Supreme Court of Florida
                            ____________

                         No. SC2025-1320
                           ____________

                    DAVID JOSEPH PITTMAN,
                           Appellant,

                                 vs.

                       STATE OF FLORIDA,
                            Appellee.

                        September 10, 2025

PER CURIAM.

     David Joseph Pittman is a prisoner under a sentence of death

for whom a warrant has been signed and an execution set for

September 17, 2025. He appeals the circuit court’s order

summarily denying his fourth successive motion for postconviction

relief filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and

denying his motion for a stay of execution filed under section

922.07(1), Florida Statutes (2025). 1 For the reasons that follow, we




     1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
affirm the circuit court’s order and deny Pittman’s motion for stay

of execution.

                                   I

     In 1990, Pittman was going through a contentious divorce

with his former wife, Marie. Pittman v. State (Pittman I), 

 (Fla. 1994).2 Pittman had made several threats against

Marie and her family. 

 He had also recently learned that Marie’s

sister, Bonnie, was attempting to press criminal charges against

him for an alleged rape that happened years earlier. 

     After cutting their phone lines from the outside, Pittman went

to the Knowles’ home on May 15, 1990. 

, 169 n.2.

Pittman was planning to speak with Bonnie about the problems he

was having with her family when Bonnie let him into the home. 

. When she refused his sexual advances, Pittman killed her

by stabbing her multiple times and slitting her throat to silence her

cries for help. 

 Pittman then stabbed and killed Marie’s mother

outside of Bonnie’s bedroom and, as Marie’s father was attempting

to use the phone, stabbed and killed him also. 

 After killing



     2. The full facts of this case are set forth in this Court’s
opinion on direct appeal. See Pittman I, 

.

                                  -2-
Marie’s family, Pittman doused the home and yard with gasoline,

burned the home down, and stole Bonnie’s car. 

, 169 n.2.

        Pittman was indicted on three counts of first-degree murder,

two counts of arson, and one count each of burglary and grand

theft. A jury ultimately found Pittman guilty of all but burglary.

. At the conclusion of the penalty phase proceedings, the

jury recommend the death penalty for all three murders by a vote of

nine to three. 

 The trial court sentenced Pittman to death,

finding two aggravating circumstances for each murder: (1) a

previous conviction of a violent felony, and (2) the heinous,

atrocious, or cruel nature of the murders. 

 In doing so, the trial

court rejected Pittman’s mitigating factors of extreme mental and

emotional disturbance, concluding that the aggravating factors

substantially outweighed the mitigating factors Pittman had proven.

 3



     3. The trial court acknowledged that Pittman put forward
expert opinions that his “capacity to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law was substantially impaired” and that he
suffered brain damage. See 

 at 169 n.2. However, the court
noted that these expert opinions were the only evidence in the
record supporting these mitigating circumstances. 

 The court
additionally found that Pittman was a “hyperactive personality,”
“may have suffered physical and sexual abuse as a child,” and was

                                  -3-
     Pittman has since unsuccessfully challenged his convictions

and death sentences in both state and federal court. In 1994, we

affirmed each of Pittman’s convictions and sentences on direct

appeal and denied rehearing. 

.4 The United States

Supreme Court denied Pittman’s certiorari petition. Pittman v.

Florida, 

 (1995). Pittman then sought postconviction

relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, which the

circuit court denied. We affirmed. 5 Pittman v. State (Pittman II),



an “impulsive person with memory problems and impaired social
judgment.” 

 Ultimately, however, the court determined that
these mitigating circumstances were both unrelated to the murders
and substantially outweighed by the established aggravating
circumstances. Id.

      4. Pittman’s claims on direct appeal were: (1) the trial court
erred in allowing evidence of collateral crimes and bad acts; (2) the
trial court erred in admitting identification testimony; (3) the trial
court erred in excluding hearsay statements of a third party’s
alleged confession; (4) the trial court failed to hold a presentencing
hearing; (5) the trial court rendered a legally insufficient sentencing
order; (6) the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance
is unconstitutionally vague; (7) the trial court erred in instructing
the jury on the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating
circumstance; (8) the trial court erred in failing to find the two
statutory mental mitigating circumstances; (9) the trial court erred
in failing to find nonstatutory mitigating circumstances; and (10)
the death penalty is disproportionate in this case. Id. at 170 n.3.

     5. Pittman raised the following claims on appeal: (1) the
postconviction court erred in denying his Brady v. Maryland, 373

                                 -4-


 (Fla. 2011). We also denied Pittman’s initial

habeas petition. See id.

 (1963), claim with respect to inmate Carl Hughes; (2) the
postconviction court erred in denying his Brady claim with respect
to inmate David Pounds; (3) the postconviction court erred in
denying his Brady claim with respect to the handwritten notes of
other witness interviews; (4) the postconviction court erred in
denying his Brady claim with respect to Dennis Waters’s
identification of the wrecker; (5) the postconviction court erred in
denying his Brady claim with respect to the letter concerning
William Smith; (6) the postconviction court erred in denying relief
based on the cumulative effect of all withheld and newly discovered
evidence; (7) the postconviction court erred in denying his Giglio v.
United States, 

 (1972), claim; (8) the postconviction
court erred in denying his guilt phase ineffective assistance of
counsel claim; (9) the postconviction court erred in denying his guilt
phase newly discovered evidence claim; (10) the postconviction
court erred in denying his penalty phase Brady claim; (11) the
postconviction court erred in denying his penalty phase ineffective
assistance of counsel claim; and (12) the postconviction court erred
in denying his penalty phase newly discovered evidence claim.
Pittman II, 

 n.8.

