Supreme Court of Florida
                             ____________

                          No. SC2023-0518
                            ____________

                         THE FLORIDA BAR,
                           Complainant,

                                  vs.

                            MALIK LEIGH,
                             Respondent.

                           March 13, 2025

PER CURIAM.

     The Florida Bar seeks review of a referee’s report

recommending that Respondent, Malik Leigh, be found guilty of

professional misconduct in violation of the Rules Regulating The

Florida Bar and suspended for 91 days.1 The Bar challenges the

entirety of the report, arguing that the referee’s factual findings are

insufficient and that the referee either dismissed or overlooked

significant acts of misconduct that support Leigh’s disbarment. For

the reasons discussed below, we find Leigh guilty of all 24 rule


     1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.
violations charged in the Bar’s complaint and disbar him from the

practice of law in Florida.

                              BACKGROUND

     The Bar filed a six-count complaint against Leigh after

receiving multiple judicial referrals from the presiding judges in the

cases Leigh initiated. Counts I and II pertain to Leigh’s conduct

while engaged in litigation involving three related cases in the

United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

against several named defendants including the Palm Beach County

School District (collectively the “School Board litigation”). During

the litigation, Leigh made a number of threatening social media

posts directed at the opposing parties in the cases, which raised

significant security concerns about those involved in the litigation

and necessitated the entry of a protective order by the federal court.

Leigh also made false accusations about opposing counsel,

accusing her in court filings of committing forgery and other

offenses without any factual basis for doing so.

     In Counts III through VI, Leigh was charged with committing

multiple rule violations stemming from his attempt to initiate a

toxic tort class action case on behalf of the residents of Stonybrook


                                 -2-
Apartments in the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit.

Leigh repeatedly failed to file a viable complaint in the case, despite

filing numerous amended pleadings over a two-year period. He also

failed to comply with numerous court orders, and he used a

paralegal to question an employee of a party that he knew was

represented by counsel. And when the case was eventually

appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Leigh falsely

accused the presiding circuit court judge in the case of racial bias.

                              ANALYSIS

       A. Findings of Fact and Recommendations of Guilt

     The Bar challenges the referee’s factual findings, arguing they

are vague and deficient, and recommendations as to guilt, arguing

that Leigh should be found guilty of 24 violations of the Rules

Regulating The Florida Bar. “To the extent that the Bar challenges

the referee’s findings of fact, this Court’s review of such matters is

limited, and if a referee’s findings of fact are supported by

competent, substantial evidence in the record, this Court will not

reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the

referee.” Fla. Bar v. Alters, 

 (Fla. 2018) (citing Fla.

Bar v. Frederick, 

 (Fla. 2000)).


                                  -3-
     Also, to the extent the Bar challenges the referee’s

recommendations as to guilt, “the referee’s factual findings must be

sufficient under the applicable rules to support the

recommendations.” Fla. Bar v. Bander, 

, 814 (Fla.

2023) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Patterson, 

 (Fla. 2018)).

As the party challenging the referee’s findings of fact and

recommendations as to guilt, the Bar has the burden to

demonstrate that there is no evidence in the record supporting, or

clearly contradicting, the recommendations. 

 (citing Fla. Bar v.

Germain, 

 (Fla. 2007)).

     We first note that the referee’s report is deficient as the referee

failed to make detailed, factual findings for every count. However,

upon our review of the record, we find that the evidence in the

record clearly supports finding Leigh guilty of all 24 charged rule

violations. We discuss our reasons below.

                                Count I

     During the School Board litigation, Leigh published

humiliating, disparaging, and threatening social media posts

directed at those involved in the case, which the federal district

court found to have delayed and interfered with the discovery


                                 -4-
process. Leigh also posted other violent, morbid messages around

the same time, although not related to the litigation. These posts

included a photo of himself with the text: “After this round if [sic]

depos in the next 2 weeks, would love to start a shooting

campaign.” He also posted a picture of a tommy gun being fired by

a movie character from The Mask with the message: “Me the next

time im [sic] in front of the #Liverpool back line!! YOU GUYS

SUCK!!! 4years now! Get it together!” Another post stated: “I can’t

hate the US and it’s [sic] people more right now. Just need a mass

extinction event right now!”

