Cherif Djimbarima Chamsadine v. Assistant Field Director Warden, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA CASE NO. 26-21487-CV-WILLIAMS CHERIF DJIMBARIMA CHAMSADINE, Petitioner, v. ASSISTANT FIELD DIRECTOR WARDEN, et al., Respondents. _________________________________________/ ORDER THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”) filed by Petitioner Cherif Djimbarima Chamsadine (“Petitioner”) (DE 1). For the reasons set forth below, the Petition (DE 1) is GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Petitioner is a citizen of Chad. (DE 1 ¶ 16). On October 22, 2023, he entered the United States. (DE ¶ 1). Upon arrival, Petitioner was placed into removal proceedings. (DE 1 ¶ 18). The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) served him with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) and released him. (DE 1 ¶¶ 20-21).

In November 2025, Petitioner failed to stop at a stop sign and was detained by law enforcement, who subsequently transferred him to the custody of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). (DE 1 ¶¶ 22-25). Other than traffic citations, Petitioner does not have a criminal history. (DE 1 ¶ 24). Petitioner is currently detained at Krome North Processing Center, and he now seeks habeas relief, arguing that his continued detention without a bond hearing is unlawful. (DE 1).

II. LEGAL STANDARD District courts have the authority to grant writs of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). Habeas corpus is fundamentally “a remedy for unlawful executive detention.”

Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (citation omitted). A writ may be issued to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is being held in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The Court’s jurisdiction extends to challenges involving immigration-related detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).

III. DISCUSSION Respondents do not contest jurisdiction.1 Accordingly, the Court proceeds to the merits of the Petition.

A. Relevant Immigration Statutes There are three statutes that govern the detention of noncitizens: 8 U.S.C. §§§ 1225, 1226, and 1231. Section 1231 provides for the detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed, including individuals in withholding-only proceedings. Because Petitioner has not yet been ordered removed, Section 1231 does not apply. Accordingly, the Court begins with an analysis of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226. i. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 Section 1225 governs the inspection, detention, and removal of applicants for admission. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225 et seq. Applicants for admission are defined as

1 Indeed, Respondents filed an “abbreviated response . . . in lieu of a formal responsive memorandum of law.” In its abbreviated response, Respondents focus their arguments on the fact that “Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b).” (DE 7 at 2). noncitizens “present in the United States who ha[ve] not been admitted” or those “arriv[ing] in the United States.” Id. All applicants for admission “must be inspected by immigration officers to ensure that they may be admitted into the country consistent with U.S. immigration law.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018).2 To that end, “U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2).” Id. at 289 (emphasis added).

Moreover, “Section 1225(b)(1) applies to all aliens initially determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation.” Id. Such non-citizens are generally subject to expedited removal “without further hearing or review.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). However, if the non-citizen expresses “an intention to apply for asylum” or a fear of persecution,” the statute requires referral to an interview with an immigration officer. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). If the immigration officer finds a “credible fear,” the non-citizen “shall be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.” Id. On the other hand, “Section 1225(b)(2) is broader” and “serves as a catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1).”

Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. Non-citizens covered under § 1225(b)(2) are detained for removal proceedings “if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted” into the

2 Indeed, Jennings began its analysis by emphasizing the temporal and categorical distinction between the detention statutes. Section 1225 applies to noncitizens who are “seeking admission into the country” at the border or a port of entry, whereas § 1226 governs those “already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.”

Jennings, 583 U.S. at 285-89. country. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Importantly, detention under § 1225(b)(2) is mandatory.

See Gomes v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-11571, 2025 WL 1869299, at *8 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025). ii. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 Federal immigration law “also authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis added). Section 1226(a) provides that when a noncitizen has been “arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States,” the Attorney General may either continue to detain the individual or release them on bond or conditional release. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The statute thus “establishes a discretionary detention framework.” Gomes, 2025 WL 1869299, at *2. With this background in mind, the Court now analyzes which statute applies to Petitioner.

