Acevedo v. Commissioner of Social Security

United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida

Acevedo v. Commissioner of Social Security

Trial Court Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

DENISE ACEVEDO,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:23-cv-2801-LSG

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant. ______________________________/

ORDER

The plaintiff Denise Acevedo moves unopposed for an award of $9,000.00 in attorney’s fees as the prevailing party under the Equal Access of Justice Act (the “EAJA”),

28 U.S.C. § 2412

(d). Doc. 26. Acevedo filed a complaint and opening brief seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of her claim for Social Security Disability benefits. Docs. 1, 16. The Commissioner filed a brief in opposition. Doc. 20. I reversed the Commissioner’s final decision and remanded the case under

42 U.S.C. § 405

(g) for further proceedings, and the Clerk entered a judgement in favor of Acevedo and against the Commissioner. Docs. 23–24. As the prevailing party, Acevedo timely1 moves unopposed for an award of attorney’s fees and costs under the EAJA. See

28 U.S.C. § 2414

(d)(1)(A); cf. Shalala v.

1 The plaintiff in a social security case has thirty days beyond the sixty-day appeal window to apply for fees and other expenses under the EAJA, for a total of ninety days after judgment. See

28 U.S.C. § 2412

(d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(G); FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(B). Here, Acevedo timely filed her application for fees on May 20, 2025, Doc. 32, within ninety days after judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(1)(C). Schaefer,

509 U.S. 292, 300-02

(1993) (concluding that a party who wins a sentence- four remand order under

42 U.S.C. § 405

(g) is a prevailing party), superseded by rule on other grounds, FED. R. CIv. P. 58(c)(2)(B). Included in her requested total are paralegal fees, which are also compensable under the EAJA.

28 U.S.C. § 2412

(a)(1) & (d)(1)(A); Richlin Sec. Serv. Co. v. Chertoff,

553 U.S. 571, 590

(2008) (“[W]e hold that a prevailing party that satisfies EAJA’s other requirements may recover its paralegal fees from the Government at prevailing market rates.”). Although the total fees exceed $10,0000, Acevedo agrees to compromise her claim for $9,000. Doc. 26 at 3. The Commissioner consents to the requested relief. Doc. 26 § 6. Therefore, for the reasons stated by Acevedo, the unopposed motion for attorney’s fees under the EAJA, Doc. 26, is GRANTED. Acevedo shall receive $9,000.00 in attorney’s fees under the EAJA. Unless the Department of Treasury determines that Acevedo owes a federal debt, the defendant must pay the fees to Acevedo’s counsel in accord with Acevedo’s assignment of fees.” See Doc. 26-1. ORDERED on this 3rd day of June, 2025.

y is NDSAY S. GRIBF United States Magistrate Judge

* After an order awarding EAJA fees, the United States Department of the Treasury determines whether a plaintiff owes a debt to the government. If the plaintiff has such pre-existing debt, the Government may use the fee award to offset that debt. See Astrue v. Ratliff,

560 U.S. 586, 592-93

(2010) (“A § 2412(d)(1)(A) attorney's fees award is payable to the litigant and is therefore subject to an offsct to satisfy the litigant's pre-cxisting debt to the Government.”).

Reference

Status
Unknown