     When defense counsel learned of the social media posts, he

abruptly suspended an ongoing deposition and filed a motion to

reschedule the remaining depositions and for a protective order

from the court. The court granted protective relief and ordered the

presence of an armed police officer for the remaining depositions.

Leigh was sanctioned and ordered to pay the defendants’ attorneys’

fees for filing and litigating the motion to suspend and reschedule

the depositions and for the protective order. Leigh was also

suspended from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of Florida for two years.


                                     -5-
     Based on this conduct, we find Leigh guilty of violating rules

4-3.6(a) (“A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a

reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of

public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should

know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially

prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding due to its creation of an

imminent and substantial detrimental effect on that proceeding.”),

4-8.4(a) (“A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules of

Professional Conduct . . . .”), and 4-8.4(d) (“A lawyer shall not

engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is

prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to knowingly,

or through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or

discriminate against litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or

other lawyers on any basis . . . .”).

                                Count II

     Leigh and opposing counsel, Lisa Kohring, were required to

submit a joint pretrial stipulation. Leigh and Kohring were working

together on the joint stipulation and on the afternoon the

stipulation was due, they exchanged several drafts of the document.

Ultimately, Leigh replied to Kohring’s last e-mail copying Kohring’s


                                  -6-
paralegal, attaching a copy of a pretrial stipulation with his

signature affixed and stating in the body of the e-mail: “Pretrial

Stipulation to sign and file.” Leigh did not explain in the e-mail that

he had made additional changes to the draft stipulation or note that

he had signed the document. Shortly after receipt and without

reviewing Leigh’s attachment, the paralegal filed a pretrial

stipulation that was not the version e-mailed by Leigh, and which

contained an electronic signature purportedly by Leigh’s law

partner, Danielle Watson, who was not involved in the drafting of

the stipulation but was copied on the e-mail exchanges. 2

     After Leigh realized the stipulation that was filed was different

from the version he had e-mailed, he contacted Watson and learned

that she had not authorized the filed stipulation. Because it was

after normal business hours and Leigh knew Kohring had left the

office for the day, Leigh filed his own version of the stipulation in an

addendum with Watson’s name in the signature block, expressly

accusing Kohring of forging Watson’s electronic signature. This




     2. Watson’s related misconduct was also referred to the Bar.
See Fla. Bar v. Watson, No. SC2023-0416 (Fla. Mar. 13, 2025).


                                 -7-
filing, which was styled as a “Joint PreTrial Stipulation Addendum”

contained the following statement:

     [T]he Joint Pre-trial Stipulation [DE 71] by the
     Defendant’s Counsel, Lisa Kohring, not only filed the
     wrong Pre-trial Stipulation, but she forged Plaintiff
     Counsel, Danielle Watson’s electronic signature and filed
     it. The Actual “agreed” or “joint” stipulation which was
     submitted with Attorney, Malik Leigh, Esq’s endorsement
     and submitted to Defense counsel [f]or filing is attached
     herein without Defense Counsel’s Signature. Counsel
     will follow up with an official Motion regarding this
     action.

     The next morning, Kohring reviewed the pretrial stipulation

and addendum and requested by e-mail that Watson and Leigh

retract their statements in the addendum. Leigh and Watson

ignored Kohring’s e-mails and calls. After receiving no response,

Kohring again e-mailed Watson and Leigh, stating that she had

tried calling twice and warning that she may seek sanctions. Leigh

replied to Kohring’s e-mail, claiming that Kohring “forged” Watson’s

signature and could be subject to sanctions or criminal penalties

based on her office affixing Watson’s signature to the stipulation

without authorization.

     Kohring and Leigh each filed a motion for sanctions.

Ultimately, the judge denied Leigh’s motion but granted Kohring’s,



                                -8-
finding that Leigh and Watson acted in bad faith and holding them

jointly responsible for the defendants’ attorneys’ fees.

