Doe v. Choice Hotels International. Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JANE DOE (J.S.H.), Plaintiff, v. Case No. 3:25-cv-851-MMH-MCR CHOICE HOTELS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and GP4 PROPERTY OWNER, LLC., Defendants.

ORDER THIS CAUSE is before the Court sua sponte. On June 3, 2024, Plaintiff initiated this action in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland by filing a three-count Complaint. See Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1; Complaint). On July 28, 2025, the action was transferred to this Court. See Order (Doc. 72). Upon review of the Complaint, the Court finds it is due to be stricken as an impermissible shotgun pleading. In the analysis that follows, the Court will discuss the problem with the Complaint and will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to file a corrected complaint consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)). Failure to comply with the pleading requirements set forth in this Order may result in the dismissal of this action without further notice.

A complaint may not run afoul of the Eleventh Circuit’s prohibition against shotgun pleading. See generally Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1321–23 (11th Cir. 2015) (outlining four broad categories of impermissible shotgun pleadings).1 The Eleventh Circuit has unequivocally instructed that shotgun pleadings are “altogether unacceptable.” Cramer v. State of Fla., 117 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Cook v. Randolph Cnty., 573 F.3d 1143, 1151 (11th Cir. 2009) (“We have had much to say about shotgun pleadings, none of which is favorable.” (collecting cases)). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has engaged in a “thirty-year salvo of criticism aimed at shotgun pleadings, and there is no ceasefire in sight.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321; see, e.g., id. at 1321 n.9 (collecting cases). As the court in Cramer recognized, “[s]hotgun pleadings, whether filed by plaintiffs or defendants,

Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1324–25 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321–23). exact an intolerable toll on the trial court’s docket, lead to unnecessary and unchannelled discovery, and impose unwarranted expense on the litigants, the court and the court’s parajudicial personnel and resources.” Cramer, 117 F.3d at 1263. As such, when faced with the burden of deciphering a shotgun pleading, it is the trial court’s obligation to strike the pleading on its own initiative and force the plaintiff to replead to the extent possible under Rule 11. See id. (admonishing district court for not striking shotgun complaint on its own initiative); see also Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321 n.10 (“[W]e have also advised that when a defendant fails to [move for a more definite statement], the district court ought to take the initiative to dismiss or strike the shotgun pleading and give the plaintiff an opportunity to replead.”).

Relevant here is the “most common type” of shotgun complaint, one in which the plaintiff asserts “multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint.”

See Weiland, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321, 1321 n.11 (collecting cases). As a result, “most of the counts … contain irrelevant factual allegations and legal conclusions.” Strategic Income Fund, L.L.C. v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002). Consequently, in ruling on the sufficiency of a claim, the Court is faced with the onerous task of sifting out irrelevancies in order to decide for itself which facts are relevant to a particular cause of action asserted. See id. Here, in each subsequent count of the Complaint, Plaintiff “re-alleges and incorporates by reference the factual allegations contained in all prior paragraphs as if fully stated in this Count.” See Complaint ¶¶ 77, 82. This manner of pleading falls squarely into the first category of impermissible shotgun pleadings. See Barmapov, 986 F.3d at 1325; see also Sarhan v. Miami Dade Coll., 800 F. App’x 769, 771–72 (11th Cir. 2020).2 Because Plaintiff’s Complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading, the Court will strike the filing and direct Plaintiff to file a corrected complaint. See Holbrook v. Castle Key Ins. Co., 405 F. App’x 459, 460–61 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The district court has the inherent authority sua sponte to require the plaintiff to file a more definite statement.”).3 Failure to comply with the Rules and this Order may result in dismissal of this action without further notice.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 1. Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1) is STRICKEN.

2. On or before August 29, 2025, Plaintiff shall file a Corrected Complaint that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the directives of this Order.

3. Defendants shall respond to the Corrected Complaint in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, on August 11th, 2025.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD United States District Judge 1c33 Copies to: Counsel of record _5-