Rawson v. Cherry
Rawson v. Cherry
Opinion of the Court
There was nothing in the evidence to justify the application of the scaling ordinance of 1865 by the jury but the fact that the date of the note was after June, 1861. It is plain that it would not be competent for the convention to have adopted such an ordinance except upon the known fact that, as a general rule, contracts between those dates were made in view of Confederate money as the medium of payment, and as a measure of the articles bought or sold or contracted about. It was evident that, under such circumstances, the constitutional measure of value was inequitable, and to pass upon the meaning of contracts in the sole light of it would be to pervert their meaning; for the truth was, that whatever the law, the theory of the thing might be, the constitution of the United States was not practically of force. But, to justify the application of the act, it must in some way appear that the contract comes, not within the letter of the ordinance, (for by the letter alone the ordinance would be void,) but within the reason that jus
Judgment reversed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.