     Leigh’s conduct resulted in additional proceedings, a court

finding that he acted in bad faith, and sanctions. We, thus, find

that the record clearly supports a finding that Leigh is guilty of

violating rules 4-8.4(a) (“A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to

violate the Rules of Professional Conduct . . . .”) and 4-8.4(d) (“A

lawyer shall not engage in conduct in connection with the practice

of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, including

to knowingly, or through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate,

or discriminate against litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel,

or other lawyers on any basis . . . .”).

                                Count III

     In the Stonybrook case, Leigh attempted to initiate a

proceeding and obtain immediate injunctive relief by filing a

“Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Emergency Motion for Preliminary Injunction.”

Leigh claimed the residents of Stonybrook Apartments were living in

inhumane and unsafe housing conditions. The circuit court denied

the motion because it did “not allege matters entitled to be heard on

an emergency or expedited basis.” Nevertheless, Leigh filed a notice


                                  -9-
of hearing, setting the motion, which had already been denied, for a

half-day hearing.

     A short time later, Leigh filed an amended motion seeking the

same relief. The court again denied the motion because it was

procedurally deficient. The court advised Leigh to cure the

deficiencies in his filing within 10 days, serve all defendants, and

then seek non-emergency, non-ex parte relief in the ordinary course

of business.

     Counsel for Defendants Millennia Housing Management, Ltd.,

LLC and Stonybrook FL, LLC filed a limited appearance and

response to Leigh’s amended motion and sought to cancel the half-

day hearing Leigh set for the motion that had already been denied.

Defendant City of Riviera Beach also filed a limited appearance and

motion to quash the improper service of the first motion and strike

the notice of hearing and the purportedly issued subpoena to the

City’s Building Official to appear at the hearing. The court

cancelled the hearing.

     Despite notice that a motion was not the proper vehicle to

bring a claim, Leigh filed a “**Corrected** Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Preliminary Injunction.” This third motion contained the same


                                 - 10 -
allegations as his first two motions and sought the same emergency

relief. Stonybrook filed a motion for sanctions because Leigh filed

three motions improperly requesting injunctive relief that contained

identical allegations despite the court’s rulings. At a hearing on

Stonybrook’s motion, the court deferred ruling on the motion,

pending the filing of a complaint stating a valid claim, and informed

Leigh that his motions failed to satisfy certain pleading

requirements. The court also granted Riviera Beach’s motion to

quash because of Leigh’s failure to follow Florida Rule of Civil

Procedure 1.070 (Process).

     Finally, Leigh filed a “Class Action Complaint with

Accompanying Request for Class Representation and Demand for

Jury Trial (corrected).” Stonybrook filed a motion to dismiss and

strike redundant and immaterial portions of the complaint, arguing

that Leigh improperly named the defendant as “Stonybrook FL, LLC

(aka Millennia Housing Management/Millennia Companies),” when

Stonybrook and Millennia are two separate entities. Furthermore,

the counts were commingled against numerous defendants, making

it impossible for Stonybrook to frame its defenses, and Leigh failed

to meet the threshold of the class certification requirements under


                                - 11 -
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220 (Class Actions) or the

requirements for entitlement to a preliminary injunction. Riviera

Beach also filed a motion to dismiss the class action complaint,

arguing that it was immune from suit under sovereign immunity.

The court held a hearing on Stonybrook’s motion and struck several

words and phrases from Leigh’s complaint as scandalous,

immaterial, or impertinent.

     Thereafter, Leigh filed an amended class action complaint,

which despite the court’s earlier ruling, contained many of the same

words and phrases that the court had struck from his initial

complaint. Riviera Beach and Millennia filed motions to dismiss

Leigh’s amended complaint, and Defendants GMF-Stonybrook,

L.L.C. and GMF-Preservation of Affordability Corp. (referred to

collectively as “GMF”) filed a motion for involuntary dismissal with

prejudice. The motion listed Leigh’s violations of the court’s orders

and claimed that the amended complaint had not been served and

was so deficient that responding properly would be nearly

impossible because it commingled claims against the several

defendants and failed to comply with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure

1.130 (Attaching Copy of Cause of Action and Exhibits).


