UMNIIDTEDDL ES TDAISTTERS IDCITS TORFI FCLTO CROIDURAT TAMPA DIVISION

LINDA SHAFFER,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 8:23-cv-571-SDM-AEP

WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB, et al.,

Defendants. ___________________________________/

ORDER Armed with a facially frivolous “arbitration award” that purports to award millions of dollars for the allegedly false foreclosure of the lien on her home, Linda Shaffer, who appears pro se, petitioned to confirm the putative “arbitration award” against six respondents — none of whom signed an arbitration agreement with, or otherwise agreed to arbitrate with, Shaffer. A July 14, 2023 order (Doc. 20) dis- misses the action for frivolousness and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction but per- mits the respondents to move for an attorney’s fee. Robertson, Anschutz, Schneid, Crane & Partners (RAS), which is both a law firm and one of the respondents against whom Shaffer attempted to confirm the “arbitration award,” timely moves (Doc. 22) for an attorney’s fee of $8,750.* Shaffer responds (Doc. 24) in opposition. As explained in the July 14 order, the “arbitration award,” which, among other things, discusses a “common law constitutional provision,” describes Shaffer’s

* RAS is the only respondent that moves for an attorney’s fee. One of RAS’s attorneys, Keith mortgage as a “Maritime Transaction,” and sporadically cites irrelevant and out-of- context court decisions interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act, fails entirely to com- port with any requirement of Shaffer’s alleged arbitration agreement, and Shaffer fails entirely to present a cognizable basis to enforce the “arbitration award” against

six respondents who never agreed to Shaffer’s alleged arbitration agreement or any other agreement to arbitrate with Shaffer. The July 14 order cites several decisions that dismiss similar frivolous “arbitration awards.” For example, the order notes that the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, dismissed a similar “arbitration award” prepared by the National Arbitration Association, LLC — the

same LLC that prepared Shaffer’s “award” — and signed by Marina Akrabian and Ismael Rodriguez — two of the three “arbitrators” that sign Shaffer’s “award.” Shaf- fer’s attempt to enforce her putative “arbitration award” evinces bad faith and war- rants a sanction. To compensate the firm for defending against Shaffer’s frivolous petition, RAS

moves for an attorney’s fee of $8,750, which comprises 12.5 hours of work at an hourly rate of $700. In response, Shaffer offers more of the “uninformative blather- skite” that filled the pages of the “arbitration award.” But other than a brief claim of health and money problems and her implausible claim that she is “a victim,” Shaffer offers no reason why an order should not impose an attorney’s fee to compensate

RAS for defending this frivolous action. Also, Shaffer fails to rebut or otherwise question the rate and number of hours claimed by RAS’s counsel. Under Norman v. Housing Authority of City of Montgomery,

(11th Cir. 1988), an attorney’s fee is determined by calculating a “lodestar,” the product of a reasonable hourly rate multiplied by the hours reasonably expended. “The ‘fee ap- plicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement and documenting the appropriate

hours and hourly rates.’” Am. C.L. Union of Georgia v. Barnes,

(11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Norman,

). “A reasonable hourly rate is the pre- vailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Norman,

. Norman explains that the calculation of the “lodestar” “presumptively in-

cludes all of the twelve factors . . . adopted in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,

(5th Cir. 1974)[]” and that the factors “have utility in establishing the hourly rate.” These factors include: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill required to perform the legal services properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee in the com- munity; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limi- tations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of any professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.

Fierro v. Beaches Sandbar, Inc.,

, at *2 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (Conway, J.) (adopting and confirming report and recommendation). RAS submits a declaration of counsel and an invoice to establish the hours worked, which hours appear reasonable for this action. However, to support the re- quest for a $700 hourly rate, RAS cites only First National Bank of Oneida, N.A. v. Brandt,

(M.D. Fla. 2021) (Sansone, M.J.). Brandt approves an hourly rate of $705.00 for a lawyer with more than thirty years of experience and an hourly rate of $650.75-$669.75 for a lawyer with more than twenty years of experi- ence. Importantly, fee awards differ based on the type of action, and Brandt awards an attorney’s fee for an action that is longer and more complex than this action. A careful review of this action, the Johnson factors, and other decisions in this district establishes that under these circumstances $500 is a reasonable hourly rate to com- pensate RAS, whose counsel is a lawyer with more than twenty years of experience. See GS Holistic, LLC v. Brother Pastor LLC,

(M.D. Fla. 2023) (Cov- ington, J.) (approving in an action in which a plaintiff attempted to prosecute a base- less claim an hourly rate of $500 for a lawyer with twenty-three years of experience). Multiplying the $500 hourly rate by the 12.5 hours worked by counsel yields a “lode- star” of $6,250. As Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn,

(2010), ex- plains, a “strong presumption” exists that the “lodestar” is a reasonable fee. For these reasons and others stated by RAS, the motion (Doc. 22) for an attor- ney’s fee is GRANTED-IN-PART. The clerk is directed to enter in favor of Robert- son, Anschutz, Schneid, Crane & Partners and against Shaffer a judgment for an at- torney’s fee of $6,250. ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on January 24, 2024. Andon aragling STEVEN D. MERRYDAY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE -4-