Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia ATLANTA,____________________ August 24, 2017 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order: A18A0058. LEMUEL MABRY, III v. THE STATE.

In 2015, Lemuel Mabry, III, pled guilty to aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court imposed a 20-year total sentence, with the first 12 years to be served in prison, and the remainder to be served on probation. The record contains no indication that Mabry filed a direct appeal from his judgment of conviction.1 In May 2017, Mabry filed a motion to vacate or correct a void sentence, raising several challenges to his indictment. The trial court denied Mabry’s motion, and he filed this direct appeal. We lack jurisdiction.

Under OCGA § 17-10-1 (f), a court may modify a sentence during the year after its imposition or within 120 days after remittitur following a direct appeal, whichever is later. Frazier v. State, 302 Ga. App. 346, 348 (691 SE2d 247) (2010).

Once this statutory period expires, a trial court may modify only a void sentence. Id. A sentence is void if the court imposes punishment that the law does not allow. Jones v. State, 278 Ga. 669, 670 (604 SE2d 483) (2004). When a sentence falls within the statutory range of punishment, it is not void and is not subject to modification beyond the time provided in § 17-10-1 (f). See id. Moreover, a direct appeal does not lie from the denial of a motion to modify a sentence filed outside the statutory time

In September 2016, this Court dismissed as untimely Mabry’s appeal from the denial of his motion for an out-of-time appeal. See Mabry v. State, No. A17A0054 (Sept. 15, 2016). period unless the motion raises a colorable claim that the sentence is, in fact, void.

Frazier, 302 Ga. App. at 348.

Here, each of Mabry’s claims challenge his convictions, and not his sentences, and thus do not state colorable void-sentence claims. See Jones v. State, 290 Ga. App. 490, 493-494 (1) & (2) (659 SE2d 875) (2008) (challenge to validity of indictment is challenge to conviction, not sentence). To the extent that Mabry’s challenge to the two firearm charges may be read as a claim that the two ensuing convictions should have merged, such a claim likewise implicates the validity of his convictions, and not his sentences, and similarly does not state a valid void-sentence claim. See Williams v. State, 287 Ga. 192, 193-194 (695 SE2d 244) (2010). Finally, to the extent that Mabry’s motion could be construed as seeking to vacate or modify his conviction, “a petition to vacate or modify a judgment of conviction is not an appropriate remedy in a criminal case,” Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, 218 (1) (686 SE2d 786) (2009), and any appeal from an order denying or dismissing such a motion must be dismissed, see id. at 218 (2); see also Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 (690 SE2d 150) (2010).

For these reasons, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

See Frazier, 302 Ga. App. at 348-349.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________ 08/24/2017 I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.