                                - 12 -
Additionally, GMF attached to its motion copies of social media

posts targeting the defendants in the case that were made by Leigh

and his law firm’s social media account, which included references

to “ ‘Concentration Camp-like’ conditions” and allegations that the

property was run by “organized crime syndicates.”

     At a hearing on GMF’s motion for involuntary dismissal, the

court declined to dismiss the case with prejudice after considering

the impact that it would have on the plaintiffs. However, the court

ordered Leigh to secure a mentor to assist him in the case and

certify that the amended complaint complied with the court’s

previous orders and that it was well-founded and accurately stated

the law. The court also ordered Leigh to take a two-hour

professionalism and civility course and imposed a gag order on the

parties and attorneys, precluding public discussion of the case and

ordering existing social media posts be removed. Thereafter, Leigh

filed a second amended complaint, but the filing violated the court’s

orders because it contained the same language that the court had

previously stricken and failed to contain the court-ordered

certification from an approved mentor.




                               - 13 -
     GMF, Stonybrook, Millennia, and Riviera Beach all filed

motions to dismiss the second amended complaint and a joint

motion for sanctions against Leigh for his failure to comply with the

court’s orders. The court granted Riviera Beach’s motion to dismiss

on sovereign immunity grounds and granted Stonybrook’s,

Millennia’s, and GMF’s motions to dismiss without prejudice. The

court held Leigh in contempt for failing to comply with the court’s

orders, finding that Leigh

     admitted that he has failed to comply with the Court’s
     57.105 Order and the Court’s Sanctions Order by: (a)
     failing to pay the sanctions when due; (b) failing to attend
     a professionalism class as ordered; (c) failing to obtain a
     proper mentor and have that mentor certify all
     substantive pleadings (including the Second Amended
     Complaint) and significant motions (specifically,
     Plaintiffs’ motion to disqualify the Court); (d) failing to
     comply with the Court’s orders striking certain
     inflammatory language; (e) failing to comply with the
     rules of pleading to state a viable cause of action, and (f)
     failing to comply with the Gag Order by, inter alia: (i)
     failing to remove references to Defendants and this
     pending litigation from his website and social media
     accounts; and (j) posting to his social media account
     about this pending litigation after the imposition of the
     Gag Order.

The court disqualified Leigh from representing any interest of the

putative class members and ordered him to pay the reasonable

costs and attorneys’ fees the defendants incurred in connection


                                - 14 -
with the show cause hearing. The court gave Leigh an opportunity

to purge his contempt of court orders, but he failed to do so.

     Nevertheless, Leigh filed a third amended complaint. This

complaint still contained the same language the court previously

struck, was uncertified by a mentor, and contained many of the

same deficiencies as the prior complaints. The court found that the

third amended complaint violated the court’s prior orders and

dismissed the complaint without prejudice but without further leave

to amend to bring claims by multiple plaintiffs, instead requiring

each plaintiff to bring his or her claim individually by commencing

new actions. The court ordered Leigh and his law firm jointly and

severally liable for the defendants’ attorneys’ fees totaling

$39,989.90.

     Ultimately, Leigh was grossly incompetent in trying to initiate

the class action lawsuit on behalf of the Stonybrook residents. He

repeatedly attempted to bring an action by filing a motion for

injunctive relief, even after the court denied the motion as improper.

He was also held in contempt for violating numerous court orders

and despite the court providing Leigh an opportunity to purge his

contempt, he failed to do so. He made several social media posts


                                 - 15 -
related to the Stonybrook case, even after the court imposed a gag

order to avoid tainting the jury pool. Leigh’s conduct covered two

years of litigation, during which he was unable to file a complaint

that stated a viable claim, resulting in the dismissal of his clients’

complaint. His conduct caused costly litigation, and Leigh was

sanctioned for payment of the defendants’ attorneys’ fees.

