UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

ARIEL DALTON, Plaintiff, Vv. Case No. 8:25-cv-1339-KKM-SPF

CITY OF LARGO and OFFICER STEPHANIE BLITZ, Defendants.

ORDER The City of Largo and Officer Stephanie Blitz move to dismiss this § 1983

action, which arises from Plaintiff Ariel Dalton’s warrantless arrest. Mot. to Dismiss

(MTD) (Doce. 14). For the reasons below, I grant this motion.

L BACKGROUND On November 9, 2024, Dalton was driving to a friend’s house for dinner and

needed to pick up her son from daycare. Compl. (Doc. 1) § 8. On the way there, Dalton encountered a road blocked by an ambulance. Id. ¥ 9. After waiting for five

to ten minutes, Dalton approached the paramedics at a nearby house and asked them

to move the ambulance. Id. § 10. Dalton stood at the rear of the carport and did not

attempt to enter either the carport or the ambulance. Id. 4 11. The ambulance driver

informed Dalton that he would move the vehicle after loading the patient, so Dalton

returned to her vehicle and waited. Id. 4 12-13.

After the patient was loaded into the ambulance, Dalton again approached to

request that the vehicle be moved. Id. ¢ 14. About two minutes later, Officer Blitz

appeared on the scene. Id. 15. After speaking with the ambulance attendants for

about two minutes, Blitz arrested Dalton. Id. ¢§ 16-17. On the way to the Pinellas

County Jail, Blitz told Dalton that she arrested her “because [Dalton] thought [she was] better than [Blitz].” Id. ¢ 18. Dalton was charged with burglary of an occupied dwelling, burglary of a conveyance, and approaching a first responder with specified intent after a warning. Id. 21; see (Doc. 1-1). These charges were later dropped. Compl. 4 22; (Doc. 1-1). Dalton initiated this action. Dalton pleads four claims: (1) malicious

prosecution against the City of Largo and Officer Blitz (Count I); (2) false

imprisonment against the City of Largo and Officer Blitz (Count I); (3) an

unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment against the City of

Largo and Officer Blitz (Count II); and negligent supervision against the City of

Largo (Count IV). Id. 44 23-54. The defendants move to dismiss. See MTD.

Il. LEGAL STANDARD Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” This pleading standard

“does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of

the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”

(quoting Twombly, 550 US. at

555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further

factual enhancement.”

(quoting Twombly,

). “To survive a motion to dismiss” for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must

plead sufficient facts to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.”

(quoting Twombly,

). A claim is plausible on its face when a “plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

“In analyzing the sufficiency of the complaint,” I may consider “well-pleaded factual allegations, documents central to or referenced in the complaint, and matters

judicially noticed.” La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc.,

(11th Cir.

2004), abrogated on other grounds by Twombly,

. The complaint’s factual allegations are accepted “as true” and construed “in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff.” Pielage v. McConnell,

(11th Cir. 2008). TI. ANALYSIS Both the City of Largo and Blitz move to dismiss. I start with the claims

against the City and then move to the claims against Blitz.

A. Claims against the City of Largo are Dismissed Dalton pleads against the City three claims under § 1983 and one state law

claim. All four must be dismissed.

Starting with the federal claims, a municipality “does not incur § 1983 liability for injuries caused solely by its employees.” McDowell v. Brown,

(11th Cir. 2004). Instead, “to impose § 1983 liability on a municipality, a

plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the

municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that

constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.” Id.

Dalton fails to allege in her complaint any such custom or policy. Thus, dismissal is

required. See id.

In her response, Dalton argues that her § 1983 claims are sufficient because

she alleges that the City failed to properly supervise Blitz. Resp. (Doc. 15) at 2. But

this allegation is insufficient under Eleventh Circuit precedent. To establish the

requisite “deliberate indifference,” a plaintiff “must present some evidence that the

municipality knew of a need to train and/or supervise in a particular area and the

municipality made a deliberate choice not to take any action.” Gold v. City of Miami,

(11th Cir. 1998). Blitz does not allege that any such evidence

exists here. Accordingly, her § 1983 claims against the City fail.

