This case is before us pursuant to a mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States,1 decided May 20, 1974, reversing a decision of this Court2 and remanding the cause for reconsideration consistent with the views expressed therein.

The suit originally sought to enjoin petitioner union’s alleged breach of a no-strike clause contained in a collective-bargaining agreement, which breach arguably is also an unfair labor practice under the Labor Management Relations Act.3 William E. Arnold Co., the plaintiff in the original action, obtained a temporary restraining order prohibiting a strike by the Carpenters Union. The Carpenters then sought a writ of prohibition from the District Court of Appeal, contending that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to order injunctive relief because the alleged breach of the no-strike clause was also arguably an unfair labor practice. The District Court of Appeal denied the petition for writ of prohibition and, upon a petition for writ of cer-tiorari, this Court reversed, holding that:

“It is unquestionable that state courts do have jurisdiction to enforce a collective-bargaining agreement and to enjoin a strike in violation of a ‘no-strike’ clause contained therein, but not when the strike is also arguably an unfair la1 bor practice prohibited by federal law.” at 302.

*11The Supreme Court of the United States reversed this Court’s holding, stating that:

“ . . . When, however, the activity in question also constitutes a breach of a collective-bargaining agreement, the Board’s authority ‘is not exclusive and does not destroy the jurisdiction of the courts in suits under § 301.’ Smith v. Evening News Ass’n, supra, 371 U.S. [195], at 197, 83 S.Ct. [267], at 269 [9 L.Ed.2d 246]. This exception was explicitly reaffirmed in Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 297-298, 91 S.Ct. 1909, 1923-1924, 29 L.Ed.2d 473 (1971).”

As a result of that opinion, the issue of whether the Circuit Court had jurisdiction to enter the temporary restraining order prohibiting a strike by the Carpenters Union has been resolved.

For this reason the cause is remanded to the District Court of Appeal for further proceedings consistent herewith.

It is so ordered.