UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA OCALA DIVISION

TVONN TSHAWN GULLY,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 5:25-cv-23-JSS-PRL

WARDEN, USP COLEMAN I,

Respondent. ____________________________________/ ORDER Petitioner, Tvonn Tshawn Gully, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under

(Dkt. 3.) The petition is before the court for preliminary review. See Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.2 This court must “promptly examine” a habeas petition and dismiss it “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court[.]”

This petition is due to be dismissed because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Habeas corpus is the “exclusive remedy” for prisoners seeking “immediate or speedier release from confinement.” Skinner v. Switzer,

(2011); Wilkinson v. Dotson,

(2005). Typically, collateral attacks on the validity of a

1 Petitioner is a federal inmate serving a seventy-nine-month sentence for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance under

(a)(1), (b)(1)(D), 846 and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime under

(c)(1). (Dkt. 3 at 9–10.) 2 These rules also apply to section 2241 petitions. See Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. federal conviction or sentence must be brought under

. Sawyer v. Holder,

(11th Cir. 2003). Challenges to the execution of a sentence, rather than the validity of the sentence itself, are properly brought under

. Antonelli v. Warden, U.S.P. Atlanta,

(11th Cir. 2008). Petitioner challenges the “validity of the marijuana laws” under which he was convicted. (Dkt. 3 at 4, 6.) Thus, Petitioner does not contest the execution of his

sentence, but instead contests its legality. See, e.g., Acosta v. Warden, FCC Coleman- Medium,

(11th Cir. 2017); Young v. Warden, FCC Coleman - Medium, No. 5:16-CV-737-OC-10PRL,

, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 28, 2017); Vargas v. Whitaker, No. CV 321-059,

, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 16, 2021), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Vargas v. Stone, No. CV 321-059,

(S.D. Ga. Feb. 4, 2022). Consequently, § 2255, not § 2241, is the appropriate statutory vehicle for Petitioner’s claim unless he can satisfy the “saving clause.” See McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc.,

(11th Cir. 2017). The saving clause is triggered when a prisoner’s remedy under § 2255 is

“inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”

(e). A motion under § 2255 “is inadequate or ineffective . . . only when it cannot remedy a particular kind of claim.” McCarthan,

. “Traditionally, courts have treated the saving clause as covering unusual circumstances in which it is impossible or impracticable for a prisoner to seek relief” such as “the sentencing court’s dissolution.” Jones v. Hendrix,

(2023) (citations omitted). Petitioner does not allege any circumstances that would demonstrate the application of the saving clause. (See Dkt. 3 at 4.) Because Petitioner fails to demonstrate the applicability of the saving clause, this court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate his § 2241 petition on the merits. See Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Accordingly, the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 3) is DISMISSED. The Clerk is directed to close this case. ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on April 17, 2025.

ia: i= JUVIE S. SNEED UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to: Tvonn Tshawn Gully 24156-509 FCI Coleman I P.O. Box 1033 Coleman, FL 33521