Dalton’s negligent supervision claim also fails. Negligent supervision or

retention “occurs when during the course of employment, the employer becomes

aware or should have become aware of problems with an employee that indicated his

unfitness, and the employer fails to take further actions such as investigation, discharge, or reassignment.” Dep’t of Env’t. Prot. v. Hardy,

(Fla. 5th DCA 2005). “Put slightly differently, negligent supervision exists when the

defendant ‘negligently placed [the plaintiff/purported victim] under the supervision of [an employee], when [the defendant] either knew or should have known that [the

employee] had the propensity to commit [the torts committed].” Acts Ret.-Life

Cmtys. Inc. v. Est. of Zimmer,

(Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (alterations in the original) (quoting Malicki v. Doe,

(Fla. 2002)). “The plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show that once an employer received actual or constructive notice of problems with an employee’s fitness, it was

unreasonable for the employer not to investigate or take corrective action.” Hardy,

. Of course, “not only must the employer owe a duty to the plaintiff, but the breach of that duty must be the proximate cause of the plaintiffs harm.”

As a result, there “must be a connection and foreseeability between the employee’s employment history and the current tort committed by the employee.”

.

Dalton pleads no facts that would indicate the City was on actual or

constructive notice “of problems with [Blitz] that indicated [her] unfitness.” Hardy,

; see MTD at 8 T]he Plaintiffs Complaint is devoid of any facts

that would indicate that the City knew or should have known of any alleged misconduct or unfitness from Officer Blitz.”). Therefore, Dalton’s negligent supervision claim fails.

B. Claims against Blitz are Dismissed Dalton pleads malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and false arrest

claims against Blitz. Compl. 4 23-45. Blitz argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity and thus Dalton’s claims must be dismissed. See MTD at 8-15. Blitz also

argues that Dalton fails to plausibly allege a violation of her Fourth Amendment

rights. See id. at 15-16. I start with the qualified immunity standard and then move

to Blitz’s arguments regarding each of Dalton’s claims. For the reasons below, Dalton fails to plausibly allege that Blitz violated her constitutional rights, so

Dalton’s claims are dismissed without prejudice. 1. Qualified Immunity Standard

“The qualified immunity defense shields ‘government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.’” Corbitt v. Vickers,

(11th Cir.

2019) (omission adopted) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

(1982)). “To receive qualified immunity, [a] public official ‘must first prove that he was

acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful

acts occurred.’” Vinyard v. Wilson,

(11th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Lee v. Ferraro,

(11th Cir. 2002)). “Once the defendant

establishes that he was acting within his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to

the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Lee,

.

“To overcome a qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff must make two

showings.” Corbitt,

. The plaintiff must first show “that the

defendant violated a constitutional right.” Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin,

(11th Cir. 2007). The plaintiff must then “show that the violation was

clearly established.”

“A right may be clearly established for qualified immunity

purposes in one of three ways: (1) case law with indistinguishable facts clearly establishing the constitutional right; (2) a broad statement of principle within the

Constitution, statute, or case law that clearly establishes a constitutional right; or (3) conduct so egregious that a constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the total

absence of case law.” Gilmore v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr.,

, 1258 (11th Cir. 2025) (en banc). For this second inquiry, the key question “is whether the state

of the law gave the defendants ‘fair warning’ that their alleged conduct was

unconstitutional.” Vaughan v. Cox,

(11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer,

(2002)).

Ordinarily, “it is proper to grant a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds when the ‘complaint fails to allege the violation of a clearly established

constitutional right.’” Corbitt,

(quoting St. George v. Pinellas

County,

(11th Cir. 2002)). “Once an officer has raised the

defense of qualified immunity, the burden of persuasion on that issue is on the

plaintiff.”

(quoting St. George,

). 2. Dalton’s Malicious Prosecution Claim is Dismissed

To succeed on a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must prove both

“(1) the elements of the common-law tort of malicious prosecution and (2) a

violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.”

