We have for review the decision in Medina v. State, 758 So.2d 113 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), which certified conflict with the decision in State v. Huggins, 744 So.2d 1215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), approved, 802 So .2d 276 (Fla. 2001). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

Robert Medina raises two issues before this Court. First, he argues that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act (PRRP) cannot be applied to the crime of burglary of an unoccupied dwelling. On this issue we quash the decision of the Second District and remand for reconsideration upon application of our decision in State v. Huggins, 802 So.2d 276 (Fla. 2001).

The second issue involves various constitutional challenges to the PRRP.1 The Second District denied the constitutional challenges and held that all of these issues have been resolved, citing Grant v. State, 745 So.2d 519 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), approved in part and quashed in part, 770 So.2d 655 (Fla. 2000). As to the constitutional challenges, we approve the decision of the Second District based on our decisions in Grant v. State, 770 So.2d 655 (Fla. 2000), and State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 345 (Fla. 2000).

It is so ordered.

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I agree with the majority that the PRRP is constitutional. However, with respect to the question of whether burglary of a dwelling, whether occupied or not, qualifies the defendant for prison releasee reoffender sentencing, I respectfully dissent for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion, and for the reasons set forth in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Wells, in State v. Huggins, 802 So.2d 276 (Fla. 2001).

WELLS, C.J., concurs.