This dispute concerns the apportionment of attorney fees he-neen former and present attorneys representing employee, Jacquelyn rleaton, in a workers’ compensation claim.

The record reflects that former attorney Alvin L. Kendall resented his client with a $15,000 employer’s settlement offer at a me after his fee contract had been approved by the State Board of Workers’ Compensation (Board). In doing so, he indicated that this as the employer’s final offer. Thereafter, the employee discharged Kendall and hired present attorney Stephen Lerner, and Lerner’s fee jreement was mailed to the Board. Further discovery and renewed ittlement negotiations were conducted by Lerner and the employer icreased its settlement offer to $30,000.

Before settling the case, Lerner sent a letter to Kendall advising im of the potential for settlement and requesting Kendall make a aim for attorney fees. Kendall failed to respond. Subsequently, a ;ipulated agreement was approved by the Board in which Kendall’s ame was included as the former attorney for the employee. The jreement provided for the division of attorney fees by binding agreement of counsel, i.e., Kendall and Lerner, or, in the event no agree-ent could be reached, the fee was to be held in escrow by counsel for íe employer until an award from the Board directing payment of ;torney fees was issued.

Inasmuch as Kendall and Lerner failed to reach agreement as to ie attorney fees due them, the matter was heard before an adminis-ative law judge (ALJ) of the Board. The ALJ awarded all attorney es to Kendall because Lerner failed to provide for his fee in the ttlement agreement. The Appellate Division of the Board reversed e ALJ’s order and awarded $5,000 to Kendall and $5,000 to Lerner. pon appeal to the superior court, the trial court reversed, and Ler-¡r appeals the trial court’s order on the ground that it is violative of e “any evidence” rule. We agree.

It is well-settled that findings of fact by the Board, when supported by any evidence, are conclusive and binding on reviewini courts and judges lack authority to set aside an award based on sucl findings of fact for disagreement with the conclusions reached. See J & L Foods v. Brooks, 214 Ga. App. 438 (448 SE2d 19) (1994); How ard Sheppard, Inc. v. McGowan, 137 Ga. App. 408 (224 SE2d 65 (1976).

In the instant case, the Appellate Division found that the reason able value of services provided by counsel in this matter was $5,000 t< Kendall and $5,000 to Lerner. This is supported by evidence of recon indicating, among other things, that present counsel Lerner repre sented the claimant during the conduct of substantial discovery, in eluding taking the deposition of the claimant. Additional efforts oi behalf of the claimant are implicit, at least in some measure, in th final settlement agreement which doubled the initial offer.

Kendall contends that our former decisions of Don Mac Gol Shaping Co. v. Register, 185 Ga. App. 159 (363 SE2d 583) (1987) and Yates v. Hall, 189 Ga. App. 885 (377 SE2d 887) (1989) mandate tha he should be awarded all attorney fees in this case as a matter of lav The foregoing decisions, however, may be distinguished from the fací of the case at bar in that in each case counsel was unaware of settle ment negotiations prior to the issuance of the final settlement agree ment.

Furthermore, the present case is distinguishable from our decision in Bass v. Annandale at Suwanee, 187 Ga. App. 209 (369 SE2 529) (1988), in that the issue of attorney fees was here expressly ac dressed in the settlement agreement whereas the settlement agret ment in Bass was silent in this respect.

Since the Appellate Division’s finding as to the apportionment c attorney fees is supported by evidence of record, the trial court erre by reversing the Board’s award of the same.

Judgment reversed.