Blue v. Lopez,

(11th Cir. 2018).’ Or, as the Eleventh Circuit

recently articulated, a plaintiff must prove: (1) “the legal process justifying [the plaintiffs] seizure was constitutionally infirm”; (2) the “seizure would not otherwise

be justified without legal process”; and (3) “the criminal proceedings against [the

“(T]he constituent elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution include[]: (1) a criminal prosecution instituted or continued by the present defendant; (2) with malice and without probable cause; (3) that terminated in the plaintiff accused’s favor; and (4) caused damage to the plaintiff accused.” Paez v. Mulvey,

(11th Cir. 2019) (alterations in the original) (quoting Wood v. Kesler,

(11th Cir. 2003)).

plaintiff] terminated in his favor.” Sylvester v. Fulton Cnty. Jail,

(11th Cir. 2024) (alterations in the original) (quoting Luke v. Gulley,

(11th Cir. 2020)). A showing of either probable cause or arguable probable cause defeats a

malicious prosecution claim. See id. at 1331. The probable cause inquiry regarding malicious prosecution focuses on “the legal process that justified the plaintiffs arrest

and the defendant’s role in that process.” Id. at 1330. Therefore, the proper analysis requires a court to “remove from the affidavit any false or misleading inculpatory

statements, insert any omitted exculpatory information, and then assess whether the

corrected affidavit is still able to establish at least arguable probable cause.” Id. at

1331. To assess probable cause, a court must “look . . . to the elements of the charged crime.” Butler v. Smith,

(11th Cir. 2023). “Probable cause

requires facts that allow ‘a person of reasonable caution to believe’ that ‘there was a

substantial chance’ that [the defendant committed the charged offense].” Sylvester,

(quoting Garcia v. Casey,

(11th Cir. 2023)). “Arguable probable cause exists . . . if a ‘reasonable officer’ presented with the

corrected version of [an] affidavit could ‘reasonably but mistakenly conclude that

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probable cause is present’ to suspect [the defendant].”

(quoting Butler,

). Dalton fails to plausibly allege malicious prosecution. While Blitz rightly points out that Dalton “does not allege that there is any error or misstatement in the

Arrest Affidavit,” MTD. at 16, Dalton more fundamentally fails to allege that Blitz

seized her pursuant to the arrest affidavit (or any other legal process), see Compl. {4 17, 23-33. A malicious prosecution claim “requires a seizure ‘pursuant to legal process.’” Williams v. Aguirre,

, 1158 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Black

v. Wigington,

(11th Cir. 2016)). “[W]arrant-based seizures

fall within this category,” as do “seizures following an arraignment, indictment, or

probable-cause hearing.”

A warrantless arrest, on the other hand, is the

quintessential seizure “without legal process.” Id.; see Kingsland v. City of Miami,

, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004); Donley v. City of Morrow,

(11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). Should she choose to file an amended

complaint, Dalton must allege that Blitz seized her pursuant to legal process to state

a claim for malicious prosecution.

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3. Dalton’s False Arrest and False Imprisonment Claims Are Dismissed

“To succeed on a false-arrest claim, a plaintiff must establish (1) a lack of

probable cause and (2) an arrest.” Brooks v. Miller,

(11th Cir.

2023). A “false imprisonment claim under § 1983 requires meeting the common law

elements of false imprisonment and establishing that the imprisonment was a due

process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Helm v. Rainbow City,

, 1278 (11th Cir. 2021). A showing of either probable cause or arguable probable cause can defeat both.

See Edger v. McCabe,

, 1236 (11th Cir. 2023) (false arrest); Skop v.

