Flanders v. Jackson
Cases that cite this one
5 later published cases cite this decision.
- Southwestern Emergency Physicians, P.C. v. Douglas L. Quinney (Ga. Ct. App. 2018)
- K. B. v. Cobb County School District (Ga. Ct. App. 2026)
- ROBERT JOSEPH SMITH v. PHILLIPE E. GADEGBEKU (Ga. Ct. App. 2025)
- Terry L. Belknap v. Michelle M. Belknap (Ga. Ct. App. 2019)
- Hammonds v. Gray Transp., Inc. (United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia 2019)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Jamie Flanders's son, James Raper, died in an automobile accident. As administratrix of her son's estate, Flanders sued Dequavus Jackson, alleging that his negligent operation of a vehicle resulted in Raper's death. Jackson later filed for bankruptcy, and after Flanders obtained an order allowing her lawsuit to proceed, Jackson moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that his bankruptcy discharge limited liability to his insurance policy's available coverage. The trial court granted Jackson's motion, and on appeal, Flanders contends that the trial court erred in ruling that Jackson's bankruptcy discharge precludes her from seeking an excess judgment and in granting partial summary judgment before she could depose Jackson. For the reasons set forth infra , we agree that Jackson's bankruptcy discharge *657does not preclude Flanders from seeking an excess judgment against him, and thus, we reverse.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Flanders (i.e., the nonmoving party),
At the time of the accident, Jackson and the vehicle he was driving were insured by his mother's automobile insurance policy with State Farm, which provided liability limits of $25,000 per person. And prior to filing her lawsuit, Flanders made a policy-limits demand to State Farm, which the insurer ultimately rejected. Then, on March 29, 2016, Flanders-as Raper's mother and the administratrix of his estate-filed a wrongful-death action against Jackson in the Superior Court of Cook County. Approximately two weeks later, Jackson filed an answer and discovery ensued.
On July 8, 2016, Jackson-who was 18 years old and living in his mother's home at the time of the accident-filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Georgia, listing Flanders's lawsuit as a dischargeable debt. As a result, Flanders's lawsuit was automatically stayed under
Thereafter, on September 7, 2016, the bankruptcy court entered a consent order modifying the automatic stay and permitting Flanders's wrongful-death action to proceed. The order, in part, specifically provided:
Neither this Order nor any act of the Movant taken pursuant to such order, shall prejudice, impair or affect in any way any rights relating to any bad faith claim or judgment against the Debtor's insurer(s) arising in connection with the claim that is the subject of the Superior Court Action.
Then, on October 27, 2016, the bankruptcy court entered an order of discharge as to Jackson's bankruptcy, which provided that most of his debts were discharged and, thus, that creditors could not collect such debts. But the order also noted that the discharge would not "stop creditors from collecting from anyone else who is also liable on the debt, such as an insurance company or a person who cosigned or guaranteed the loan."
On December 12, 2016, Jackson filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that his bankruptcy discharge limited his personal liability to the State Farm insurance policy's available coverage of $25,000. Flanders filed a response, arguing that the trial court should defer ruling on Jackson's motion until after he was deposed. In addition, Flanders argued that Jackson's bankruptcy discharge did not preclude her from seeking *658a judgment in excess of the insurance policy limits as a precursor to establishing State Farm's liability for a potential bad-faith-failure-to-settle claim.
Shortly thereafter, Jackson moved for a protective order to prevent Flanders from deposing him, in light of the criminal proceedings pending against him as a result of the accident. Flanders filed an objection, but without ruling on Jackson's motion for a protective order, the trial court granted Jackson's motion for partial summary judgment, determining that, as a result of Jackson's bankruptcy discharge (which prohibited any act to collect a judgment against the property of Jackson), "any judgment rendered in this case shall be limited to $25,000.00." This appeal follows.
1. Flanders contends that the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment, arguing that Jackson's bankruptcy discharge did not preclude her from seeking a judgment in excess of the insurance policy limits. We agree.
In order to adequately address Flanders's contention on appeal, a brief discussion is warranted regarding the type of bad-faith claim the trial court's partial summary judgment grant implicitly precludes. As a general rule, a plaintiff does not have standing to "bring a direct action against a defendant's insurance company unless the plaintiff has obtained a judgment against the defendant that remains unsatisfied."
Here, in his motion for partial summary judgment, Jackson argued-and the trial court agreed-that his bankruptcy discharge precludes Flanders from seeking a judgment in excess of the $25,000 State Farm policy limits and, therefore, obviates any potential bad-faith-refusal-to-settle claim. But this argument appears to be based on a rather broad and ultimately incorrect application of the relevant bankruptcy statute,
Tasked with interpreting statutory language, we necessarily begin our analysis with "familiar and binding canons of construction."
Here, in relevant part,
(a) A discharge in a case under this title-
(1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged under section 727, 944, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of this title, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived;
(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived....
But under
Here, in Jackson's bankruptcy discharge, the bankruptcy court ruled that creditors could not collect a discharged debt from Jackson personally . But, in line with the foregoing statutory and case authority, the bankruptcy court also held that its order would not "prejudice, impair or affect in any way any rights relating to any bad faith claim or judgment against the Debtor's insurer(s) arising in connection with the claim that is the subject of the Superior Court Action." Nevertheless, Jackson argues that because any debt for which a jury might find him personally liable to Flanders has been discharged, Flanders cannot seek an excess judgment but, rather, is limited to seeking the policy limit of $25,000. This contention is a nonstarter.
Jackson's argument conflates Flanders's ability to seek an excess judgment by prevailing in her tort claim with her ability to collect such a judgment from him personally. But Flanders has not asserted that she can collect an excess judgment, or any judgment for that matter, from Jackson personally. And we are not aware of any case authority-and Jackson has cited none-holding that her inability to ultimately collect such a judgment *660from Jackson personally precludes her from seeking it. In fact, the authority outlined supra counsels otherwise.
2. Flanders also contends that the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment before she could depose Jackson. But given our holding in Division 1 supra , reversing the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment, and the fact that the trial court did not rule on Jackson's motion for a protective order prior to granting partial summary judgment, we need not address this issue.
For all these reasons, we reverse the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Jackson and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and case remanded.
Ray and Self, JJ., concur.
See, e.g. , Swanson v. Tackling ,
See
Atl. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Lewis ,
Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brightman ,
See Brightman ,
Holcomb v. Long ,
Deal v. Coleman ,
See Holcomb ,
See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc. ,
Deal ,
In the Interest of L.T. , 325 Ga. App. at 592,
Holcomb ,
In re Hayden ,
In re Hayden ,
In re Hayden ,
See supra note 15.
Whritenour v. Thompson ,
Whritenour ,
See supra note 15.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.