Idelmis Leyva Dominguez v. Warden, Baker Correctional Institution, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

IDELMIS LEYVA DOMINGUEZ, Petitioner, v. Case No. 3:26-cv-197-WWB-MCR WARDEN, BAKER CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, et al., Respondents. ___________________________________ ORDER Petitioner, a native and citizen of Cuba, initiated this action by filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) is currently detaining Petitioner at the Baker County Detention Center. (Id.). According to the Executive Office for Immigration Review’s (“EOIR”) website, Petitioner’s removal order became final on July 2, 2004. See EOIR, Automated Case Information, available at www.acis.eoir.justice.gov (last visited Feb. 20, 2026). Petitioner contends that ICE detained him on October 25, 2025, to execute his removal. (Doc. 1 at 1–2). He asserts that he is still in ICE custody, and his prolonged detention violates his due process rights under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). (See generally id.). As relief, Petitioner requests that the Court order his immediate release and or an individualized bond hearing. (Id. at 2).

In Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690, the Supreme Court held that indefinite detention of aliens raises serious constitutional concerns. Once an order of removal is final, ICE should make every effort to remove the alien within a reasonable time. Id. at 701. The Court also concluded that six months is a presumptively reasonable period to detain a removable alien awaiting deportation. Id. “Although not expressly stated, the Supreme Court appears to view the six-month period to include the 90-day removal period plus 90 days thereafter.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002).

After that six-month period has passed and the alien “‘provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,’” the burden then shifts to the Government to provide evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. Id. (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701). Thus, “in order to state a claim under Zadvydas the alien not only must show post-removal order detention in excess of six months but also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052.

Here, ICE took Petitioner into custody on October 25, 2025. At the time Petitioner filed the Petition, on January 26, 2026, he had been in ICE custody for 93 days (excluding the date on which the Petition was filed). Although the six-month period will soon expire, the “six-month period . . . must have expired at the time [Petitioner’s] § 2241 petition was filed in order to state a claim under Zadvydas.” Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052; see, e.g., Enwonwu v. Joyce, No. 6:25-CV-0232, 2025 WL 2112712, at *3 (W.D. La. May 14, 2025) (finding a petition premature when it was filed “prior to the expiration of the presumptively reasonable six-month period of post-removal order detention”); H.N. v. Warden, Stewart Det. Ctr., No. 7:21-CV-59, 2021 WL 4203232, at *3 n.5 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2021) (“Even if [the p]etitioner was now past the six-month removal period, his petition would still be subject to dismissal because it had not run—or even commenced—at the time he filed his petition.”); but see Munoz-Saucedo v. Pittman, 789 F. Supp. 3d 387, 398 (D.N.J. 2025) (rejecting the government’s “argument that Zadvydas precludes [the p]etitioner from challenging his detention prior to the six-month mark”). Thus, any claim under Zadvydas is not yet ripe and is dismissed without prejudice as premature.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows: 1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.

3. If Petitioner appeals this Order, the Court denies a certificate of appealability.1 Because the Court has determined that a certificate of appealability is not warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from the pending motions report any motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be filed in this case. Such termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, on February 20, 2026.

1 The court should issue a certificate of appealability only if a petitioner makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make this substantial showing, a petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,’” Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335–36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)). Upon consideration of the record as a whole, this Court denies a certificate of appealability.

WENDY W.B UNITED STATES T JUDG Jax-7 C: Idelmis Leyva Dominguez, #073233015