judicial Circuit in and for Brevard County, Florida, Case No. 05-2024-CA 018079. 3. The Clerk is directed to close this case. DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida, on June 274 2024.

4 (oC JOHN ANTOON II United States District Judge Copies furnished to: Counsel of Record