Daugherty v. Jarrett
Daugherty v. Jarrett
Opinion of the Court
On October 19, 1994, Jasper County authorities seized property of Wyman Jarrett, plaintiff-appellee, his son Larry Jarrett, and Ralph Jarrett incident to the arrest of Larry Jarrett for violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act (“GCSA”), i.e., possession with intent to sell methamphetamine, possession of illegal firearms, and possession of vehicles with altered vehicle identification numbers. Larry Jarrett hired John F. Daugherty and the law firm of Greer, Klosik & Daugherty (“Greer Klosik”) to represent himself and his father in the criminal charges and the civil forfeiture proceeding.
On December 8, 1994, the district attorney filed a civil forfeiture proceeding pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-49 for the property seized. On January 3, 1995, an answer was filed timely. The documentation of ownership, i.e., bill of sale, deed, closing statement, and survey, had
On August 5, 1997, Wyman Jarrett sued Greer Klosik for legal malpractice in failing to file a proper answer to the civil forfeiture action under OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (3). Greer Klosik filed its answer. On April 17, 1998, Greer Klosik filed its motion for summary judgment. Jarrett responded, stating “[i]n support of this response, the plaintiff relies on all the pleadings, briefs, and discovery on file with the Court.” On June 12, 1998, the trial court denied Greer Klosik’s motion for summary judgment.
On July 14, 1998, Greer Klosik’s application for discretionary appeal was granted. On July 16,1998, Greer Klosik’s notice of appeal was filed.
Greer Klosik contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant their motion for summary judgment. We agree.
Jarrett v. State of Ga., supra, was specifically overruled in Rojas v. State of Ga., 269 Ga. 121, 123 (498 SE2d 735) (1998). The Supreme Court held: “[w]e conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in Jarrett in holding that an amended answer cannot relate back to a timely-filed initial answer, and we therefore overrule that portion of the Jarrett decision.” Id.; see also Jackson v. State of Ga., 231 Ga. App. 320, 321 (1) (498 SE2d 159) (1998); Lee v. State of Ga., 225 Ga. App. 733, 734-735 (484 SE2d 777) (1997); Knodal v. State of Ga., 222 Ga. App. 514 (474 SE2d 700) (1996); State v. Gonzales, 213 Ga. App. 661, 662 (445 SE2d 808) (1994). Thus, it cannot be said that the law was settled and its application clearly demanded, and the failure to apply it apparent. See Berman v. Rubin, 138 Ga. App. 849, 853 (227 SE2d 802) (1976). Where the Court of Appeals was equally divided in Rojas v. State of Ga., supra at 121, as pointed out by the Supreme Court, as to whether the relation back of an amendment should apply, this, as a matter of law, clearly manifested the uncertain state of the law that Greer Klosik faced. “[Ujnless the law is so well settled, clear,
Upon examination of the amendment to the answer in Jarrett v. State of Ga., supra, it did supply the information and fully complied with OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (3), so that the trial court erred in denying summary judgment. See Rojas v. State of Ga., supra at 123; Jackson v. State of Ga., supra at 321.
Judgment reversed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.