Supreme Court of Florida, 1942

Hunter Lyon, Inc. v. Walker

Supreme Court of Florida · Decided December 11, 1942 · Terrell, Brown, Whitfield, Buford, Chapman, Adams, Thomas

11 So. 2d 176; 152 Fla. 61; 1942 Fla. LEXIS 694 (Southern Reporter, Second Series)

Cases that cite this one

21 later published cases cite this decision.

Pediatric Nephrology Associates v. Variety Children's Hospital (United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida 2016)
GNB, Inc. v. UNITED DANCO BATTERIES (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
Hoon v. Pate Const. Co., Inc. (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
Am. Diversified Ins. Services, Inc. v. Un. Fid. Life Ins. Co. (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
Ethyl Corp. v. Balter (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
Churruca v. Miami Jai-Alai, Inc. (Fla. 1977)
Serafino v. Palm Terrace Apartments, Inc. (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
Bond v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971)
Port Everglades Terminal Co. v. Trans-Continental Traffic Service Bureau, Inc. (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966)
Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc. (Fla. 1964)
Nancy A. Radford v. United States of America (5th Cir. 1959)
Renpak, Inc. v. Oppenheimer (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)
Robertson v. Industrial Insurance Company (Fla. 1954)
Pokress v. Southern Hotel Corporation (Fla. 1949)
Faulk v. Allen (Fla. 1943)
Townsend v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n (Fla. 1943)
Carroll v. Florida Publishing Co. (Duval County Circuit Court 1964)
Regan v. Davis (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957)
Renpak, Inc. v. Oppenheimer (Palm Beach County Circuit Court 1957)
State Ex Rel. Davis v. City of Clearwater (Fla. 1933)
State Ex Rel. Davis v. City of Clearwater (Fla. 1931)

This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.

Opinion of the Court

TERRELL, J.:

Appellant represents certain insurance companies in Dade County engaged in the business of writing fire, windstorm and other insurance. Some of the appellees are the directors of First Federal Savings and Loan Association engaged in the business of making first loans on homes and business properties.

Appellant sued appellees for conspiring to coerce those to whom they made loans from securing the properties and the loans with policies in insurance companies represented by them (appellant) thereby wantonly inflicting material damage to appellant and its business. A demurrer to the second amended declaration was sustained, the plaintiff declined to amend and final judgment was entered for the defendant. This appeal was prosecuted.

The sole question is whether or not the declaration states a cause of action for conspiracy to wantonly interfere with appellant’s business. Duval Laundry Co. Inc. v. Reif 130 Fla. 276, 177 So. 726; and Globe and Rutgers Fire Insurance Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Fire Ins. Co., 97 Miss. 148, 52 So. 454, are relied on for an affirmative answer to this question.

From these and other cases of like import, the gist of such actions is the malicious, wanton, and unlawful disturbance or interference with the business of the plaintiff to his *63 damage. It extends to all classes of contracts and is good against one or all the defendants, the charge of conspiracy being merely the basis to join all as parties defendant.

The evidence must show wanton and unlawful interference resulting in a refusal of customers to deal with the plaintiff. If it shows rather that the conduct of defendant was an incident to the accomplishment of a legitimate purpose, amounted to nothing more than lawful competition or the exercise of a sound discretion which the law allows a mortgagee to direct within reason, the placing of insurance on the property involved a case of malicious interference is not made.

This rule is particularly applicable to those making high percentage loans on improved property or in cases where it it shown that the insurance agency is for any reason hostile to the lending agency. If the evidence shows these elements rather than malicious interference, relief should be denied. The ultimate issue will be whether the interference charged was done solely through malice or in the lawful protection of defendant’s loans.

We are convinced that the declaration states a cause of action so the judgment below is reversed.

Reversed.

BROWN, C. J„ WHITFIELD, BUFORD, CHAPMAN and ADAMS, JJ., concur. THOMAS, J., dissents.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.