Elias Gonzales Aguero v. Warden, Krome Service Processing Center, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA CASE NO. 26-cv-21846-ALTMAN ELIAS GONZALES AGUERO, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, KROME SERVICE PROCESSING CENTER, et al., Respondents. __________________________________/ ORDER On March 11, 2026, Elias Gonzalez Aguero filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his continued detention in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). See Petition [ECF No. 1] at 8 (signing the Petition on “March 11, 2026”).1 Six days later, he filed another § 2241 petition before U.S. District Judge Beth Bloom. See Petition, Aguero v. Warden, No. 26-cv-21959-BB (S.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2026), ECF No. 1 at 8 (signing the petition on “March 17, 2026”). The Respondent appeared in this case and filed a Notice explaining that Aguero’s Petition “involves the same parties and same legal issue” as his § 2241 petition before Judge Bloom.

Notice of Pending, Refiled, Related, or Similar Acts [ECF No. 5] at 1. We agree and, after careful review, DISMISS the Petition as duplicative.

“Federal courts retain broad powers to prevent duplicative or unnecessary litigation.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000); see also Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000) We’ll deem Aguero’s Petition filed on March 11, 2026—the date he signed it. See Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1290 n.2 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Under the ‘prison mailbox rule,’ a pro se prisoner’s court filing is deemed filed on the date it is delivered to prison authorities for mailing.”); Jeffries v. United States, 748 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Absent evidence to the contrary, we assume that a prisoner delivered a filing to prison authorities on the date that he signed it.”). (“As part of its general power to administer its docket, a district court may stay or dismiss a suit that is duplicative of another federal court suit.” (citations omitted)); I.A. Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson Nat’l Bank, 793 F.2d 1541, 1551 (11th Cir. 1986) (“It is well established ‘as between federal district courts, . . . the general principle is to avoid duplicative litigation.’” (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976))). “[T]he general rule is that a suit is duplicative of another suit if the parties, issues and available relief do not significantly differ between the two actions.” I.A. Durbin, Inc., 793 F.2d at 1551 (citations omitted). We think this Petition bears all three hallmarks of a duplicative filing. First, Aguero is suing the same parties in both cases. Compare Petition at 1 (suing the “Warden” at “Krome Service Processing Center” and “U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement”), with Petition, Aguero v. Warden, No. 26-cv-21959-BB (S.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2026), ECF No. 1 at 1 (same). Second, Aguero raises the same issues in both petitions. Compare Petition at 6–7 (alleging that his “detention violates the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause of the Fifth Amendment”; that “the Supreme [C]ourt [has] authorize[d] [detention] only where it is singnificantly [sic] likely that removal will occur in [the] reasonable future”; and that “the government may continue detention beyon[d] the 90 day remov[al] period if a noncitizen falls within certain broad categories of remova[bility] or is determined to be a risk of the community”), with Petition, Aguero v. Warden, No. 26-cv-21959-BB (S.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2026), ECF No. 1 at 6–7 (same). Third, Aguero asks for the same relief, too. Compare Petition at 7 (asking for an order “directing the [R]espondent to bring [him] to this [C]ourt at a time to be specified and explain why [he] should not be realeased [sic] from DHS custody”), with Petition, Aguero v. Warden, No. 26-cv-21959-BB (S.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2026), ECF No. 1 at 7 (same). For these three reasons, the Petition is clearly duplicative.

It’s true that his § 2241 petition before Judge Bloom was filed after this Petition. And at least some courts agree that, “when duplicative lawsuits are filed successively in two different federal courts, the court where the action was filed first,” meaning this Court, “has priority”—sometimes called the “first-filed” rule. Chavez v. Dole Food Co., Inc, 836 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2016); see also id. at 217-21 (discussing the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit’s application of the “first-filed” rule). But it’s a/so true that, “where duplicative actions are pending in two federal courts and the second-filed suit has progressed further than the first-filed suit, dismissal of the first in favor of the second 1s appropriate.”

In re M.C. Prods., Inc, 205 F.3d 1351 (9th Cir. 1999). That’s the case here. In Aguero’s case before Judge Bloom, he has already paid the Clerk’s filing fee, and Judge Bloom directed the Respondent to file a response to the petition. See Clerk’s Notice of Receipt of Filing Fee, Agvero v. Warden, No. 26- cv-21959-BB (S.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2026), ECF No. 3; Order to Show Cause, Aguero v. Warden, No. 26- cv-21959-BB (S.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2026), ECF No. 4. In contrast, Aguero hasn’t paid the fee here, and we haven’t ordered a response yet. See generally Docket. So, because Aguero’s second-filed case has outpaced this one, we'll dismiss this Petition as duplicative. * * * We therefore ORDER AND ADJUDGE that Ehas Gonzales Aguero’s Petition [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED without prejudice as duplicative. All pending motions ace DENIED as moot. The Clerk shall CLOSE the case.

DONE AND ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on March 31, 2026.

ROYKALTMAN.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE CC: Ehas Gonzales Aguero, pro se