OPINION AND ORDER ON DEBTOR’S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Everette L. Davis (“Debtor” or “Plaintiff’) filed her Chapter 13 petition and proposed Plan of Reorganization on January 14, 2015. Dckt. Nos. 1, 4.1 In the petition, Debtor listed among her assets her residence located at 2220 Mason Drive, Savannah, Georgia (the “Property”). Dckt. No. 1. On April 7, 2015, Debtor initiated this Adversary Proceeding by filing a Complaint to Determine Discharge-ability, seeking to cancel the second mortgage lien on the Property. A.P. Dckt. No. 1. Springleaf Financial Services, Inc. (“Springleaf’ or “Defendant”) failed to answer Debtor’s complaint. As a result, the Clerk entered default against Defendant as authorized by Bankruptcy Rule 7055 on June 3, 2015. A.P. Dckt. No. 6. Debtor filed this Motion for Default Judgment on June 10, 2015. A.P. Dckt. No. 8.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiffs affidavit states that Defendant was properly served with the Summons and Complaint. A.P. Dckt. No. 5. After such service, Defendant failed to file any responsive pleadings. A defaulted defendant is deemed to have admitted the plaintiffs well-pleaded facts. See Cotton v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005). I find that the facts from Debtor’s complaint are well-plead, and therefore they are deemed admitted by Defendant and quoted herein verbatim.

1. The Plaintiff filed Chapter 13 on January 14, 2015, and is subject to the jurisdiction of the Court.

3. The Plaintiff owns real property at 2220 Mason Drive, Savannah, GA 31404.

4. At the time of filing, the fair market value of the real property was approximately $62,000.00.

5. At the time of filing, the balance due to the first mortgage holder was approximately $73,085.61.

6. The Defendant has a claim against the Plaintiff for approximately $28,000.00, secured by a second mortgage against the real property described above.

7. There is no equity in the real property to secure the debt owed to the Defendant.

*4829. The Plaintiffs Chapter 13 plan, which proposed to treat the Defendant as a wholly unsecured creditor, has been confirmed.

A.P. Dckt. No. 1.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), often referred to as the anti-modification clause, states that a plan may “modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence.... ”

The Supreme Court in its seminal case interpreting section 1322(b)(2), read the exception broadly, focusing on the fact that what is prohibited is a modification of the lender’s “rights,” not merely the status of its claim, Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 328, 113 S.Ct. 2106, 124 L.Ed.2d 228 (1993). There, the debtors attempted to “strip down” the lender’s secured claim in their plan to the fair market value of the residence and treat the remaining portion of the bank’s claim as unsecured pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).2 Id. at 326, 113 S.Ct. 2106; The Court held that the debtors “were correct in looking to § 506(a) for a judicial valuation of the collateral to determine the status of the bank’s secured claim,” but even accepting the debtors’ valuation, “the bank is still the ‘holder’ of a ‘secured claim,’ ” because the debtors’ home retained some value as collateral. Id. at 328-29, 113 S.Ct. 2106. Therefore, the bank’s “rights” as the holder of a secured claim remained protected by § 1322(b)(2). Id. at 329, 113 S.Ct. 2106. These “rights” the Court held, are determined by the relevant mortgage instruments which are enforced under state law and include “the right to retain the lien until the debt is paid off.” Id.

The Eleventh Circuit interpreted Nobel-man as protecting only a lender’s secured claim in the debtor’s residence if it retains some value as collateral and is not a wholly unsecured claim. Tanner v. FirstPlus Financial. Inc. (In re Tanner), 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000).3 In reaching its conclusion, the court noted “to ... extend the antimodification clause to even wholly unsecured claims would vitiate the Nobel-man Court’s pronouncement that ‘[debtors] were correct in looking to § 506(a) for a judicial valuation of the collateral to determine the status of the bank’s secured claim.’ ” Id. at 1360 (citation omitted)(alteration in the original).

Here, Debtor’s property is valued at $62,000.00 with a balance due to the first mortgage holder of $73,085.61. Therefore, Springleaf s claim is wholly unsecured and the lien may be “stripped off’ under Eleventh Circuit’s (and all the circuits that have ruled on this issue) interpretation of § 1322(b)(2) and the Nobelman decision.4 Tanner, 217 F.3d at 1360.

*483 ORDER

For these reasons, it is ORDERED that: Plaintiffs Motion for Default Judgment as to Defendant is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that the mortgage lien on the Property held by Defendant, which is recorded in Deed Book 318 B, Page 001 in the Superior Court of Chatham County, Georgia, is deemed void with respect to the interest of the Debtor in the Property and shall be extinguished automatically, without further court order, upon entry of the Chapter 13 discharge in this case. Additionally, Plaintiff may record this judgment in the appropriate real estate records indexing system upon the entry of the discharge in this case.

In the event that this case is dismissed, the lien of Springleaf shall not be affected by this Order. See 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(1)(C). In the event that this case is converted to a Chapter 7 case, the rights of Springleaf with regard to its lien shall be governed by the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code at that time.