City of Atlanta,

(11th Cir. 2007) (same); Helm, 989 F.3d at

1278-79 (false imprisonment).* As noted above, “[w]hether an officer possesses probable cause or arguable probable cause depends on the elements of the alleged crime and the operative fact pattern.” Brown v. City of Huntsville,

(11th Cir. 2010). Where a malicious prosecution claim focuses on the legal

* “The elements of common law false imprisonment are an intent to confine, an act resulting in confinement, and the victim’s awareness of confinement.” Campbell v. Johnson,

(11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). > Even if there is adequate justification for the initiation of the seizure, an officer may be liable for false imprisonment when the manner of detention is unreasonable. See Helm, 989 F.3d at 1280. Dalton’s claim is not predicated on the manner of detention. See Compl. qq 34-40. 12

process, a false arrest claim “challenges as constitutionally deficient an officer’s on-

the-spot determination of probable cause.” Sylvester,

. A false

imprisonment claim shares the same inquiry. See Helm, 989 F.3d at 1279.

Dalton was arrested for, and later charged, with burglary of an occupied dwelling, burglary of a conveyance, and approaching a first responder with specified intent after a warning. Compl. 4 21; see (Doc. 1-1). Blitz argues that Dalton fails to

plausibly allege that she was arrested without either probable cause or arguable probable cause. See MTD at 8-16. I agree. As relevant, Florida law defines a “burglary” to mean “[e]ntering a dwelling, a

structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the

premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to

enter.” § 810.02(1)(b)(1), Fla. Stat. A person commits a second-degree felony when

“in the course of committing the [burglary], the offender does not make an assault

or battery and is not and does not become armed with a dangerous weapon or

explosive, and the offender enters or remains in”: (1) a “[d]welling, and there is

another person in the dwelling at the time the offender enters or remains” or (2) a

“[c]onveyance, and there is another person in the conveyance at the time the offender

enters or remains.” Id. § 810.02(3)(a), (d).

13

With respect to approaching a first responder, a person commits a second-

degree misdemeanor when he, “after receiving a verbal warning not to approach from

a person he or she knows or reasonably should know is a first responder, who is

engaged in the lawful performance of a legal duty,” “knowingly and willfully” violates

this warning and “approach[es] or remain|s] within 25 feet of the first responder with the intent to”: 1. Impede or interfere with the first responder’s ability to perform such duty; 2. Threaten the first responder with physical harm; or 3. Harass the first responder. § 843.31(2)(a), Fla. Stat. To “harass” means “to willfully engage in a course of

conduct directed at a first responder which intentionally causes substantial emotional

distress in that first responder and serves no legitimate purpose.” Id. § 843.31(1)(b).4 As to all three offenses, Dalton fails to plausibly allege that Blitz arrested her

without probable cause. Dalton alleges that Blitz arrived at the scene, “spoke with

the ambulance attendants for approximately two minutes,” threatened to arrest

* While no party mentions it, this offense did not take effect until almost two months after Dalton’s arrest, compare Ch. 2024-85, § 2, Laws of Fla. (“This act shall take effect January 1, 2025.”), with Compl. 4§ 8, 17 (explaining that Blitz arrested Dalton on November 9, 2024), though it was necessary to support all three charges, see § 810.02(1)(b)(1), Fla. Stat. (requiring intent to commit a separate offense in the burgled dwelling, structure, or conveyance as an element of burglary). 14

Dalton, and then did so. Compl. 15-17. Yet Dalton does not allege what facts, if any, were available to Blitz when she arrested Dalton. When assessing whether an

officer arrested someone without probably cause, “[w]hat counts ... is the

information known to the defendant officers or officials at the time of their conduct.”

Wilkerson v. Seymour,

(11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Jones v.

Cannon,

, 1283 n.4 (11th Cir. 1999)). Dalton does not allege what, if anything, the ambulance attendants told Blitz, whether what they told Blitz was

accurate, or whether someone else had relayed facts to Blitz prior to her arrival on

the scene, whether accurate or inaccurate, of Dalton’s conduct before she arrived on

the scene. See Compl. Dalton’s current pleading does not allege enough for the

Court to determine whether she has plausibly alleged that Blitz arrested or falsely imprisoned her without probable cause. Accordingly, those claims are dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION Accordingly, the following is ORDERED:

1. The Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14) is GRANTED.

2. The Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

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3. Dalton may file an amended complaint addressing the above

deficiencies no later than September 26, 2025.

ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on September 11, 2025.

Fl imball Mizelle United States District Judge

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