Appellee as plaintiff sued appellant as defendant to collect freight charges on goods delivered by truck. Attachment affidavit was filed with the complaint, writ of attachment was issued and a certain Ford tractor and trailer were taken into custody and return noted on the writ. Affidavit for publication was filed January 20, 1955, and notice of the suit was issued directed to defendant requiring him to defend on or before February 21, 1955. On the last named date defendant filed his answer and motion to dismiss with the Clerk of Circuit Court and a forthcoming bond with the Sheriff of Putnam County. The truck and trailer were then turned over to defendant.

At the trial the Circuit Court found and held that in view of these proceedings and the fact that defendant admitted the amount of the indebtedness in his answer, there were no other material issues of fact for determination so he entered judgment for the plaintiff. This appeal is from that judgment.

The only point for determination is whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction of the defendant.

We think this question requires an affirmative answer and is foreclosed by Rorick v. Stilwell, 101 Fla. 4, 133 So. 609, and Florio v. Colquitt Hardware Co., 160 Fla. 92, 33 So.2d 722. See also 4 Am.Jur. 582, and Wagner v. Farmers’ Co-Operative Exchange Co. of Good Thunder, 147 Minn. 376, 180 N.W. 231, 14 A.L.R. 279.

Affirmed.

(concurring specially) .

I concur in the foregoing opinion and judgment but I think it would have been more appropriate to have quashed the appeal under the provisions of Section 59.33, Florida-Statutes 1951, F.S.A., and to have assessed damages under that Section against the appellant.

A careful examination of the record in this cause as well as the reading of the foregoing opinion by Justice Terrell leaves no doubt that the appeal is wholly without *816merit and falls squarely in the category of appeals condemned by the foregoing Section of the Statute. It is worthy to note that this Statute has been a part of the Statute laws for more than one hundred years. No substantial changes have been made in it since it was originally enacted by the Legislative Council of the Territory of Florida, Section 13 of Act 59 of February 10, 1832.

In 1945 the Legislature reenacted this Section changing the words “courts of error” to “appellate courts” ánd “proceedings in error” to “appeals.” See Section 33, Chapter 22854, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1945. Moreover, this identical section, as amended in 1945, has been brought forward in each reenactment at each regular session of the Legislature since then.

The act was designed not only to compensate the innocent appellee for “delay and expense”, Williams v. La Penotiere, 25 Fla. 473, 6 So. 167,. 169, but also to prevent the deluging of the appellate courts with frivolous appeals. Every such appeal which this Court must hear and consider necessarily takes time which could be well consumed in cases where important and meritorious questions are present. Delay in the administration of justice, whether the case involved liberty or property, is condemned by our Constitution1 and that of most of the other sovereign states of the Nation. It is a matter of great concern not only to the litigant and this Court but to the public and I think it is appropriate to recall the provisions of this Statute to the Bench and Bar. In Redmond v. Donaldson, 35 Fla. 167, 17 So. 70, we assessed the 10% penalty for a frivolous appeal so there is precedent for such action in appropriate cases.