      6. The habeas petition raised the following claims: (1)
appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the Florida Supreme Court erred in
affirming the exclusion of certain evidence; (3) the Florida Supreme
Court erred in affirming Pittman’s convictions and sentences where
the State withheld pertinent facts; (4) appellate counsel was
ineffective in failing to argue that Pittman’s death sentences were
based on an improper aggravator; (5) appellate counsel was
ineffective in failing to argue that the prosecutor used improper
argument in the penalty phase; and (6) appellate counsel was
ineffective in failing to argue that the penalty phase jury was misled
by improper comments and instructions. 

 at 804 n.9.

                                 -5-
     Pittman then sought relief in federal court, but the United

States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied his

habeas petition and the United States Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Pittman v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.

(Pittman III), No. 8:12-cv-1600-T-17EAJ, 

, at *1

(M.D. Fla. Feb. 20, 2015); see also id. at *68 (declining to issue a

certificate of appealability); Pittman v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.

(Pittman IV), 

 (11th Cir. 2017). Pittman also

unsuccessfully sought certiorari relief in the United States Supreme

Court. Pittman v. Jones, 

 (2018).

     Most recently, Pittman filed a third successive motion for

postconviction relief and a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure

3.800(a) motion to correct illegal sentence. Pittman v. State

(Pittman V), 

, 776 (Fla. 2022).7 The amended

postconviction motion raised an intellectual disability claim, and

the 3.800(a) motion asserted that Pittman’s death sentences were

illegal because he did not receive an evidentiary hearing on the



     7. Pittman filed his first and second successive motions for
postconviction relief but did not appeal their denial by the circuit
court. See 

 at 777 n.2.


                                   -6-
intellectual disability claim. 

 The postconviction court denied

both motions, and we affirmed. Id. at 777.

     On August 15, 2025, Governor DeSantis issued a death

warrant for the execution of Pittman. As a result, Pittman filed a

fourth successive motion for postconviction relief and a motion for a

stay of execution. His fourth successive motion raised one claim:

that his death sentence is unconstitutional because he is entitled to

an evidentiary hearing to show that his execution is constitutionally

prohibited due to his intellectual disability. The postconviction

court entered an order summarily denying Pittman’s motions.

Pittman timely appeals and filed a motion for a stay of execution.

                                   II

                                   A

     “Summary denial of a successive postconviction motion is

appropriate ‘[i]f the motion, files, and records in the case

conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.’ ” Bogle v.

State, 

, 46 (Fla. 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B)); see also Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(h)(6).

In reviewing a circuit court’s summary denial, “this Court must

accept the defendant’s allegations as true to the extent that they are


                                  -7-
not conclusively refuted by the record.” Tompkins v. State, 

 (Fla. 2008) (citing Rolling v. State, 

 (Fla. 2006)). Still, “[t]he defendant bears the burden to

establish a prima facie case based on a legally valid claim; mere

conclusory allegations are insufficient.” Franqui v. State, 

 (Fla. 2011) (citing Freeman v. State, 

(Fla. 2000)). A circuit court’s decision whether to grant an

evidentiary hearing on a rule 3.851 motion “is tantamount to a pure

question of law, subject to de novo review.” Marek v. State, 

 (Fla. 2009) (citing State v. Coney, 

(Fla. 2003)).

     Also relevant here, postconviction claims in capital cases must

generally be filed within one year after the judgment and sentence

become final. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1). With certain exceptions,

rule 3.851 prohibits both untimely and repetitive claims. Fla. R.

Crim. P. 3.851(e)(2); see also Hendrix v. State, 

 (Fla. 2014) (“Claims raised and rejected in prior postconviction

proceedings are procedurally barred from being relitigated in a

successive motion.” (citing Van Poyck v. State, 

(Fla. 2013))).


                                -8-
                                   B

     On appeal, Pittman challenges the postconviction court’s

denial of his intellectual disability claim. His claim relies in large

part on retroactive application of Hall v. Florida, 

(2014), which this Court decided should be applied retroactively in

Walls v. State (Walls I), 

 (Fla. 2016). But in

Phillips v. State, 

 (Fla. 2020), we held that the

Walls I decision was clearly erroneous and that Hall should not be

retroactively applied. Id. at 1019-21. So, Pittman argues that

Phillips was wrongly decided.

     Like we have before, we decline to revisit Phillips and conclude

the postconviction court correctly applied it to Pittman’s claim. See

Foster v. State, 

, 130 (Fla. 2024) (rejecting invitation

to recede from Phillips), cert. denied, 

 (2025); Walls

v. State (Walls II), 

, 233 (Fla.) (noting we have already

rejected arguments to recede from Phillips and have instead

consistently applied its holding in the postconviction context), cert.

denied, 

 (2023).

