Brown v. City of Union Point
Cases that cite this one
9 later published cases cite this decision.
- Sheley v. Board of Public Education (Ga. Ct. App. 1974)
- Watts v. City of Dillard (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)
- Willis v. City of Atlanta (Ga. Ct. App. 2004)
- Williams v. Solomon (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)
- Ellis v. City of Fairburn (United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia 1994)
- City of Thomson v. Davis (Ga. Ct. App. 1955)
- Boone v. City of Columbus (Ga. Ct. App. 1953)
- Greenwood v. City of Lincoln (Neb. 1952)
- Black v. Baker (Tex. 1938)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Certain language used in Duke v. Rome, 20 Ga. 635, 636, as a negative pregnant, and quoted in Bartlett v. Columbus, 101 Ga. 300, 303 (28 S. E. 599, 44 L. R. A. 795), is relied on by the plaintiff and is as follows: “Can an action in any form be maintained against a municipal corporation for an error in judgment, only where exercising judicial functions, where no corruption and malice is imputed? We think not. Just as well upon principle sue this or any other court.” (Italics ours.)
In Gould v. Atlanta, 60 Ga. 165, 166, 167, a mayor and council were charged with having willfully, wantonly, and maliciously passed a resolution subjecting non-resident plaintiffs to a city tax, for the purpose of preventing them from competing with city merchants. No question appears to have been there presented or decided as to any legal basis for the city’s liability, except the general principle, as stated in the opinion, that “the city government had as little right to attack them, in the way alleged in the declaration, as it had to attack the oldest and most reputable merchant in the community.” The question of the city’s liability for an exercise of governmental functions, either with or without willfulness, wantonness, or malice, seems not to have been raised or discussed. Therefore these cases can not be taken as sustaining the principle contended for by the plaintiff, that, even though a city may not be held liable for the merely unlawful acts of its police and other officers, done in the performance of legislative or judicial duties under governmental functions, yet the city will become liable if such acts were done corruptly, willfully, wantonly, or maliciously. So to hold would run counter to the plain and specific adjudications of our Supreme Court, and would have the effect in many cases of nullifying both section 69-307 and section 69-301 of the Code, which declare that municipalities shall not be liable for “the torts” of their “policemen or other officers engaged in the discharge of the duties imposed on them by law,” or “for failure to
Judgment affirmed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.