     Thus, we find that the record clearly supports a finding that

Leigh is guilty of violating rules 4-1.1 (“A lawyer must provide

competent representation to a client.”), 4-3.1 (“A lawyer shall not

bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue

therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is

not frivolous . . . .”), 4-3.4(c) (“A lawyer must not knowingly disobey

an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open

refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists[.]”),

4-3.6(a) (“A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a

reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of

public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should

know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially

prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding due to its creation of an

imminent and substantial detrimental effect on that proceeding.”),


                                 - 16 -
4-8.4(a) (“A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules of

Professional Conduct . . . .”), and 4-8.4(d) (“A lawyer shall not

engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is

prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to knowingly,

or through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or

discriminate against litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or

other lawyers on any basis . . . .”).

                                Count IV

     When Leigh filed the first amended complaint in the

Stonybrook case, he received notice that e-service delivery had

failed. He sent an e-mail to opposing counsel, acknowledging the

error and attaching the complaint but not including any exhibits,

which is required for proper service. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.130(b);

1.070(e). Nevertheless, he filed a motion for default, claiming the

complaint was served. In denying Leigh’s motion for default, the

court specifically found that “there was no legal support for

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default either factually or by an application of

then-existing law to the facts presented.” Additionally, as to Leigh’s

complaint against the City of Riviera Beach, the court awarded

sanctions against Leigh and found that “counsel knew or should


                                  - 17 -
have known that the claims stated in the Complaints against the

City were not supported by the application of then-existing law to

the material facts alleged in the Complaints.” The court awarded

Riviera Beach $16,150.00 in attorney’s fees to be paid by Leigh and

his law firm, jointly and severally.

     Therefore, we find that the record clearly supports a finding

that Leigh is guilty of violating rules 4-1.1 (“A lawyer must provide

competent representation to a client.”), 4-3.1 (“A lawyer shall not

bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue

therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is

not frivolous . . . .”), 4-3.4(c) (“A lawyer must not knowingly disobey

an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open

refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists[.]”),

4-8.4(a) (“A lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules of

Professional Conduct . . . .”), and 4-8.4(d) (“A lawyer shall not

engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is

prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to knowingly,

or through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or

discriminate against litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or

other lawyers on any basis . . . .”).


                                  - 18 -
                               Count V

     During the Stonybrook litigation, Leigh contacted Carol Baer,

a court reporter, to take the sworn statement of Mayra Lugaro,

assistant manager of Millennia, a party represented by counsel.

Leigh sent Baer a list of questions to ask Lugaro. Leigh explained

to Baer that as an opposing party, he could not be present for the

sworn statement and could not talk to Lugaro. Baer took the sworn

statement at Lugaro’s home and asked Lugaro Leigh’s questions.

Leigh traveled to Lugaro’s residence and waited outside while the

sworn statement was being taken. During the sworn statement,

Leigh texted Baer about obtaining internal confidential company

documents from Lugaro.

     Leigh used the information obtained from the sworn

statements and documents to support allegations in his third

amended complaint. He also attempted to disqualify defense

counsel and have the court impose sanctions on Stonybrook,

Millennia, and GMF based on allegations that they were retaliating

against his clients. Based on this conduct, the court disqualified

Leigh from representing any clients in the litigation or in any other




                                - 19 -
matter against the defendants relating to the Stonybrook

Apartments complex.

     Based on this conduct, we find Leigh guilty of violating rules

3-4.3 (“The commission by a lawyer of any act that is unlawful or

contrary to honesty and justice may constitute a cause for

discipline . . . .”), 4-4.2(a) (“In representing a client, a lawyer must

not communicate about the subject of the representation with a

person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer

. . . .”), 4-4.4(a) (“In representing a client, a lawyer may not . . .

knowingly use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal

rights of such a person.”), 4-8.4(a) (“A lawyer shall not violate or

attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct . . . .”), and

4-8.4(d) (“A lawyer shall not engage in conduct in connection with

the practice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of

justice, including to knowingly, or through callous indifference,

disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, jurors,

witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on any basis . . . .”).

