In this action to recover a real-estate broker’s commission there was a conflict in the evidence (the defendant having been cross-examined by the plaintiff) as to whether the defendant had requested an agent of the plaintiff to procure him a purchaser, and the case should have been submitted to a jury. Neither the testimony of an agent for the plaintiff that the defendant did not expressly promise to pay a commission (Code § 3-107) and that an agent for the plaintiff told the prospective purchaser that she would get the house for him at as low a price as possible, demanded a finding for the defendant; nor, under the circumstances of this case, would the fact that the defendant refused to permit the plaintiff to advertise the house at a particular time and refused to keep the house open at a particular time for the plaintiff to exhibit, demand a finding for the defendant. There, was evidence which would have authorized a jury to find that the property was listed with the plaintiff for sale at a named sale price for a reasonable commission and that the plaintiff’s agent’s services were the procuring cause of the sale, under which circumstances the owner would be liable for a reasonable commission despite the fact that the defendant sold the property himself to the prospective purchaser for a price less than that at which it was listed with the plaintiff. Odell v. Dozier, 104 Ga. 203 (2) (30 S. E. 813); Edwards v. Andrews Bros., 24 Ga. App. 645 (1) (101 S. E. 775); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 31 Ga. App. 486 (119 S. E. 445); Vaughn v. Clements, 65 Ga. App. 823, 825 (16 S. E. 2d 607); Hendrix v. Crosby, 76 Ga. App. *456191, 193 (45 S. E. 2d 448); Erwin v. Wender, 78 Ga. App. 94 (50 S. E. 2d 244).

The court erred in not reinstating the case on proper motion after the grant of a nonsuit.

Judgment reversed.