Urquhart v. Oliver
Cases that cite this one
5 later published cases cite this decision.
- Ellis v. Darden (Ga. 1890)
- Ferrell v. Gill (Ga. 1908)
- Beatie v. Calhoun (Ga. 1885)
- Fleming v. Fountain (Ga. 1884)
- Freeman v. Holmes (Ga. 1879)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
A married woman made a will in September 1869, and died in 1873. Her husband gave no consent to the will; indeed, did not know of it till after her death. Upon its being propounded for probate, he entered his caveat on thatground, and supported it by proof. It appeared in evidence that the testatrix had been his wife for forty years, and had lived with him happily until her death. She died without children, leaving him her only heir-at-law. Her will specified no par
The question is whether her will was valid, the same having been made without the husband's consent; and its invalidity is put, by his counsel, upon the provisions of the Code, sections 2405 and 2410. Section 2405 is this: “Every person is entitled to make a will unless laboring under some disability of the law. This disability arises either from a want of capacity or a want of perfect liberty of action.” Section 2410 reads thus: “Married women are incapable of making wills for want of perfect liberty of action, being presumed to be under the control of their husbands. A married woman may make a will in the following cases: 1st. Where express power to will her separate estate is reserved or granted to her in the instrument creating the same, or by marriage contract; 2d. When, having a separate estate absolutely, or an estate in expectancy, her husband consents to her disposing of' the same by will; 3d. Where her will is in execution of a power vested in her; 4th. Whenever, by reason of the abandonment of her husband, or a divorce from bed and board, or for other cause, the law declares her to have the right of a feme sole as to her own earnings.” In 36 Georgia Reports; 500, there was a construction of this last section in reference to the husband's consent. It was there said the consent was necessary only when the estate disposed of was one in expectancy. The decision of that question was not required for the case, which rested altogether on the previous law, the testatrix having died in 1851, long before the Code was adopted.
In dealing with the present case we proceed quite independently of any prior decision of this court upon the direct
A wholly new rule of property is thus introduced. With reference to all they own, women remain, after marriage, as effectually separated from men as they were before marriage. The husband has as little interest in, or control over, his wife’s property as she has in or over his, indeed less, for she is entitled to be supported out of his, and when necessary is recognized by the law as his agent to charge it with her support; whereas, his power and control over her property, rests, in all cases, upon her voluntary consent. She is thus his full equal before the law in the ownership and control of property.
If, under the new order of things, the restrictive terms of the Code, with reference to the will of a married woman, still apply, why would not the restrictive terms in reference to contracts apply also? Section 2730 of the Code declares that “ the contracts of a married woman are generally void.” Is this
Thus far I have spoken for the court, and what I have said I understand to express the clear and decided conviction of my brethren; but I have, myself, very grave doubts as to the legal accuracy of the conclusion at which they have arrived. I am not certain enough that I am right, and they wrong, to warrant mein dissenting from the judgment of the court; but my doubts are too strong for me to feel justified in concealing them, or in suppressing the reasons upon which they are founded. By the ancient common law, and as it was construed down to the time of Blackstone, I think a married woman could not make a testament disposing of her own property without the consent of her husband, unless she did il in the execution of a power. Blackstone says: "In reality the woman makes no will at all, but only something like a will.” This he says in consequence of the rule that she had to act, in making a testament, altogether upon his license. Married women were expressly excepted out of the statute of wills: 34 and 35 Hen. vnr. In 1789, was decided the case of Eettiplace vs. Gorges, 1 Vesey junior, 46, and in that it was held, that where personal property is given to a feme covert, to her sole and separate use, she may dispose of it by will without the assent of her husband. This seems to have gained recognition as law: See 1st Williams on Executors, 46, 47; 2d Story’s Equity, sec. 1388 to 1893. Conceding it to have been law in Georgia prior to the Code, and conceding, also, that our general policy of putting realty and personalty upon the same footing would make it apply to both alike, yet it seems to me that the codifiers restored the strict common law rule, and for some reason which I cannot conjecture, subjected married women, in the matter of testamentary power, to a qualified control by their husbands. The Code is very express; and I wholly reject the softening of it which was attempted in 36 Georgia Reports, 500. My conviction is clear that a true reading would make the husband’s consent as necessary for disposing of an
Judgment affirmed.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.