                                 Count VI

     Leigh appealed the circuit court’s order holding him in

contempt and sanctioning him to the Fourth District Court of


                                   - 20 -
Appeal. In the initial brief, Leigh challenged the sanctions imposed

against him by labeling these actions as “the trial court’s repeated

acts of bias and disregard for neutrality in various hearings and

positions.” Leigh asserted that the adverse rulings entered against

him were based on his race rather than for any substantive

purpose, stating:

           Third, Plaintiffs’ Counsel was accused of violating
     the Florida Bar, in various areas: communication,
     candor, and competency. These were not based upon
     any substantive purpose other than they occurred after a
     witness (white) accused Plaintiffs’ Counsel (Black) of
     being aggressive with her and calling her a pejorative;
     one who’s [sic] very corroborative witnesses stated was
     not truthful. . . .
           ....
           Sixth, whether the Court can bypass the Class
     Certification process set forth in F.R.C.P. 1.220 in
     retaliation of the Plaintiffs finding zero confidence in the
     trial court judge’s ability to adjudicate fairly and without
     bias (implicit racial bias or any other exhibited) in a way
     that seeks to destroy both the Plaintiffs’ credibility, the
     credibility of their arguments, and Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s
     credibility.

Furthermore, Leigh directly charged:

           What the Plaintiffs in the trial case; Appellants in
     the instant, are sure of is that the judicial system literally
     took one look at them and denied them a fair opportunity
     to be heard. That it all started typically enough: a white
     woman accused a large scary black man of something he
     did not do, and there were witnesses to support his side.
     But those witnesses all looked like him, and those on the


                                 - 21 -
     other side all looked their way; and in the end, regardless
     of what was presented to the contrary, this is also what
     the Court saw.

     Leigh made numerous assertions that the trial judge engaged

in repeated acts of racial bias, but he failed to establish that he had

an objectively reasonable factual basis for making the statements.

Although Leigh claimed that adverse rulings entered against him

were based on his race rather than for any substantive purpose, the

record reflects that Leigh was sanctioned for violating numerous

court orders and filing a frivolous complaint against the City, and

the complaint against the remaining defendants was ultimately

dismissed because despite numerous opportunities to amend the

complaint, Leigh was not able to plead a viable cause of action.

     Based on this conduct, we find Leigh guilty of violating rule

4-8.2(a) (“A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer

knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity

concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge . . . .”). See Fla.

Bar v. Jacobs, 

, 883 (Fla. 2023) (explaining that the

Court uses “an objective test, asking if the lawyer had ‘an

objectively reasonable factual basis for making the statements’ ”

(quoting Fla. Bar v. Ray, 

 (Fla. 2001))). We also


                                 - 22 -
find that Leigh is guilty of violating rules 4-8.4(a) (“A lawyer shall

not violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional

Conduct . . . .”) and 4-8.4(d) (“A lawyer shall not engage in conduct

in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to the

administration of justice, including to knowingly, or through callous

indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants,

jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on any

basis . . . .”).

                             B. Discipline

      We disapprove the referee’s recommended sanction of a 91-day

suspension. Considering the multitude of offenses and egregious

nature of Leigh’s conduct, we find disbarment is the appropriate

sanction. Leigh exhibited gross incompetence and has

demonstrated that he lacks the ability to grasp the most basic,

fundamental legal concepts. In failing to follow court orders and

rules, he has displayed contempt for the courts, the parties

involved, and the legal system as a whole. Moreover, his repeated

actions indicate an unwillingness to learn from his mistakes. We

hold that such flagrant misconduct signifies a significant character

flaw and merits a severe sanction.


                                 - 23 -
     “Prior to making a recommendation as to discipline, referees

must consider the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, which

are subject to aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and this

Court’s existing case law.” Fla. Bar v. Strems, 

, 90

(Fla. 2022). Our review of a referee’s recommended discipline “is

broader than that afforded to the referee’s findings of fact because,

ultimately, it is [our] responsibility to order the appropriate

sanction.” Patterson, 

 (citing Fla. Bar v. Anderson,

 (Fla. 1989); art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.).

                              Standards

     In looking at the Standards, we find support for disbarment as

the presumptive sanction in this case. See Fla. Stds. for Imposing

Law Sancs. 4.5(a) (“Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer’s

course of conduct demonstrates that the lawyer does not

understand the most fundamental legal doctrines or procedures

and causes injury or potential injury to a client.”); 6.2(a)

(“Disbarment is appropriate when a lawyer causes serious or

potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding or knowingly

violates a court order or rule with the intent to obtain a benefit for

the lawyer or another and causes serious injury or potentially


                                 - 24 -
serious injury to a party.”); 7.1(a) (“Disbarment is appropriate when

a lawyer intentionally engages in conduct that is a violation of a

duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for

the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious

injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.”).

