Petitioner, who is awaiting trial on multiple charges of grand larceny, resisting arrest and rioting, presents in this habeas corpus proceeding the single issue of the constitutional propriety of the trial court’s requirement of bail bond surety as a condition to his pretrial release, after an adjudication of his insolvency and appointment of defense counsel.

By a previous proceeding in habeas corpus the amount of petitioner’s total bond upon all charges pending against him has been reduced to $850, and the petition in this Court is confined to the proposition that because of his adjudicated insolvency a requirement of surety in any amount is unreasonable.1 He contends the order of the trial court in these circumstances does not accord petitioner due process and equal protection of law2 on a parity with those who are financially able to< post bond and be at large to aid in pretrial preparation of their defense.

Our study of the decisions under applicable state and federal constitutional provisions indicates uniform adherence in this situation to the rule that “whatever the petitioner’s right in the premises may be, he is not entitled to be discharged from custody without bail, and, as that is the prayer of the petition, it will be denied.”3 *31We find no ground for departure in this case, and conclude that to accede to petitioner’s claim would be to disregard the state’s right to custody or control of an accused, essential for the protection of society, and would make of indigency a pass-key to all places of restraint to which he might be committed prior to trial.

Upon the petition before us there is presented no necessity for determination of whether under our law4 the requirement of security for the bond may be dispensed with upon a showing of other deterrents which may be regarded, on both practical and historical considerations, as equivalent to the threat of forfeiture in reducing the risk of noncompliance with conditions of release.5 Certainly in this age of incredible speed and mobility of urban population no presumptions can be indulged against the necessity for bail security to achieve orderly administration of criminal procedures and insure the presence of the defendant to answer the charges that society has lodged against him when his case is called for trial.

The writ heretofore issued should accordingly be discharged and petitioner remanded. It is so ordered.

(concurring specially).

I agree with Justice Drew’s opinion since it is not contrary to modern concepts that bail may be dispensed with in most cases involving indigents charged with minor offenses under a system providing investigations to determine whether indigents accused of such offenses may be released on recognizance or under other conditions without bail.