concurred.

On the ground that the judgment moved against being of such a character as the party might have corrected by bill of - exceptions and he having failed to do so, he is barred after the lapse of thirty days from the adjournment of the court giving the judgment.

It is sufficient to say that this case comes within the principle of the rule adopted in the case of Kelly vs. Brooks, 50 *358Georgia, 582, and as the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitation when the motion was made to reinstate, there was no error in the judgment of the court in refusing the motion. For the reasons which control my opinion on this question, I refer to what I said in the cases of Tison vs. McAfee, 50 Georgia, 279, and Prescott vs. Bennett et al., Ibid., 266. As to the question, when was the mortgage in this case barred by the statute of limitations, seethe case of John George vs. James Gardner, 49 Georgia, 441.

Judgment affirmed.

dissenting.

It appears from the record that the plaintiff’s case was dismissed from the docket of the court in which the same was pending at the May term, 1871, because no affidavit of the payment of the taxes had been filed. At the November term, 1873, the plaintiff made a motion to reinstate the case on the docket, which motion was refused. As the court had no legal power or authority to dismiss the plaintiff’s case out of court for that cause, the plaintiff should have been allowed to have reinstated the same on the docket where it rightfully belonged; but if the judgment of dismissal stood in his way, then the motion to set aside that judgment was made in time, as held by a majority of this court, in Prescott vs. Bennett, 50 Georgia, 266. The case that was dismissed for non-payment of taxes -was a petition to foreclose a mortgage on real estate. "When was the mortgage barred by the statute of limitations?