We have for review Durden v. State, 743 So.2d 77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), in which the district court certified the same question of great public importance that it had in Woods v. State, 740 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), approved sub nom. State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 345 (Fla. 2000), and several other cases.1 We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

Durden challenges his life sentence under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act2 (the “Act”). We approved the decision in Woods, holding that the Act does not violate the separation of powers clause, and rejecting other constitutional challenges, including those that asserted that the Act is void for vagueness and that the Act violates a criminal defendant’s due process rights by allowing a “victim veto” over whether a defendant is sentenced under it. See State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 345 (Fla. 2000). Therefore, we decline to address those same types of challenges that Dur-den makes here. Further, in Grant v. State, 770 So.2d 655 (Fla. 2000), we held that the Act does not violate the single subject rule for legislation.3

Accordingly, we approve the decision of the district court in Durden’s case.

It is so ordered.

dissenting.

I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissent in State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 345, 358-59 (Fla. 2000).