     Because Phillips governs, Pittman’s claim fails for several

reasons. First, his claim is untimely, as we already held in


                                  -9-
Pittman V. See 337 So. 3d at 777 (holding Pittman was required to

raise his intellectual disability claim no later than 60 days after

October 1, 2004).

     Second, because Pittman has already raised his intellectual

disability claim, it is procedurally barred. See Hendrix, 

 (“Claims raised and rejected in prior postconviction

proceedings are procedurally barred from being relitigated in a

successive motion.” (citing Van Poyck, 

)). We

equally reject Pittman’s argument that procedural bars should not

apply to intellectual disability claims. Indeed, we have regularly

applied procedural bars to exemption-from-execution claims. See

Dillbeck v. State, 

, 100 (Fla. 2023) (holding that this

Court’s precedent “flatly refutes Dillbeck’s contention that no time

limits apply to categorical exemption claims”); Barwick v. State, 

, 795 (Fla. 2023) (same); Carroll v. State, 

 (Fla. 2013) (same). And our approach is consistent with the

Eleventh Circuit’s. See In Re Bowles, 

 (11th Cir.

2019). 8



     8. Because the claim is both untimely and procedurally
barred, Pittman is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Moreover,

                                 - 10 -
     Finally, we reject Pittman’s argument that his execution is

constitutionally prohibited. To the extent that Pittman presents a

due process argument, it fails. “Due process requires that a

defendant be given notice and an opportunity to be heard on a

matter before it is decided.” Asay v. State, 

 (Fla.

2016) (citing Huff v. State, 

 (Fla. 1993)). Here,

Pittman has received the process due to him and has failed to meet

the requisite standards for overcoming summary denial. See Bates

v. State, No. SC2025-1127, 

, S224-25, 

, at *4-5 (Fla. Aug. 12, 2025) (rejecting a death row

defendant’s request for due process relief to further demonstrate his

mental state at the time of his offense because it was time-barred),

cert. denied, No. 25-5370, 

 (U.S. Aug. 19, 2025).

     Likewise, this Court’s decision to adhere to Phillips does not

result in an arbitrary and capricious application of the death

penalty. We recently rejected a similar Eighth Amendment

challenge, noting that developments in the case law did not alter

our previously held position that Florida’s death penalty scheme is



this Court will not subvert its role as an appellate court and make a
factual finding about Pittman’s intellectual capabilities.

                                - 11 -
constitutionally sound. See Miller v. State, 

, 1127

(Fla.) (rejecting argument that Lawrence v. State, 

(Fla. 2020), and Bush v. State, 

 (Fla. 2020), result in

arbitrary application of death penalty), cert. denied, 

(2024). Our decision in Phillips, which correctly applies our

established retroactivity test, also does not alter that analysis.

                                   C

     Because Pittman is not entitled to relief, we deny his motion

for a stay of execution. See Dillbeck, 357 So. 3d at 103 (“[A] stay of

execution on a successive motion for postconviction relief is

warranted only where there are substantial grounds upon which

relief might be granted.” (quoting Davis v. State, 

 (Fla. 2014))).

                                  III

     We affirm the summary denial of Pittman’s fourth successive

motion for postconviction relief. We also deny his motion for stay of

execution. No oral argument is necessary, and no motion for

rehearing will be considered by this Court. The mandate shall issue

immediately.

     It is so ordered.


                                 - 12 -
MUÑIZ, C.J., and COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and
SASSO, JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., dissents with an opinion.
CANADY, J., recused.

LABARGA, J., dissenting.

     In Pittman v. State (Pittman V), 

, 777 (Fla.

2022), I dissented to the majority’s decision affirming the summary

denial of Pittman’s intellectual disability claim. The majority’s

affirmance was based on its conclusion in Phillips v. State, 

 (Fla. 2020) (receding from Walls v. State, 

(Fla. 2016), and holding that Hall v. Florida, 

 (2014),

does not apply retroactively).

     I dissented in Phillips in light of my concern that the decision

“potentially deprives certain individuals of consideration of their

intellectual disability claims, and it results in an inconsistent

handling of these cases among similarly situated individuals.” 299

So. 3d at 1026 (Labarga, J., dissenting).

     In this death warrant case, Pittman yet maintains that he is

intellectually disabled, and he urges this Court to allow him “the

opportunity to present a full and complete picture of his intellectual

disability.” Because I continue to adhere to my dissent in Phillips, I



                                 - 13 -
dissent to today’s decision affirming the summary denial of

Pittman’s fourth successive motion for postconviction relief.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Polk County,
    Jon K. Abdoney, Judge – Case No. 531990CF002242A1XXXX

Eric Pinkard, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Julissa R.
Fontán, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Megan
Montagno, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, and John
“Jack” LoBianco, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel,
Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida,

     for Appellant

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Timothy A.
Freeland, Special Counsel, Assistant Attorney General, and Michael
W. Mervine, Special Counsel, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa,
Florida,

     for Appellee




                                - 14 -