Supreme Court of Florida
                                ____________

                              No. SC2023-1435
                                ____________

INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE NO. 2023-006 & 2023-067 RE:
                HON. JOHN B. FLYNN.

                              March 21, 2024

PER CURIAM.

     We have for review a stipulation between the Judicial

Qualifications Commission and Polk County Judge John Flynn.

The stipulation reflects the parties’ agreement that Judge Flynn

committed misconduct during his 2022 campaign and that, as

discipline, this Court should impose a public reprimand and a 30-

day suspension without pay. We reject the stipulation because it is

based in part on a legally incorrect reading of the Code of Judicial

Conduct. See In re Gooding, 

 (Fla. 2005) (Court

will review stipulated findings to determine if they support the

alleged ethical violation).

     The JQC’s findings and recommendation of discipline involve

two distinct charges for conduct during Judge Flynn’s 2022 judicial
campaign: (1) Judge Flynn made multiple comments showing bias

in favor of law enforcement and against persons accused of crimes;

and (2) Judge Flynn attended a meeting of the Patriot Club of

Lakeland—a meeting to which Flynn’s campaign opponent was not

invited—and later advertised the Patriot Club’s endorsement of his

candidacy. The defect in the stipulation, and by extension in the

JQC’s findings and recommendation, pertains only to the second

charge.

     Based on the discussion in the JQC’s “Findings and

Recommendation of Discipline,” the JQC appears to have

determined that Judge Flynn’s Patriot Club-related conduct violated

only Canon 7C(3). That canon regulates judicial candidates’

attendance at a “political party function.” Canon 7C(3) also says

that a candidate should “refrain from commenting on the

candidate’s affiliation with any political party or other candidate,

and should avoid expressing a position on any political issue.”

     The problem is that the findings and stipulation contain no

proof that the Patriot Club of Lakeland is a “political party.” The

JQC’s findings instead say that the club is a “political organization,”

a defined term in the Code of Judicial Conduct. Under the Code,


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“political organization” means “a political party or other group, the

principal purpose of which is to further the election or appointment

of candidates to political office.” While the Code makes a “political

party” a type of “political organization,” the term “political

organization” also includes entities that are not a political party. In

other words, the Code does not use the terms “political party” and

“political organization” synonymously. The JQC erred by

interpreting Canon 7C(3) in a way that ignores the difference

between those terms.

     We cannot overlook a legal error like this just because both

parties agreed to it. So, we reject the stipulation and remand the

case for further proceedings. We leave it to the parties to decide

whether to propose another stipulation or to proceed in some other

fashion consistent with the JQC’s rules.

     It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and
SASSO, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., specially concurs with an opinion.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.




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LABARGA, J., specially concurring.

     I agree with the majority to the extent that it remands this

matter for further proceedings. However, as opposed to open-ended

proceedings wherein the parties are left “to decide whether to

propose another stipulation or to proceed in some other fashion

consistent with the JQC’s rules,” majority op. at 3, I believe that

these proceedings should involve an evidentiary hearing

culminating in detailed factual findings.

     Moreover, while the majority observes that the terms “political

party” and “political organization” are not used synonymously

under the Code of Judicial Conduct, see 

 I am concerned with

the practical effect of attempting to distinguish these terms and the

impact of such a distinction when determining what types of

conduct are permissible under the Code.

Original Proceeding – Judicial Qualifications Commission

Gregory W. Coleman, Chair, and Alexander J. Williams, General
Counsel, Judicial Qualifications Commission, Tallahassee, Florida,

     for Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, Petitioner

Victor Smith, Winter Haven, Florida,

     for Judge John B. Flynn, Respondent



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