Atwater v. Tucker
Cases that cite this one
3 later published cases cite this decision.
- Tucker v. Atwater (Ga. 2018)
- Shantai Brooks v. Andrew Palmer (Ga. Ct. App. 2022)
- TUCKER v. ATWATER (Ga. 2018)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
*301Kelly H. Tucker (a middle school teacher), filed a complaint for damages pursuant to
"[B]ecause the trial court considered matters outside the pleadings, the motion [for judgment on the pleadings] was converted to one for summary judgment." Sims v. First Acceptance Ins. Co. of Ga., Inc.,
So construed, the evidence shows the following. During the 2014-2015 school year, Tucker was employed as a middle school teacher in the Tift County Public School *59System; the school system was managed by the Tift County Board of Education ("the Board"). On December 6, 2014, a Christmas parade was held in Tifton, Georgia, at which demonstrators displayed signs that read "Black Lives Matter," in what was "commonly known as a 'Ferguson protest.' " A local radio show host posted a question on Facebook regarding the appropriateness of the demonstration. Tucker posted a comment in response to the question, then engaged in a "posting dialogue" with another person. As part of that dialogue, Tucker posted the following public comment on Facebook, which comment precipitated the underlying disciplinary proceeding:
It's turned into a race matter. What about the thugs that beat the father in his vehicle because he didn't slow down. What about the thugs that shot the college baseball player *303because they were bored. The list can go on and on. If the dude hadn't have stolen [sic], he would be alive. I think the signs should read, TAKE THE HOOD OFF YOUR HEAD, AND PULL UP YOUR DANG PANTS, AND QUIT IMPREGNATING EVERYBODY. I'm tired of paying for these sorry *&^ thugs...I would much rather my hard earned money that the government takes go to people who need it, such as abusive [sic] adults and children, not to mention the animals they beat and fight too...That's all I'm saying...[.]
Tucker's comment (the "post") "went viral," and many people in the community saw, shared, forwarded, and discussed the post. On about December 8, 2014, several individuals contacted Atwater to express concern about Tucker's post, including a Board member, a high school student, and a county commissioner. The commissioner expressed her concern and her constituents' concern that "a teacher ... would post such a message." Later that month, several other individuals contacted Atwater and expressed their concerns about the post; some parents requested that their children be removed from Tucker's class; and several teachers and administrators at the school where Tucker taught lodged complaints with the school principal regarding the post.
In January 2015, Atwater issued a letter to Tucker notifying her that he was recommending to the Board that she be suspended for ten days and receive diversity training because of the post, and notifying her that a hearing would be held on the matter. Atwater wrote that Tucker had posted "an offensive message ... which went viral." Atwater wrote that "[t]hese stereotypes [in the post] ... are highly offensive to the African American community, and to members of our community as a whole"; that Atwater received complaints about the post from several of Tucker's colleagues, members of the community, former students, and parents; that her message "is very disturbing to [her] African American colleagues, students, and [her] students' parents and is disruptive to the educational environment at [the school]"; that Tucker's posting of the comment demonstrated "a lack of professional judgment" and "an inappropriate attitude toward" her students; that Tucker violated Board policies and Standard 10 of the Georgia Code of Ethics for Educators;
The Board held a hearing at which Tucker and various school administrators, teachers, and parents testified. See OCGA § 20-2-1160 (a) (regarding the authority of county boards of education to conduct hearings). The testimony included the following: witnesses interpreted the post as referring to and "stereotyping" or unfairly characterizing African-American *60males; a parent requested to have her child removed from Tucker's class; several people brought copies of the post to the assistant principal and sought to involve him in the matter; a teacher at the school complained to the principal and said that, in light of the post, it would be difficult for her to continue to work with Tucker; the principal stated that 30 percent of the students at the school were African-American, and opined that the post would cause problems with the student disciplinary processes (as parents would have grounds to argue that Tucker was disciplining some students based upon their race); Atwater opined that the post disrupted operations by deteriorating the community's trust in the school system; several witnesses testified that they were concerned that, based on the views expressed in the post, Tucker would treat students differently based upon race; when asked if the post had any effect on the school, the assistant principal replied, "[n]ot directly. ...But, indirectly, it has," referred to the student class change and added that the post had the "potential" to cause problems.
In its decision, the Board found that the post showed a "clear lack of judgment on the part of a public school teacher presently teaching African American students," that it created a "toxic atmosphere at the school," and that it "had the effect of undermining the trust" that students, their parents, and Tucker's colleagues had in her ability to effectively teach and mentor the students. The Board found "good and sufficient cause" to suspend Tucker for five days and to require her to participate in diversity training.
Tucker filed the underlying complaint against Atwater, in his individual capacity and his official capacity as school superintendent, and Rutland, in her individual capacity and her official capacity as *305Board chairperson, seeking redress under
1. Atwater and Rutland contend that they are entitled to official immunity because their actions did not violate any clearly established law. We agree.
"The doctrine of official immunity, also known as qualified immunity, offers public officers and employees limited protection from suit in their personal capacity." Cameron v. Lang,
The test for determining whether a defendant is protected from suit by the doctrine of qualified immunity is the objective reasonableness of the defendant's conduct as measured by reference to clearly established law[; in this regard,] a reasonably competent public official should know the established law governing his conduct.