                  Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

     As to aggravation, the referee found three factors under

Standard 3.2(b): (1) pattern of misconduct; (2) multiple violations;

and (3) indifference to making restitution. The Bar claims that the

referee erred in failing to find three additional aggravating factors:

dishonest or selfish motive, refusal to acknowledge the wrongful

nature of the conduct, and substantial experience in the practice of

law. We find error only in the referee’s failure to find a dishonest or

selfish motive as an aggravating factor.

     “[A] referee’s findings of mitigation and aggravation carry a

presumption of correctness and will be upheld unless clearly

erroneous or without support in the record.” Germain, 

 (citing Fla. Bar v. Arcia, 

, 299 (Fla. 2003)).

The referee declined to find a dishonest or selfish motive in

aggravation because Leigh was providing legal services on a pro


                                  - 25 -
bono basis. But Leigh violated several rules involving dishonesty,

and his use of a court reporter to ask an employee of an opposing

party questions that he was expressly prohibited by rule from

asking himself was entirely dishonest. Thus, we find dishonest or

selfish motive as an aggravating factor.

     As to mitigation, the referee found nine factors under

Standard 3.3(b): (1) absence of a disciplinary record; (2) absence of

a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) personal or emotional problems;

(4) cooperative attitude towards the proceedings; (5) inexperience in

the practice of law; (6) character or reputation; (7) unreasonable

delay in the disciplinary process; (8) interim rehabilitation; and (9)

remorse. We find error in five of these findings.

     First, because we have found that the referee erred in not

finding a dishonest or selfish motive in aggravation, we

correspondingly disapprove the referee’s finding in mitigation of

absence of a dishonest or selfish motive.

     Next, the Bar challenges the referee’s findings that Leigh’s

personal or emotional problems are mitigating factors. Notably, the

Bar does not contest the underlying facts related to Leigh’s personal

and emotional problems. Instead, the Bar argues that the problems


                                 - 26 -
were related to his childhood and young adulthood and unrelated to

the events that transpired in this case. We agree. In Florida Bar v.

Schwartz, 

, 612 (Fla. 2024), we found that the

mitigating factor did “not apply because at issue is a life-long

personality characteristic as opposed to an acute emotional

impairment.” Similarly, the referee in this case even emphasized

that these events in Leigh’s life shaped his character, and she did

not find that his actions were caused by an acute impairment.

Therefore, we hold that the referee’s finding of this mitigating factor

is clearly erroneous.

     The Bar challenges the referee’s finding as a mitigating factor

that Leigh was inexperienced in the practice of law. This finding is

inconsistent with the referee’s analysis of aggravating factors.

However, in examining her justification for finding this mitigator,

she appears to be referring to Leigh’s inexperience in a specific area

of litigation. We recently explained that “the substantial experience

factor is not parsed by expertise in specific areas of the law, but

instead applies to experience related to the capability of determining

whether conduct is violative of the rules.” Bander, 361 So. 3d at




                                 - 27 -
817. Accordingly, we hold that the referee’s finding of this

mitigating factor is clearly erroneous.

     Additionally, the Bar challenges the referee’s finding of

unreasonable delay as a mitigating factor. To find this mitigating

factor, it requires not only that there has been a delay, but also that

the respondent demonstrate “specific prejudice resulting from that

delay.” Here, the referee found no prejudice, stating that “no

witness was unavailable due to the delay.” Accordingly, we reject as

clearly erroneous the referee’s finding of unreasonable delay as a

mitigating factor.

