By the Court.

delivering the opinion.

[1.] The complainant insists on his right to discovery, for the reason that the defendant, by his answer, may admit the parol agreement. But what of that, if he claims the benefit of the Statute ? It would be utterly nugatory; for whatever doubts may have once existed, it is now well settled, that if the defendant should, by *459 his answer, admit the parol agreement, and should insist on the benefit of the Statute, he will be fully entitled to it, notwithstanding such admission. Story’s Eg. Pl. §763.

[2.] It is contended, that as judgment has been obtained in a suit at law, against McKenzie, on the notes, in which the matter alleged in this bill, may have been set up by way of defence, that Equity has no jurisdiction. 3 Merivale’s Rep. 225, 226. Chitty on Contracts, 113. Sugden on Vendors, 129.

But the true rule, we understand to be this — that it is not enough that there is a remedy at Law to make such a plea a good bar to a proceeding in Chancery — it must be shown that it was as practical and as efficient to the ends of justice, and its prompt administration, as the remedy in Equity. Besides, frauds and trusts are peculiarly within the jurisdiction of the Chancery Courts. 1 Mad. Ch. 262. 3 Cranch, 280. 9 Ves. 21. 1 Jacob & Walker, 19. 5 John. Ch. Rep. 174. 2 Conn. 129. 2 John. Ch. Rep. 596. 6 Munf. 283. 4 Penn. Rep. 131. 3 Peters’ Rep. 210.

[3.] On the main question, as to whether McKenzie is entitled to have the deed which ho made to Harman in his lifetime, delivered up to be cancelled, the view we take of it is this — the note of Dykes, the principal debtor, was to have been substituted for the three notes of Dykes, McKenzie and Greer, and the deed to the land given as collateral security. The conveyance was executed, but Harman retained the original notes, in order to ascertain, by calculation, for what amount the new note should be taken, and died before the arrangement with Dykes was consummated, Hollingshead, his administrator, finding the old notes amongst the papers of his intestate, has sued for and collected the money due thereon. Here, then, the deed, which was originally valid, has, by subsequent events, to wit: the payment of the indebtedness, become fi-uctus officio. It is a nullity to all intents and purposes, and a Court of Chancery will interpose in the administration of a protective or preventive justice, and decree a delivery and cancellation of the instrument. The case of Inock vs. Steyvesant, (2 Paige’s Rep. 84,) was very similar to this. There, absolute deeds were made, but for the purpose of effecting certain objects not specified on their face. The objects contemplated by the parties were prevented by an Act of the Legislature; and a bill was filed for a re-conveyance, as in the present instance, which was decreed with costs'; and Chancellor Walworth lays down this *460 broad principle, wbicb he asserts is constantly acted upon, subject to such limitations and restrictions as are necessary to protect the rights of bona fide purchasers and others, who have superior equities, namely: that where, from any defect of the Common Law — want of foresight of the parties, or other mistake or accident, there would be a failure of justice — it is the duty of a Court of Equity to interfere and supply the defect, or furnish the remedy.

Judgment affirmed.