Sandlin v. State
Sandlin v. State
Opinion
After a jury trial, Jason Allen Sandlin was acquitted of driving under the influence of drugs to the extent that he was less safe, 1 and was convicted of driving under the influence of a controlled substance 2 and failure to maintain lane. Sandlin was also charged with, and pled nolo contendere to, possession of marijuana. On appeal, *574 Sandlin argues that the trial court committed three errors: (1) it denied his motion to suppress; (2) it overruled his demurrer challenging the constitutionality of OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (6); and (3) it entered a judgment of conviction on the violation of OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (6). Because this case is governed by Love v. State, 3 which held that OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (6) was unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, we reverse Sandlin’s conviction on this charge.
1. The record shows that David Golz, a forensic toxicologist employed by the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, testified that Sandlin’s blood contained metabolites of marijuana and alprazolam, which is commonly referred to as Xanax. Golz testified that alpra-zolam, a Schedule IV drug, 4 is a controlled substance that acts as a central nervous system depressant, and is only available through prescription.
OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (6) provides that a person with any amount of marijuana or a controlled substance in his or her urine or blood can be convicted of driving under the influence. Under OCGA § 40-6-391 (b), however, a person who legally uses a controlled substance can only be convicted of DUI if that person “is rendered incapable of driving safely as a result of using a drug other than alcohol which such person is legally entitled to use.” 5 Therefore, Sandlin maintains that the statute denies him equal protection under the law because it disparately treats legal and illegal users of alprazolam.
The same argument was made in Love, 6 in which our Supreme Court held that OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (6) was unconstitutional as it pertained to persons with detectable levels of marijuana in their systems. 7 The Court explained that the legislative distinction between users of legal and illegal marijuana was not directly related to the public safety purpose of the legislation. 8 Therefore, it concluded that the statute was arbitrarily drawn and was an unconstitutional denial of equal protection. 9 The Court reversed the defendant’s conviction. The same result is warranted here because alprazolam is also a controlled substance that can be legally prescribed. 10 The state *575 maintains that Sandlin was required to show that he was legally authorized to use the alprazolam, but Love 11 does not require such a showing to assert an equal protection challenge to the statute. Thus, Sandlin’s conviction of violating OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (6) cannot stand.
2. In light of our holding in Division 1, we need not address Sandlin’s remaining enumeration of error.
Judgment reversed.
OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (2). The drugs identified in the accusation were alprazolam and marijuana.
OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (6). The controlled substance named in the accusation was alprazolam.
271 Ga. 398 (517 SE2d 53) (1999).
See OCGA § 16-13-28 (a) (1).
OCGA § 40-6-391 (b).
Supra.
Id. at 402-403 (3).
Id. at 403 (3).
See Doster v. State, 259 Ga. App. 605, 607, n. 2 (578 SE2d 262) (2003) (demurrer to DUI charge granted based upon Love, supra, where defendant tested positive for the presence of amphetamine, a Schedule II drug (OCGA § 16-13-26 (3) (A)). Compare Keenum v. State, 248 *575 Ga. App. 474, 475 (2) (546 SE2d 288) (2001) (OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (6) is not unconstitutional when applied to those convicted of driving with a detectable level of cocaine in their systems because “there would never be an instance of a ‘legal cocaine user’ ”). Accord Head v. State, 303 Ga. App. 475, 477-478 (2) (693 SE2d 845) (2010) (same).
Supra.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.