Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia ATLANTA,____________________ April 03, 2017 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order: A17A1356. DEWAYNE CARTER GIPSON v. THE STATE.

In 2014, Dewayne Carter Gipson pled guilty to one count of child molestation, and the trial court sentenced him to 20 years with seven to serve. Two years later, Gipson filed a motion to vacate a void sentence. The trial court denied the motion, and Gipson filed this direct appeal.

A direct appeal may lie from an order denying a motion to vacate or correct a void sentence only if the defendant raises a colorable claim that the sentence is, in fact, void. See Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, 217, n. 1 (686 SE2d 786) (2009); Burg v. State, 297 Ga. App. 118, 119 (676 SE2d 465) (2009). “Motions to vacate a void sentence generally are limited to claims that – even assuming the existence and validity of the conviction for which the sentence was imposed – the law does not authorize that sentence, most typically because it exceeds the most severe punishment for which the applicable penal statute provides.” von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569, 572 (2) (748 SE2d 446) (2013). When a sentence is within the statutory range of punishment, it is not void. Jones v. State, 278 Ga. 669, 670 (604 SE2d 483) (2004).

Here, Gipson’s 20-year sentence falls within the statutory range of punishment. See OCGA § 16-6-4 (b) (1) (sentence for child molestation is “not less than five nor more than 20 years”).

In a novel legal argument, Gipson suggests that OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (b) mandates the trial court sentence him only to the five year minimum to serve with the remainder of his sentence on probation.1 Five years, however, is the mandatory minimum rather than the mandatory sentence. See OCGA § 16-6-4 (4); see also New v. State, 327 Ga. App. 87, 108 (5) (755 SE2d 568) (2014). Accordingly, Gipson has not raised a colorable argument that his sentence is void, and the trial court’s denial of his motion is not subject to direct appeal. See Frazier v. State, 302 Ga. App. 346, 348 (691 SE2d 247) (2010). For this reason, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________ 04/03/2017 I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (b) provides, in relevant part, that “any person convicted of a sexual offense shall be sentenced to a split sentence which shall include the minimum term of imprisonment specified in the Code section applicable to the offense.”