Medrano v. State
Opinion of the Court
Following a jury trial, Manual Medrano was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual battery and one count of child molestation against his girlfriend’s daughter, D. R.
“On appeal from a criminal conviction, a defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict.”
So viewed, the evidence shows that D. R., who was 16 years old at the time of trial, testified that when she was 11 years old, Medrano would hug her, fondle her breasts, and tell her that he loved her “like an adult.” Later that year, Medrano then took D. R. and her sister to a vacant trailer where he had previously lived. Leaving her sister in the car, Medrano took D. R. into the trailer and had sexual intercourse with her for the first time. Afterward, Medrano threatened “to do something to my sister and my mom would get sick” if D. R. told anyone what he had done to her.
The first incident was isolated because D. R.’s mother was home with the girls most of the time. But when the mother found a temporary job that took her away from home from time to time, Medrano took advantage of these occasions to have sexual intercourse with D. R. D. R. “lost count” of how many times Medrano had sex with her “because it was a lot.”
At some point, D. R. took matters into her own hands. She borrowed a tape recorder and secretly recorded several conversations she had that day with Medrano. In one conversation, after D. R. states that she “will not sleep with” Medrano anymore, he threatens her with “consequences” and says that he will reveal the nude photographs of her.
1. Medrano first contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because there was conflicting evidence presented to the jury indicating that D. R. lied about the molestation because she wanted to prevent her mother from marrying Medrano. However, it is the function of the jury, not this Court, to judge the credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.
2. Medrano contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because (a) he was unaware of Medrano’s immigration status; (b) he did not object to an English translation of Medrano’s notes to D. R. being sent back with the jury; (c) he did not object to the admission of evidence of adult pornography found on Medrano’s cell phone; and (d) he moved for a directed verdict on all counts without argument.
Medrano argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by deciding not to object to allowing the jury to see translations of the notes written by Medrano to D. R. and by not objecting to the admission of adult pornography found on Medrano’s cell phone. There is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct falls within the broad range of reasonable professional conduct, and a criminal defendant must overcome this presumption.
Medrano next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he was not fully aware of Medrano’s immigration status at the time of trial and because he moved for a directed verdict after the close of evidence without any argument to the court. These arguments fail because Medrano has not shown prejudice from the alleged errors. Trial counsel’s failure to provide argument to support his motion for directed verdict is unlikely to have swayed the trial judge. At the motion for new trial, the trial judge stated that “in this case, probably more than most, if not any other ... child molestation case that this Court has presided over, the documentary and recorded evidence is overwhelming.” Further, Medrano has not shown that the result of the trial would have changed if his trial counsel had full knowledge of his immigration status.
Judgment affirmed.
Medrano was acquitted of battery and sexual battery against a child under 16.
(Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Goss v. State, 305 Ga. App. 497 (699 SE2d 819) (2010).
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bray v. State, 294 Ga. App. 562, 563 (1) (669 SE2d 509) (2008).
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Miller v. State, 273 Ga. 831, 832 (546 SE2d 524) (2001).
See Hammontree v. State, 283 Ga. App. 736, 737 (1) (642 SE2d 412) (2007).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).
Cuzzort v. State, 307 Ga. App. 52, 55 (2) (703 SE2d 713) (2010).
(Citation omitted.) Id.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Robinson v. State, 277 Ga. 75, 76 (586 SE2d 313) (2003).
(Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Nesbitt v. State, 296 Ga. App. 139, 142 (3) (d) (673 SE2d 652) (2009).
But compare Padilla v. Kentucky,_U. S._(III) (130 SC 1473, 176 LE2d 284) (2010) (an attorney who fails to advise client that he faced automatic deportation if he entered a plea of guilty was not constitutionally competent).
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.