     The Bar also argues that the referee’s finding of interim

rehabilitation is unsupported by the record. In finding this factor,

the referee cited the uncontroverted testimony that Leigh has

practiced ethically since 2020. However, at the time of the hearing,

Leigh still had not complied with court orders to take

professionalism and ethics courses. When asked if he had done

anything to help with his mental health or obtain additional

education, he gave vague, evasive answers. Also, at the time of the

hearing, Leigh had not paid the monetary sanctions imposed

against him and his firm. Therefore, we hold the referee’s finding of


                                - 28 -
this mitigating factor is clearly erroneous. Cf. Fla. Bar v. Irish, 

 (Fla. 2010) (holding that referee’s rejection of

interim rehabilitation as a mitigating factor was supported when

respondent spoke to a doctor for a couple hours but did nothing

more); Fla. Bar v. Valentine-Miller, 

 (Fla.

2008) (holding that referee’s finding of interim rehabilitation was

supported when respondent checked herself into an inpatient

rehabilitation facility).

                               Case Law

     Finally, in determining the appropriate sanction, we look to

prior cases for guidance. In Florida Bar v. Springer, 

(Fla. 2004), we held that disbarment was warranted where the

respondent engaged in multiple instances of misconduct in six

matters, which collectively demonstrated a pattern of failing to

provide competent representation, failing to act with reasonable

diligence, and misrepresenting the status of the client’s matter.

     In Florida Bar v. Committe, 

 (Fla. 2014), we

imposed a three-year suspension on a respondent who filed a

frivolous tort action and failed to pay the monetary sanction

imposed for the frivolous lawsuit. Then, after receiving two letters


                                 - 29 -
requesting payment be rendered, “Committe wrote to the United

States Attorney, accusing the defendant of attempting to extort

money from him and requesting that she be criminally prosecuted.”

.

     Considering the totality of Leigh’s actions and the resulting

number of rule violations, we conclude that the case law supports

disbarment. We acknowledge that cases where we imposed a

lengthy rehabilitative suspension, such as Committe, are similar but

note that the misconduct at issue in those cases does not rise to the

level of Leigh’s misconduct in this case. Leigh’s misconduct is more

comparable to the misconduct that occurred in Springer, where, like

here, there was a lengthy pattern of misconduct and gross

incompetence. We find that the magnitude of Leigh’s misconduct

signifies a larger issue with Leigh that cannot be remedied by a

rehabilitative suspension.

     While Leigh has no prior disciplinary record and we typically

approach discipline incrementally, we have disbarred attorneys with

no prior history when the violations are egregious enough. See

Strems, 

. Here, Leigh’s conduct demonstrates a

failure to grasp the most fundamental legal doctrines or procedures,


                                - 30 -
and despite numerous warnings, he has demonstrated a propensity

to flout court rules and orders. Leigh’s refusal to follow multiple

court orders demonstrates that he is not amenable to learning or

rehabilitation. Further, at the time of the hearing before the

referee, Leigh had not yet paid the sanctions, demonstrating a lack

of respect for the court’s authority in imposing the sanctions and a

disregard for the parties to whom the sanctions are owed.

     We conclude, based on a review of relevant case law, the

Standards, and the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the

referee, that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this case.

                             CONCLUSION

     Accordingly, Malik Leigh is disbarred from the practice of law

in Florida. Leigh’s disbarment is effective 30 days from the date of

this opinion so that Leigh can close out his practice and protect the

interests of existing clients. If Leigh notifies this Court in writing

that he is no longer practicing and does not need the 30 days to

protect existing clients, we will enter an order making his

disbarment effective immediately. Leigh must not accept any new

business from the date of this opinion, and he is prohibited from




                                 - 31 -
engaging in any acts constituting the practice of law in Florida once

his disbarment becomes effective.

     Leigh must fully comply with Rules Regulating The Florida Bar

3-5.1(h) and, if applicable, 3-6.1.

     Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson

Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from

Malik Leigh in the amount of $3,594.42, for which sum let

execution issue.

     It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS,
FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.

THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR REHEARING SHALL NOT ALTER
THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS DISBARMENT.

Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar

Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, Patricia Ann Toro Savitz, Staff
Counsel, Mark Lugo Mason, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar,
Tallahassee, Florida,

     for Complainant

Juan Carlos Arias of Law Office of Juan Carlos Arias, Esq., Fort
Lauderdale, Florida,

     for Respondent




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