B. Whether § 1225 or § 1226 Applies The primary issue before the Court is whether § 1225 or § 1226 governs Petitioner’s detention. Respondents argue that Petitioner is mandatorily detained under § 1225. The Court disagrees.

As a threshold matter, this is a question of statutory interpretation squarely within the Court’s jurisdiction. Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 9, 2025) (“[This case] requires the Court to decide whether § 1226(a) or § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to [Petitioner]. To answer the question, the Court must determine how the two sections interplay with one another. . . . Ultimately, the issue boils down to a matter of statutory interpretation. And matters of statutory interpretation belong historically within the province of the courts.”) (citing Loper Bright Enter. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 386 (2024)); Barrios v. Shepley, No. 25-cv-00406, 2025 WL 2772579, at *5 (D.

Me. Sep. 25, 2025) (district court had jurisdiction to review petitioner’s challenge to the “statutory framework” regarding his detention); See Gomes, 2025 WL 1869299, at *8 n.9 (“[T]o the extent . . . the BIA would conclude that Gomes is subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2), this Court respectfully disagrees with that conclusion. Courts must exercise independent judgment in determining the meaning of statutory provisions”); Mosqueda, 2025 WL 2591530, at *7 (district court had jurisdiction to decide whether § 1225 or § 1226 applied as “[t]hese are purely legal questions of statutory interpretation.”).

This Court and countless others have uniformly rejected the Government’s expansive interpretation of § 1225.3 See e.g., Gil-Paulino v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 25-cv-24292, DE 41, (S.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 2025) (respondent’s interpretation of the INA “directly contravenes the statute” and “disregards decades of settled precedent”); see also Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *7 (“Finally, the BIA's decision to pivot from three decades of consistent statutory interpretation and call for Pizarro Reyes’ detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) is at odds with every District Court that has been confronted with the same question of statutory interpretation.”); Puga, No. 25- The Court recognizes the Fifth Circuit’s recent, divided opinion in Victor Buenrostro- Mendez v. Bondi, et al., which runs contrary to the legion of lower court decisions cited in this Order. No. 25-20496, 2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir. 2026). However, the Fifth Circuit’s decision is not binding on this Court. Carmichael v. United States, No. 19-12298, 2022 WL 908943, at *3 (11th Cir. 2022) (“The decisions of other circuit courts are not binding on district courts within this Circuit.”). Moreover, as Judge Douglas sets forth in her dissent, the majority opinion ignores the fact that the Government’s “newly discovered mandate arrives without historical precedent . . . [and the fact that] the overwhelming majority of courts in [the Fifth Circuit] and elsewhere have recognized that the government’s position is totally unsupported . . . [and] ignore[s] the Supreme Court’s clearly stated understanding of the statutory scheme[.]” Id. at 10. Accordingly, without Eleventh Circuit guidance, this Court will not adopt the Government’s expansive reading of § 1225.

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15, 2025); dos Santos v. Noem, 25-cv-12052, 2025 WL 2370988, at *6–8 (D. Mass. Aug.

14, 2025); Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25-cv-5937, 2025 WL 2371588, at *4–9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); Rosado v. Figueroa, No. 25-12157, 2025 WL 2337099, at *6–11 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025) report and recommendation adopted by, 2025 WL 2349133 (Aug. 13, 2025); Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 25-cv-01873, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171364, at *13–16 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 2025); Martinez v. Hyde, No. 25-11613, 2025 WL 2084238, at *5–9 (D.

Mass. July 24, 2025); Gomes, 2025 WL 1869299, at *5–8; Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779 F.

Supp. 3d 1239, 1256–61 (W.D. Wash. 2025). The Court finds no reason to depart from these decisions here.

Because Petitioner is detained under § 1226, he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows: 1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (DE 1) is GRANTED.

2. Respondents shall afford Petitioner an individualized bond hearing consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) on or before March 20, 2026, or otherwise release Petitioner.

3. Respondents shall file a notice with the Court on or before March 23, 2026, confirming and detailing their compliance with this Order.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Miami, Florida, this 17th day of March, 2026.

KATHLEEN M. WILLIAMS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Page 10 of 10