*61Gardner v. Rogers,
*306For the law to be clearly established to the point that qualified immunity does not apply, the law must have earlier been developed in such a concrete and factually defined context to make it obvious to all reasonable government actors, in the defendant's place, that 'what he is doing' violates federal law.
Board of Commissioners of Effingham County,
Although the law is well-established that the [S]tate may not demote or discharge a public employee in retaliation for speech protected under the [F]irst [A]mendment, a public employee's right to freedom of speech is not absolute. In Pickering[v. Board of Education,391 U.S. 563 ,88 S.Ct. 1731 ,20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) ], the landmark case concerning a public employee's [F]irst [A]mendment rights, the Supreme Court held that a public employee's interests are limited by the [S]tate's need to preserve efficient governmental functions. The [S]tate has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the employee as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the [S]tate, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.
*307Department of Corrections v. Derry,
In applying Pickering,
[a] four-stage analysis has evolved. First, the court must determine if the employee's speech may be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern. Second, if the speech addresses a matter of public concern, the court must then conduct a balancing test in which it weighs the First Amendment interests of the employee against the interest of the [S]tate, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Third, if the employee's claim survives the balancing test, the fact-finder must determine whether the employee's speech played a substantial part in the government's decision to discharge the employee. Finally, if the fact-finder determines that the employee's speech played a substantial part in the employee's discharge, the [S]tate must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have discharged the employee even in the absence of the speech.
Derry,
Assuming that Tucker made her post as a citizen and the post was a comment on a matter of public concern, the courts must "balance ... the interests of [Tucker], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the [government] as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." Pickering,
*62Government employers are permitted to take action against employees who engage in speech that "may unreasonably disrupt the efficient conduct of government operation[s]." Tindal v. Montgomery County Commission,
*308In this case, Atwater and Rutland brought the disciplinary proceeding against Tucker for alleged violations of OCGA § 20-2-940 (a) (which permits the suspension of a teacher for specified reasons, including "good and sufficient cause") and Standard 10 (which sets forth standards for professional conduct for educators), asserting that her posting of the comment was disruptive to the school environment in which she taught and detailing the grounds for the disciplinary action. OCGA § 20-2-940 sets out the notice and procedural requirements for such disciplinary action, and there is no claim that the required procedures were not followed.
Here, there was evidence, recounted above, that Tucker's post interfered with the operation of the middle school where she taught. Although Tucker asserts that "there is no evidence that there was any actual disruption of the educational environment as the result of Appellee's posts," only "concern[s]" that the post could be disruptive, that assertion is belied by record evidence that the post did in fact affect the operations of the school.
As the Court acknowledged in Garcetti, "conducting these inquiries sometimes has proved difficult." Garcetti, supra."This is the necessary product of 'the enormous variety of fact situations in which critical statements by teachers and other public employees may be thought by their superiors ... to furnish grounds for [disciplinary action].' "
Atwater and Rutland did not violate any clearly established law of which a reasonable person would have known. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
pre-existing law [does not] dictate, that is, truly compel (not just suggest or allow or raise a question about), the conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government agent that [taking disciplinary action against Tucker for her post] violates [the First Amendment] in the circumstances,
the trial court erred in ruling that Atwater and Rutland were not entitled to official immunity. See *63Board of Commissioners of Effingham County, supra at 824 (2),
2. Atwater and Rutland were also entitled to judgment as a matter of law to the extent Tucker asserted claims against them in their official capacities.
A local government such as the county may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983. This rule also applies to local government officials sued in their official capacities.
Schroeder v. DeKalb County,
Because Atwater and Rutland were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the trial court erred by denying their motion. See Harper v. Patterson,
Judgment reversed.
Barnes, P. J., concurs. McMillian, J., concurs in judgment only.
Tucker also asserted claims against other defendants, but those claims are not relevant to this appeal.
Standard 10 provides:
An educator shall demonstrate conduct that follows generally recognized professional standards and preserves the dignity and integrity of the teaching profession. Unethical conduct includes but is not limited to any conduct that impairs and or diminishes the certificate holder's ability to function professionally in his or her employment position or behavior or conduct that is detrimental to the health, welfare, discipline, or morals of students.
The Code was in the Employee Handbook for the Tifton County Public School System; Tucker had received a copy.
OCGA § 20-2-940 (a) sets forth grounds for terminating or suspending teachers' employment contracts. Grounds enumerated include: (2) insubordination, (3) wilful neglect of duties, (4) immorality, and (8) any other good and sufficient cause.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ..., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....
A plaintiff in a § 1983 action must show (1) "that he has been deprived of a right secured by the constitution and laws of the United States, and [ (2) that] the defendant acted under color of state law." Poss v. Moreland,
Notably, the assertion in Tucker's brief that "both administrators who testified for the Appellants at the Board hearing testified that there was absolutely no interruption of school operations" materially misstates the administrators' testimony shown on the record pages she has cited.
We also note that Tucker's brief includes the following statement: "In fact, to this date, no student at Eighth Street Middle School has even voiced an objection to Appellee's posts; perhaps because they, too, are tired of dealing with thugs of all races who walk around with hoods over their heads, sagging pants and who commit random acts of violence." Tucker provides no citations to the record to support this statement. See Court of Appeals Rule 25 ; Leone v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC,
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.